

★ THE ★
PRESIDENT'S
MAN

The Memoirs of Nixon's Trusted Aide

DWIGHT CHAPIN

The logo for William Morrow, featuring a stylized, cursive script of the letters 'wm'.

WILLIAM MORROW

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
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WHITE HOUSE STAFF CHART


Chart Limited to the Principal Individuals
or Groups Mentioned in *The President's Man*

Chart Depicts Relationships
and Not Rank

*Denotes Brotherhood Member



WHITE HOUSE WEST WING FIRST FLOOR PLAN



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EXHIBIT 1: FBI REPORT JULY 5, 1974

To "The Director" of the FBI Cover Memorandum. Includes Dean as "Master Manipulator."

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 7/5/74

FROM : O. T. JACOBSON

SUBJECT: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION
OPE ANALYSIS

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Serv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

James Walter McLeod

Pursuant to the Director's instructions on 5/14/74 for the Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE) to conduct a complete analysis of the FBI's conduct of the Watergate and related investigations the enclosed study has been prepared. The General Investigative Division participated in major portions of this study.

In view of the immense scope of the Watergate investigations, it was necessary for OPE to narrow the focus of this analysis to those areas of the investigations which have caused critical commentary relating to the Bureau's performance. Therefore, the OPE staff undertook a review of selected materials which provided a comprehensive cross section of commentary regarding these investigations. The materials reviewed included "White House Transcripts", proceedings of the Senate Watergate Committee; confirmation testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the nomination of L. Patrick Gray III to be FBI Director, Earl J. Silbert to be U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, and William D. Ruckelshaus to be Deputy Attorney General. Numerous books and articles relating to the Watergate matters were also reviewed. In addition, inspection reports, summary memoranda, and selected file materials were reviewed and analyzed as to content.

Enclosure *attached by Director 7-10-74* REC-84
1 - Mr. Callahan (Encl.)
1 - Mr. Adams (Encl.)
1 - Mr. Gebhardt (Encl.)
1 - Mr. Jacobson
1 - Mr. Sheets
1 - Mr. Revell

139-4089

OBR/lmt
(7)

13 JUL 23 1974

CONTINUED - OVER

67 JUL 24 1974

"ENCLOSURE IN BULLEY ROOM"
1P 873 JEH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/11/80 BY SP4 JEM/087

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**Memorandum to The Director
RE: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION -
OPE ANALYSIS**

that the actions of former Attorney Generals Mitchell and Kleindienst served to thwart and/or impede the Bureau's investigative effort. The actions of John W. Dean at the White House and Jeb S. Magruder at the Committee to Re-Elect the President were purposefully designed to mislead and thwart the Bureau's legitimate line of inquiry. At every stage of the investigation there were contrived covers placed in order to mislead the investigators.

In spite of the most serious impediments posed in this investigation, the professional approach used by the Bureau and the perseverance of our investigative personnel were the ultimate key to the solution of not only the Watergate break-in but the cover up itself.

Those most closely associated with the Bureau's efforts including Acting U. S. Attorney Earl Silbert, Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, former Acting Director Ruckelshaus and the Special Prosecutor's Office have on several occasions praised the Bureau's investigative performance in these cases. The direction given to Bureau investigations by the U. S. Attorney's Office and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has been the subject of much criticism due to a clear intent to initially steer away from political issues. Acting U. S. Attorney Silbert and Assistant Attorney General Petersen have borne the brunt of most of this criticism. The FBI followed well established Departmental policies in these areas and did vigorously pursue cases when requested to do so by the Department and/or the Special Prosecutor. All information developed indicating any possible violations of Federal law was properly referred to the Department.

In OPE's view the Bureau has a legitimate and compelling defense in all but three of the areas of criticism. In these three areas the facts must speak for themselves as no adequate explanation can be rendered due to the circumstances involved.

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The Inspection Division completed its analysis of the activities of former Acting Director Gray on June 26, 1973. Ten specific allegations were addressed in the analysis set forth in a memorandum which is twelve pages in length. The most significant aspect of the Inspection staff's analysis appears to be the following observations:

"In considering possible impediments to obtaining the full facts of the Watergate case the furnishing of numerous FBI reports and other communications by Gray to Dean must be considered. . . It is true there is no evidence in the files indicating this action by Gray impeded our investigation from an investigator's standpoint. Access by Dean to our investigation would logically indicate to him what information had been developed and which would enable him to work out strategy to cover up the case. Likewise, the destruction by Gray of documents apparently furnished him from Hunt's safe would have impeded the investigation although this cannot be stated positively since we do not know what specific material he destroyed, if any."⁷

On April 10, 1974, the Inspection Division's analysis of Mr. Gray's activities relating to the Watergate investigation were furnished to the Special Prosecutor's Office along with 32 other Bureau

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IV. AREAS OF CRITICISM AND COMMENTS

1. Allowing John Dean to sit in on interviews of White House personnel; submitting copies and/or reports of the FBI investigative results to Dean, and clearing proposed investigative activity through Dean.⁹

COMMENTS: On June 19, 1972, WFO by teletype requested authority to interview Charles W. Colson since information had been developed that Hunt had worked for Colson at the White House. On June 22, 1972, Mr. Gray telephonically authorized then Assistant Director Bates to have WFO contact John Dean to set up interview with Colson. Dean subsequently indicated he would sit in on interviews of White House personnel and all requests for investigation at the White House had to be cleared through him.

Criticism of FBI interviews in the presence of Dean and clearing proposed investigative activities through him is justified. However, there appeared no alternative to WFO and to the Accounting and Fraud Section to following this procedure since the decision concerning this apparently had been made between Mr. Gray and Dean, and neither Bureau supervisors nor field agents were in a position to overrule decisions of the Acting Director.

With respect to the submitting of copies of FBI reports to Dean, this is probably the most serious blunder from an investigative

Page 10 of the report.

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standpoint made by Mr. Gray. The facts concerning this development became known outside Mr. Gray's staff for the first time on February 5, 1973. This is long after the substantive investigation into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters (DNCH) break-in was completed and, in fact, was after the trial of those originally implicated was completed. While Dean's role as the master manipulator of the cover up was unknown and, in fact, the cover up itself was unknown during the investigation, obviously the furnishing to Dean by Mr. Gray of our reports allowed Dean the total opportunity to plan a course of action to thwart the FBI's investigation and grand jury inquiry. There was no way that FBI personnel could have avoided this situation since it was unknown that Mr. Gray was furnishing the reports to Dean.

The principal lesson to be learned from this is that rarely should we conduct interviews in the presence of an attorney and never should we allow the same attorney to sit in on all interviews relative to a certain situation. Further, FBI reports should be disseminated only to the prosecutor and certainly never to the White House.

EXHIBIT 2: "GUNGA DEAN"

—June 18, 1973, William Safire Poem in the *New York Times*
(From *The New York Times*. ©1973 The New York Times
Company. All rights reserved. Used under license.)

WASHINGTON.

You may talk o' Hunt and Liddy
When you're feelin' gay and giddy
And you think you have th' White House in your sights,
But when your side is achin'
To prove Nixon said "Go break in"
You need an aide who sat there at the heights.
Now in D.C.'s sunny clime
Where I used to spend my time
A-servin' of the public, sight unseen,
Of all the crewcut crew
The straightest lace I knew
Was the man in charge of ethics, Gunga Dean.
 He was "Dean! Dean! Dean!"
 "You smoothie of a lawyer, keep us clean!"
 "With your ardor never dampened
 "We'll see rectitude is rampant
 "For no scandal can deflect us, Gunga Dean."
Nixon entered the campaign
And considered it insane
To concern himself with breakin' any rules,
For a-watchin' the committee
And its forty-million kitty
Was his counselor from all the finest schools.
But while leading lambs to slaughter
Came the shockin' gate o' water
And all the district fuzz began to fly.
To give him true reports.
Of any White House torts
Nixon wrongly chose an implicated guy.

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It was "Dean! Dean! Dean!"
"I want the deepest probe you've ever seen!"
"Don't blow anybody's cover
"But try and soon discover
"If CREEP did anything illegal, Gunga Dean."
For six long months Dean battled
(Nobody caught had tattled)
And kept sendin' word he had the problem solved.

ESSAY

When the Oval Office queried
Dean would smile, and with eyes bleared,
Say: "No one in the White House was involved."
Then McCord untied his knot
And the story went to pot
And the hunter was the hunted sudden-ly;
Dean ran out hell-for-leather,
Said: "We were in it altogether,
"—And nobody makes a scapegoat out of me."
Then it was "Dean! Dean! Dean!"
"For your testimony we are very keen!"
"Point the finger, show who's sleazy,
"And we'll see the judge goes easy.
"Here's your chance to cop a plea, Gunga Dean."
"Thanks, but I'll not need ya.
"I've got contacts in the media
"Who'll print my leaks until the price has risen.
"I'll use them for my ends,
"According to Dean's friends,'
"For the likes of me does not belong in prison."
He would sing out any tune
To hear Sirica say "immune"
("No less than forty times I've made the scene!")
Justice balked, but Senate crumbled,
To Ervin's saving arms he tumbled,

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And now they cannot jail you, Gunga Dean.
So it's Dean! Dean! Dean!
Smear your leader, save your skin and vent your spleen!
Though the Fifth Amendment aids you,
By the TV that parades you—
You will never drag down Nixon, Gunga Dean.
Yes, it's Dean! Dean! Dean!
Star of everybody's television screen.
You will claim that you obeyed,
But the truth is you betrayed
A far better man than you are, Gunga Dean!

EXHIBIT 3: OBITUARY OF ALICE MAYHEW—February 4, 2020, *New York Times*

(From The New York Times. ©2020 The New York Times Company. All rights reserved. Used under license.)

Alice Mayhew, Who Edited a Who's Who of Writers, Dies at 87

At Simon & Schuster, best sellers were her stock in trade. She popularized the nonfiction political page turner, starting with “All the President’s Men.”

By Anita Gates

Published Feb. 4, 2020 Updated Feb. 5, 2020

Alice Mayhew, a widely admired editor who shepherded into print best sellers by a veritable who's who of writers—along the way popularizing the Washington political narrative, beginning with “All the President’s Men” in 1974—died on Tuesday at her home in Manhattan. She was 87.

The death was confirmed by Simon & Schuster, where she had been a vice president and editorial director.

“All the President’s Men,” the Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s account of how they uncovered the truth

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about the Watergate burglary and the subsequent White House effort to cover it up, became an immediate best seller and had a decided impact on American history. Published on June 15, 1974 (no advance copies had been provided, even for reviewers), it accelerated a growing public disapproval of President Richard M. Nixon's actions and helped fuel a congressional drive toward impeachment that led to Nixon's resignation 55 days later.

Ms. Mayhew also worked with notable public figures, including President Jimmy Carter ("A Full Life: Reflections at Ninety," 2015) and the Supreme Court justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("My Own Words," 2017).

The countless best sellers that Ms. Mayhew edited include John Dean's "Blind Ambition: The White House Years" (1976); Taylor Branch's "Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years" (1998); Walter Isaacson's books, including "Steve Jobs" (2011) and "Leonardo da Vinci" (2017); David Brooks's "On Paradise Drive: How We Live Now (and Always Have) in the Future Tense" (2004), an examination of contemporary American society; Diane McWhorter's Pulitzer Prize-winning civil rights history, "Carry Me Home" (2001); and the first volumes of Sidney Blumenthal's political biography of Abraham Lincoln, beginning with "A Self-Made Man" (2016).

In 2014, when Simon & Schuster celebrated its 90th anniversary by having staff members vote for their 90 favorite titles over those years, almost one-third of the books (29) had been edited by Ms. Mayhew.

Mr. Woodward's "Fear: Trump in the White House" (2018) was, as he noted in the acknowledgments, his 19th book with her.

Ms. Mayhew's books occasionally dealt with the lighter side of political or popular culture. She edited Kitty Kelley's gossipy biography "Nancy Reagan" (1991) and two memoirs by the fashion designer Diane von Furstenberg.

Though Ms. Mayhew was highly regarded, her own life was something of a closed book, so rigorously did she defend her privacy. When The New York Times ran an article about her in 2004 with the headline "Muse of the Beltway Book," she declined to be interviewed. The article relied on the observations of those who worked with her, some of whom said her greatest talents lay in conceptualization and structure.

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“She is particularly adept at unearthing submerged themes,” the Times article concluded, “developing swift transitions, unsentimentally pruning away digressions, even when—especially when—they are hundreds of pages long. Mayhew’s faith in chronological organization is said to be nearly religious.”

Alice E. Mayhew was born on June 14, 1932, in Brooklyn, the daughter of Alice and Leonard S. Mayhew. Alice grew up in the Bronx and had an older brother, Leonard F. Mayhew, who was her neighbor in Sag Harbor, N.Y., on Long Island, where she also had a home. He died in 2012.

Simon & Schuster said she left no immediate survivors.

Ms. Mayhew joined Simon & Schuster in 1971. One of her early successes there was “Our Bodies, Our Selves” (1973), the feminist classic assembled by the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective. What began as a 193-page course booklet on stapled newsprint sold, in the Simon & Schuster version, at least 4.5 million copies worldwide.

Just a sampling of her other authors, many of them historians and journalists, would include, in no particular order, Betty Friedan, Frances Fitzgerald, Michael Beschloss, Steven Brill, E. J. Dionne, J. Anthony Lukas, Kati Marton, Richard Reeves, Evan Thomas, David Gergen, Jill Abramson, David Herbert Donald, Robert Gates, Fred Kaplan, Sylvia Nasar, William Shawcross, James B. Stewart, Amy Wilentz, Joe Conason, Mark Whitaker, Harold Holzer, Connie Bruck, Jonathan Alter, Jennet Conant, Richard Engel, David Maraniss and Sally Bedell Smith.

Ms. Mayhew’s reputation was sterling, but her career was not untouched by scandal. In 2002, the historians Stephen E. Ambrose and Doris Kearns Goodwin, both Mayhew authors, were accused of plagiarism. Ms. Goodwin acknowledged that in 1987 Simon & Schuster settled with an author over accusations of plagiarism in a book she had written about the Kennedy family. Mr. Ambrose was found to have lifted, without using quotation marks, passages from another book, though he had footnoted them.

The twist with the Ambrose episode, as the gossip site Gawker reported, was that the book Mr. Ambrose had mined, Robert Sam Anson’s “Exile: The Unquiet Oblivion of Richard M. Nixon,” had also been edited by Ms. Mayhew.

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In 2008, Priscilla Painton became Simon & Schuster's executive editor, taking over many of Ms. Mayhew's duties. But Ms. Mayhew continued to acquire and edit titles.

While Ms. Mayhew firmly avoided talking about herself, she was considerably more straightforward when discussing others.

In an interview with Len Colodny, co-author of "Silent Coup: The Removal of a President," about Mr. Dean's claim that his editors had told him to include false information in "Blind Ambition" (reissued in 2009), Ms. Mayhew said: "That's a lie. L-I-E. That is spelled L-I-E."

EXHIBITS 4A TO 4D: THE MARCH 13, 1973, TO MARCH 21, 1973, TAPE SEGMENTS

These tape exhibits contain segments from the March 13, 1973, to the March 21, 1973, Oval Office tapes. *The segments selected are those only relevant to my story.* These segments are a minuscule part of the entire tape collection. Those interested in a deeper understanding or who want to listen to more detail are encouraged to visit the tape website Nixontapes.org or find other sources. For clarity, it will be helpful if you read the transcript while listening to a specific tape. Luke Nichter's transcription books are an excellent source for accurate transcripts. (See Recommended Sources on President Nixon.)

The March 13 to March 17 tapes were not made available to the public until 1995, as the result of a private lawsuit.

All use of these transcripts of tape excerpts is made possible by permission granted by Luke A. Nichter. All segments have been verified for accuracy.

**EXHIBIT 4A: FROM THE MARCH 13, 1973, OVAL OFFICE
MEETING—Richard Nixon and John Dean**

To listen to this segment as you read the transcript, go to Nixon Tapes.org, then to “audio & transcripts,” then to “John W Dean III,” then to 3/13/73—OVAL 878-014b.

Author’s Note: John Dean had been telling the president for nine months—since the June 17, 1972, break-in—that no one in the White House knew in advance about the Watergate operation. Dean finally tells the president here that actually Gordon Strachan, who was on the White House staff, knew in advance. And, of course, I believe Dean himself knew in advance, though he doesn’t confess that.

At 00:22:

NIXON: They’re really—let’s face it, after—I think they are really after Haldeman.

DEAN: Haldeman and Mitchell.

NIXON: Mitchell—I mean, Colson is not a big enough name for them. He really isn’t. You know, he is a thorn in their side, but Colson’s name bothers them none. So they get Colson. They’re after Haldeman and after Mitchell. Don’t you think so?

DEAN: That’s right. Or they’d take Ehrlichman if they could drag him in but they’ve been unable to drag him in in any way.

NIXON: Ultimately, Haldeman’s problem is Chapin, isn’t it?

DEAN: Bob’s problem is circumstantial.

NIXON: What I meant is, looking at the circumstantial, I don’t know that anything—Bob had nothing—didn’t know any of those people, like the Hunts and all that bunch. Colson did. But Bob did know Chapin.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: Now, what—now however the hell much Chapin knew I’ll be goddamned. I don’t know.

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DEAN: Well, Chapin didn't know anything about the Watergate, and—

NIXON: You don't think so?

DEAN: No. Absolutely not.

NIXON: Did Strachan?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: He knew?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: About the Watergate?

DEAN: Yes.

NIXON: Well, then, Bob knew. He probably told Bob then. He may not have. He may not have.

DEAN: He was judicious in what he relayed, and—but Strachan is as tough as nails. I—

NIXON: What'll he say? Just go in and say he didn't know?

DEAN: He'll go in and stonewall it and say, "I don't know anything about what you are talking about." He has already done it twice, as you know, in interviews.

Author's Note: As the conversation continues, Dean tells the president, "They would have a hell of a time proving that Strachan had knowledge of it, though." John Dean had no idea that there was a recording device in the Oval Office. As it turns out, it's easy to prove that Strachan had knowledge of it: John Dean's own words, as recorded in the Oval Office, prove it!

NIXON: Yeah. I guess he should, shouldn't he? In the interests of—why, I suppose we can't call that justice, can we? We can't call it [unclear].

DEAN: Well, it—

NIXON: The point is, how do you justify that?

DEAN: It's a personal loyalty with him [meaning Gordon Strachan]. He doesn't want it any other way. He didn't have to be told. He didn't have

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to be asked. It just is something that he found is the way he wanted to handle the situation.

NIXON: But he knew? He knew about Watergate? Strachan did?

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: I'll be damned. Well, that's the problem in Bob's case, isn't it? It's not Chapin then, but Strachan. Because Strachan worked for him.

DEAN: Mm-hmm. They would have one hell of a time proving that Strachan had knowledge of it, though.

Author's Note: In the following segment of the same conversation, Segretti's name comes up. You can hear in the conversation that Nixon is still unclear as to what Watergate was actually about—because his White House Counsel, John Dean, had not been giving him accurate information.

Continuing at 4:50:

NIXON: Bob must have known about Segretti.

DEAN: Well, I—Segretti really wasn't involved in the intelligence gathering to speak of at all.

NIXON: Oh, he wasn't?

DEAN: No, he wasn't. He was out just—he was out—

NIXON: Who the hell was gathering intelligence?

DEAN: That was Liddy and his outfit.

NIXON: I see. Apart from Watergate?

DEAN: That's—well, that's right. That was part of their whole—Watergate was part of intelligence gathering, and this—

NIXON: Well, that's a perfectly legitimate thing. I guess that's what it was.

DEAN: What happened is they—

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NIXON: What a stupid thing. Pointless. That was the stupid thing.

DEAN: That was incredible. That's right. That's right.

NIXON: I wouldn't want to think that Mitchell would allow—would have allowed this kind of operation to be in the committee.

DEAN: I don't think he knew it was there.

NIXON: You kidding?

DEAN: I don't—

NIXON: You don't think Mitchell knew about this thing?

DEAN: Oh, no, no, no. Don't mis—I don't think he knew that people—I think he knew that Liddy was out intelligence gathering.

NIXON: Well?

DEAN: I don't think he knew that Liddy would use a fellow like McCord, for God's sake, who worked for the Committee. I can't believe that. You know, that—

NIXON: Hunt? Did Mitchell know Hunt?

DEAN: I don't think Mitchell knew about Hunt either.

Author's Note: A couple of minutes later, in the same conversation, the president goes back to the idea of putting all information out. John Dean advises re: "White House involvement in the Watergate" that he thinks "there is just none . . . people here [in the White House] just did not know that that was going to be done." (That statement contradicts what he told the president a couple of minutes earlier in the same conversation, when he said that Gordon Strachan, who was on the White House staff, did know in advance.) Dean continues to advise that it's too late to put all the information out, that there would be "a certain domino situation" and that "there are going to be a lot of problems if everything starts falling." Dean himself couldn't afford for all the information to be put out. If it had been, Dean would have clearly been seen in the middle of both the plan to break into the Watergate and the subsequent cover-up—and he would no doubt have been one of the dominos to

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fall. As for Segretti's work, Nixon says there was nothing "sinister" about it. Dean says it was, in fact, "quite humorous."

Continuing at 7:47:

NIXON: Is it too late to, frankly, go the hangout road? Yes, it is.

DEAN: I think it is. I think—here's the—the hangout road—

NIXON: The hangout road's going to be rejected by—somebody on your staff has rejected it.

DEAN: It was kicked around. Bob and I, and—

NIXON: I know Ehrlichman always felt that it should be hangout. [unclear]

DEAN: Well, I think I convinced him why—that he wouldn't want to hang out either. There is a certain domino situation here. If some things start going, a lot of other things are going to start going, and there are going to be a lot of problems if everything starts falling. So there are dangers, Mr. President. I'd be less than candid if I didn't tell you there are. There's a reason for us not—not everyone going up and testifying.

NIXON: I see. Oh, no, no, no, no, no. I didn't mean go up and have them testifying. I meant—

DEAN: Well, I mean just—they're just starting to hang out and say, "Here's our story—"

NIXON: I mean putting the story out to PR buddies somewhere. "Here's the story, the true story about Watergate [. . .]"

DEAN: They would never believe it.

NIXON: That's the point.

DEAN: The point is—the two things they are working on, on Watergate—

NIXON: Who is "they"? The press?

DEAN: The press—

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NIXON: The Democrats?

DEAN: The Democrats, the intellectuals—

NIXON: The Packwoods [recent criticism by Senator Packwood]?

DEAN: Right. Right. “They” would never buy it, as far as, one, White House involvement in the Watergate, which I think there is just none—for that incident that occurred over in the Democratic National Committee headquarters. People just—here would—did not know that that was going to be done. I think there are some people who saw the fruits of it, but that’s another story. I am talking about the criminal conspiracy to go in there. The other thing is that—the Segretti thing. You hang that out, they wouldn’t believe that. They wouldn’t believe that Chapin acted on his own to put his old friend [unclear] Segretti in to be a Dick Tuck on somebody else’s campaign. They would have to paint it into something more sinister, something more involved—a part of a general plan.

NIXON: Shit, it’s not sinister at all. None of it is.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: Segretti’s stuff hasn’t been a bit sinister.

DEAN: It’s quite humorous, as a matter of fact.

Excerpts from *The Nixon Tapes: 1973* (With Audio Clips) (Enhanced Edition), Douglas Brinkley & Luke A. Nichter, <https://books.apple.com/us/book/the-nixon-tapes-1973-with-audio-clips-enhanced-edition/id1396139825>. This material may be protected by copyright.

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**EXHIBIT 4B: FROM A MARCH 16, 1973, PHONE CALL—
Richard Nixon and John Dean—8:14 to 8:23 P.M.**

To listen to this segment as you read the transcript, go to Nixon Tapes.org, then to “audio & transcripts,” then to “John W Dean III,” then to 3/16/73—WHT 037-134.

Author’s Note: After telling the president three days earlier, on March 13, that Gordon Strachan knew about Watergate in advance, Dean goes back to his original story, saying that “there was not a scintilla of evidence in the investigation that led anywhere to the White House.” He then suggests to the president that the way he could extricate himself from the Watergate mess was to put the attention on Segretti because, while it’s “a little embarrassing, it’s not evil. It’s nothing.”

At 6:44:

DEAN: A lot of the—a lot of my conclusions were based on the fact that there was not a scintilla of evidence in the investigation that led anywhere to the White House.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: There’s nothing in the FBI file that indicates anybody in the White House was involved.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: There’s nothing in what was presented before the grand jury indicating—

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: —White House involvement.

NIXON: Well, just saying some of those things could be helpful.

DEAN: That’s right.

NIXON: See? It could be helpful—

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DEAN: [unclear]

NIXON: And then we just put it out and then let, let the committee try to prove otherwise.

DEAN: And I understand that they will not get the grand jury minutes, which is good because the grand jury is even more thorough than the FBI.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: The committee's starting ten paces behind, and Ervin does not, I'm told, have a total disposition for what he's doing. He just doesn't relish it. He wants to find out things. He's—

NIXON: Why not?

DEAN: He's more excited about the confrontation on executive privilege, I think, than he is about what else he might find.

NIXON: We would welcome that, wouldn't we?

DEAN: Oh, he'd love that.

NIXON: Well, so would we.

DEAN: Mm-hmm.

NIXON: I mean, let's have it. Particularly if it's on you—oh, no, he won't have it on you. He'll—

DEAN: No, I don't think he'll [laughs] bite for that—

NIXON: On Chapin, huh?

DEAN: Chapin or Colson.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: I think that the other part of the report that we can probably put out with even greater detail than, say, Watergate is Segretti. And that—

NIXON: That I would like.

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DEAN: And that—you see, that would put us in a very forthcoming posture.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

DEAN: Here's—

NIXON: We could point out that the one case has now been determined by the courts, and that we have nothing to indicate that the White House was involved. Now, second, with regard to Segretti, let's lay all this—let's lay it all out. Here it is.

DEAN: Now, sure, it's a little embarrassing—

NIXON: The problem there—

DEAN: It's nothing evil. It's nothing—

NIXON: Well, it's less embarrassing than what's been charged, and the innuendo.

DEAN: That's right.

NIXON: Of course, I realize the major problem there is the financing, but even that—

DEAN: That's going to have to be answered well before Ervin—

NIXON: That's gonna come out. That's right, so you—

DEAN: —so we might as well leave it out—

NIXON: Yeah. That's right. So, you can think about it. Okay?

DEAN: All right, sir. Well—

NIXON: Fine.

DEAN: We will win! [laughs]"

Excerpt from *The Nixon Tapes: 1973* (With Audio Clips) (Enhanced Edition), Douglas Brinkley & Luke A. Nichter, <https://books.apple.com/us/book/the-nixon-tapes-1973-with-audio-clips-enhanced-edition/id1396139825>. This material may be protected by copyright.

**EXHIBIT 4C: FROM THE MARCH 17, 1973, OVAL OFFICE
MEETING—Richard Nixon and John Dean**

To listen to this segment as you read the transcript, go to Nixon Tapes.org, then to “audio & transcripts,” then to “John W Dean III,” then to 3/17/73—OVAL 882-012b.

Author’s Note: When the president asks who could be vulnerable in the Watergate incident, Dean offers, for the first time, that he—Dean—could be, which surprises the president who immediately assumes that Dean didn’t have any foreknowledge of the break-in. When Jeb Magruder’s name comes up, Dean expresses concern that Magruder would not go down without dragging many others down with him—which seems to concern Dean, who likely was thinking that he, Dean, would be among those dragged down. The president clearly had no idea why there had been a break-in at the Watergate, wonders what kind of “intelligence” they were hoping to find in the Democratic National Committee headquarters there—and wonders who was pushing for the break-in.

At 32:04:

NIXON: Now, you were saying too, ah, what really, where the, this thing leads, I mean in terms of the vulnerabilities and so forth. It’s your view that the vulnerables are basically Mitchell, Colson, Haldeman, indirectly, possibly directly, and of course, the second level, as far as the White House is concerned, Chapin.

DEAN: And I’d say Dean, to a degree.

NIXON: You? Why?

DEAN: Well, because I’ve been all over this thing like a blanket.

NIXON: I know, I know, but you know all about it, but you didn’t—you were in it after the deed was done.

DEAN: That’s correct that I have no foreknowledge . . .

NIXON: Here’s the whole point, here’s the whole point. My point is that your problem is you, you have no problem. All the others that have

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participated in the goddamned thing, and therefore are potentially subject to criminal liability. You're not. That's the difference.

DEAN: That's right.

(Pause)

NIXON: And on that score, of course, we have to know where we are.

DEAN: And on . . .

NIXON: Everybody—Magruder I understand knows, told some people that Haldeman knows, told other people that, ah, Colson knows [unintelligible].

DEAN: Oh Jeb, is ah, Jeb is a good man. But if Jeb ever sees himself sinking, he will reach out to grab everybody he can get hold of.

NIXON: Will he?

DEAN: Yes, and I think the unfortunate thing in this whole thing, Jeb is the most responsible man for the whole incident.

NIXON: [Unintelligible]

Author's Note: Dean tells the president in the following segment of this conversation that Gordon Liddy told him that Gordon Strachan was the only person in the White House who knew of the Watergate break-in in advance. Dean did not testify that way before the Senate Watergate Committee. In his testimony before the committee, Dean testified that Gordon Liddy told him that no one in the White House knew of the Watergate break-in in advance.

DEAN: Well, let me tell you, one, after it happened and on, on Monday—I—didn't take me very long to put the pieces together what had occurred, ah, I got ahold of Liddy and I said, "Gordon, I want to know who in the White House is involved in this." And he said, "John, nobody is involved or has knowledge, that I know of. Ah, that we were going in or the like, with one exception and it was a lower level person."

NIXON: Strachan?

DEAN: Strachan. Ah, he said, "I don't really know if he, how much he knew." And I said, "Well why in the hell did it happen?" And he said,

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“Magruder pushed me without mercy to go in there. Magruder said I had to go in there. He had to do this . . .”

NIXON: Who pushed Magruder?

DEAN: That’s . . .

NIXON: Colson?

DEAN: That’s—that what Jeb . . .

NIXON: Colson, did Colson push Magruder though?

DEAN: Now that’s where there’s two stories.

NIXON: That’s my point, I don’t, I think, I—Colson can push, but he didn’t know Magruder that well.

DEAN: No.

NIXON: And had very damn little confidence in him. Uh . . .

DEAN: Right.

NIXON: So maybe that one can come from here. Is that your point?

DEAN: That’s, ah, that’s . . .

NIXON: Think Haldeman pushed him?

DEAN: Well, I think what happened is that on sort of a tickler . . .

NIXON: I can’t believe Haldeman would push Magruder.

DEAN: No, I don’t think that happened.

NIXON: I don’t think [unintelligible]—maybe Chapin did.

DEAN: No, I think Strachan did. Because Strachan just had it on his tickler. He was supposed to be gathering intelligence and talking to Jeb and saying what, where is it and why isn’t it coming in? You haven’t produced it.

NIXON: Intelligence problems? What were they worried about? They worried about, as I understand it, the San Diego demonstrations. I’m too sure of, but I guess everybody around here except me worried about them.

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Author's Note: Shortly thereafter the president and Dean talk about ending the Watergate matter by shifting the blame to Segretti and me, knowing that Segretti's "Dick Tuck-like pranks" are of lesser consequence than Watergate. The president says that "Chapin and all of them have just got to take the heat." The segment then goes on to Dean's characterization of Segretti's activities as "just not that serious."

Continuing at 36:39:

NIXON: I think what you've got to do, to the extent that you can, John, is cut her off at the pass. And you cut off at the pass. Liddy and his bunch just did this as part of their job.

Author's Note: "Cut her off at the pass" is not referring to a specific person. It's simply an expression the president is using.

DEAN: They were out on a lark. They went beyond any assignment they ever had.

NIXON: Now on the Segretti thing, I think you've just got to—Chapin and all of them have just got to take the heat. Look, you've got to admit the facts, John, and . . .

DEAN: That's right.

NIXON: And that's our—and that's that. And Kalmbach paid him. And paid a lot of people. I, I just think on Segretti, no matter how bad it is—it isn't nearly as bad as people think it was. Espionage, sabotage, shit.

DEAN: The intent, when Segretti was hired, was nothing evil, nothing vicious, nothing bad, nothing. Not espionage, not sabotage. It was pranksterism that got out of hand and we know that. And I think we can lay our story out there. Ah, I have no problem with the Segretti thing. It's just not that serious . . .

Excerpts from *The Nixon Tapes: 1973* (With Audio Clips) (Enhanced Edition), Douglas Brinkley & Luke A. Nichter, <https://books.apple.com/us/book/the-nixon-tapes-1973-with-audio-clips-enhanced-edition/id1396139825>. This material may be protected by copyright. This transcript is courtesy of Luke A. Nichter.

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EXHIBIT 4D: FROM A MARCH 21, 1973, OVAL OFFICE MEETING—Richard Nixon and John Dean

To listen to this segment as you read the transcript, go to Nixon Tapes.org, then to “audio & transcripts,” then to “John W Dean III,” then to 3/21/73—OVAL 886-008a.

Author’s Note: This is from the “cancer on the presidency” conversation. Dean tells the president he “thought we ought to talk this morning” because he has “the impression” that the president doesn’t know everything he, Dean, knows. If Dean hasn’t been telling the president everything he knows, then of course the president would not know what he knows. Dean continues—nine months after the June 17, 1972, break-in—to tell him the “basic facts,” clearly information that one would think the White House Counsel would have told the president from the beginning. Among his pronouncements, Dean says they’re being blackmailed. It is a couple of weeks after this conversation that Dean decides to jump ship and hires his own criminal defense attorney.

At 5:52:

DEAN: The reason I thought we ought to talk this morning is because in our conversations, I have the impression that you don’t know everything I know—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —and it makes it very difficult for you to make judgments that only you can make—

NIXON: That’s right.

DEAN: —on some of these things and I thought that—

NIXON: You’ve got—in other words, I’ve got to know why you feel that something—

DEAN: Well, let me—

NIXON: —that we shouldn’t unravel something.

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DEAN: Let me give you my overall first.

NIXON: In other words, your judgment as to where it stands, and where we go now.

DEAN: I think that there's no doubt about the seriousness of the problem we're—we've got. We have a cancer—within—close to the presidency, that's growing. It's growing daily. It's compounding. It grows geometrically now, because it compounds itself. That'll be clear as I explain, you know, some of the details of why it is. And it basically is because, one, we're being blackmailed; two, people are going to start perjuring themselves very quickly that have not had to perjure themselves to protect other people and the like. And that is just—and there is no assurance—

NIXON: That it won't bust.

DEAN: That that won't bust.

NIXON: True.

DEAN: So let me give you the sort of basic facts, talking first about the Watergate, and then about Segretti, and then about some of the peripheral items that have come up. First of all, on the Watergate: How did it all start? Where did it start? It started with an instruction to me from Bob Haldeman to see if we couldn't set up a perfectly legitimate campaign intelligence operation over at the reelection committee.

NIXON: Mm-hmm.

Author's Note: The reader can continue to listen as Dean goes on to explain to the president—in great detail—his version of events relating to the June 17, 1972, break-in and the involvement of the various players. The meeting lasted about 97 minutes and was recorded on two tapes. About 57 minutes into the meeting, the president asked Haldeman to join them, which Haldeman did (at 1:06 in the second tape).

The conclusion of the meeting (beginning at 37:46 on the second tape):

As John Dean gave his explanation of events to the president and Haldeman, it became evident to them that Dean himself could be implicated in the Watergate debacle as "a principal." At that point, the president, Haldeman, and

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Dean concluded that an outside “special counsel” was needed, “for the purpose of conducting an investigation” and, as the president says, “to get to the bottom of the goddamn thing.” They decided that Henry Petersen at the Department of Justice would be a good candidate. The meeting ended with the decision to approach Petersen to conduct the investigation. It was just days later, after Dean left this meeting, that he hired his own criminal defense attorney and began to work with the prosecutors and against the president.

To me, the president sounds calm as he is listening to Dean and asking questions, while Dean sounds unsettled as he offers his explanations. However, readers can make their own judgment by listening to their conversation themselves.

The two tapes that comprise this 97-minute meeting can be found by going online to nixontapes.org, then to “audio & transcripts,” then to “John W. Dean III,” then to 3/21/1973. The first of the two tapes is “OVAL 886-008a.” The second is “OVAL 886-008b.” It will be much easier to understand the audio if readers read a transcript of it as they listen.

I have found Brinkley & Nichter’s transcriptions to be excellent and accurate, and recommend them.

Excerpts from *The Nixon Tapes: 1973 (With Audio Clips)* (Enhanced Edition), Douglas Brinkley & Luke A. Nichter, <https://books.apple.com/us/book/the-nixon-tapes-1973-with-audio-clips-enhanced-edition/id1396139825>. This material may be protected by copyright.

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EXHIBIT 5: AUGUST 28, 1972, FBI REPORT, INTERVIEW
OF CHAPIN AND STRACHAN, DEAN PRESENT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 28 1972

NR014 WF PLAIN

6:58PM IMMEDIATE 8-28-72 ALM

TO ACTING DIRECTOR (139-4089) TELETYPE

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (139-166) (P) 3P

JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR., ETAL; BURGLARY, DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C. JUNE SEVENTEEN SEVENTY-TWO
Interception of Communications
1001 00: WFO
Office of Origin: Washington Field Office

Reference
RE WFO TELETYPE TO BUREAU TODAY.

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION.

CHARLES COLSON AND SECRETARY JOAN HALL FURNISHED SWORN
DEPOSITIONS TODAY AT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. NO ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION OF VALUE OBTAINED.

THIS EVENING, DWIGHT CHAPIN AND GORDON STRACHAN INTERVIEWED
AT EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING IN PRESENCE OF JOHN W. DEAN,
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT. BOTH INTERVIEWED RE GUIDANCE OF
DONALD HENRY SEGRETTE AND HIS ACTIVITIES IN REGARDS TO DEMOCRATIC
CANDIDATES.

BOTH ADMITTED KNOWING SEGRETTE SINCE COLLEGE DAYS IN CALIFORNIA.
BOTH LAST MET WITH SEGRETTE IN JUNE SEVENTY-TWO WHEN HE CALLED
AND SAID FBI WAS LOOKING TO TALK WITH HIM. ASKED THEN WHAT THE FBI
WANTED. NEITHER COULD TELL HIM. BOTH TOLD HIM BETTER TALK
TO FBI AND FIND OUT WHAT ITS ALL ABOUT.

CHAPIN ADMITS GIVING SEGRETTE JOB OF HARASSING DEMOCRATIC

END PAGE ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/16/80 BY SP2 TAT/...

18 SEP 22 1972

67 MAR 1 1973

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Dalbey	
Mr. Jenkins	
Mr. Marshall	
Mr. Miller, E.E.	
Mr. Ponder	
Mr. Soyars	
Mr. Walters	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Kinley	
Mr. Armstrong	
Mr. Herwig	
Miss Gandy	

REC-111 139-4089-990

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PAGE TWO

CANDIDATES AND SEGRETTI DID THIS ON HIS OWN WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FROM CHAPIN OR STRACHAN.

WHEN PRESSED ABOUT FEES OR COMPENSATION FOR SEGRETTI'S WORK, CHAPIN SAID FEES OR PAYMENT WERE ARRANGED THROUGH HERBERT KOMBACH, ^{KALMBACH} AN ATTORNEY ON THE WEST COAST, IN LOS ANGELES. AT THIS POINT DEAN INTERJECTED THAT KOMBACH IS A VERY CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT'S. CHAPIN SAID KOMBACH DID NOT KNOW WHAT SEGRETTI WAS BEING PAID FOR. CHAPIN SAID MAYBE ONLY ONCE OR TWICE, SEGRETTI CALLED HIM AND TOLD HIM HOW SUCCESSFUL HE WAS IN ACCOMPLISHING A CERTAIN FEAT, LIKE CHANGING A TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES OFFICE AND THINGS ALONG THAT NATURE.

WHEN ASKED ABOUT ED WARREN AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF HIM, BOTH STRACHAN AND CHAPIN DENIED KNOWING ANYONE BY THAT NAME OR ANYONE EVER USING THAT NAME. THEY BOTH DENIED EVER TELLING SEGRETTI THAT SOMEONE NAMED WARREN WOULD BE CONTACTING HIM.

STRACHAN DID ADMIT TALKING WITH GEORGE G. LIDDY IN LATE FEBRUARY OR MARCH, SEVENTY TWO. LIDDY WAS UPSET SINCE SOMEONE WAS HARASSING SURROGATE ~~HARASSING~~ A SURROGATE CANDIDATE OF THE REPUBLICANS AND HAD CALLED THE WHITE HOUSE TRYING TO TOUCH BASE WITH SOMEONE WHO MIGHT KNOW
END PAGE TWO

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PAGE THREE

THIS. STRACHAN SAID HE RECALLS TELLING LIDDY ABOUT A MAN HE HAD WORKING FOR HIM, BUT CANNOT POSITIVELY SAY HE DID NOT TELL LIDDY SEGRETTI'S NAME AND PRESENT LOCATION. HE DID ADMIT GIVING A PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION TO LIDDY FOR SOME REASON, BUT CANNOT RECALL WHY HE DID THAT.

STRACHAN DID NOT RECEIVE ANY REPORT FROM SEGRETTI NOR HAS HE HAD CONTACT WITH HIM MORE THAN A HALF A DOZEN TIMES.

INVESTIGATION CONTINUING.

END

HOLD

MRF FBI WA DC

3

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT 6: LETTER FROM THEODORE H. WHITE,
AUTHOR OF *THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT* 1968

White is returning my handwritten notes from Election Day, saying, "You're an amateur historian." The first three pages of my notes are below. Note on page two—aboard the airplane with Tricia, Julie, and David Eisenhower present—Nixon gives his wife an Election Day gift—"Diamond and Pearl Pin and ear rings."

THEODORE H. WHITE 168 EAST 64 STREET NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

December 9, 1968

Mr. Dwight Chapin,
Staff of President-Elect, Richard M. Nixon,
39th Floor,
The Pierre Hotel,
New York.

Dear Dwight:

I'm sorry for keeping these so long; but wanted to wait until you were back in town so they would not get lost.

They are magnificent historical data; you're an amateur historian; and you should keep them for delivery to the archives in Washington at some future date. All my thanks to you.

The President said we had best wait until all the cabinet is chosen for our next session; so I am standing by. He also said that he would let me glance at the Kissinger-Lindsey memo on re-organization of the White House if it were of interest to me; which, indeed, it is. I'll telephone you on both matters later this week.

All best. And again my gratitude,


Teddy White

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Chaffl. Chapin
10 Rippawam
COS COS, TENN.

November 5, 1968
Los Angeles, California
Century Plaza Hotel

1:25 AM u/s RA turned in for the night

7:20 PST RA came into announce he was up

- said he wanted to see long
- ask departure time
- said he slept pretty well

7:45 Breakfast - hot oatmeal, juice, milk, coffee

ask to see HRH & ~~Frank~~ to Garment

8:15 make calls -

- John Mitchell (12 min)
- Norman Chandler (10 min)
- Mrs. DOE (12 min)
- Mary Christman (10 min)
- Ed Nixon (6 min)
- Mary Starr (5 min)

- During this period both HRH & John Ehrlichman were in to see him.

Handwritten notes from Election Day 1968. Page 1 of 12

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9:15 Depart Suite for car &
airport.
Ron Zeigler rode to airport

9:45 - Arrive Airport bond place
- pickup only - no men -
- RW chosen to Sport Court
- coffee

10:00 RW walks through plane &
Sholen heads - calls the
family up to first cabin area

- Presents Mr. W with a
gift - Diamond & Pearl
Pin & ear rings. (Doris,
Tricia & Julie present.)
- Received the election
pamphlet with the family
chosen on winning & losing
- what would happen either
way - a presentation

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(30) 10:20 to 10:50 Met with Jim Keogh,
Pat Bushman, Bill Sefire,
and Ray Price

(40) 10:55 to 11:35 Met with Ken Cornett,
Frank Shulze, Paul Keger
Bud Wilkinson & Roy Allen

(Note: At 11:15 Ellsworth saw Ray with
a message - also mentioned vote very
heavy - heavy in Philadelphia)

11:35 Cannot ask for a couple
of minutes alone with Ray

11:38 Met with Fitch, Ellsworth,
Herb Klein & McWhorter -
HARR limited but wouldn't
go.

(Note: at this time Ray had three
Blond Jubaets on the rocks.



With my mother, Betty June; father, Spencer; and sister, Linda, in 1954 on our Derby, Kansas, farm. That summer we moved to Brentwood in western Los Angeles.



With my quarter horse Pat. We won a white ribbon for barrel racing at the local rodeo.



We were married in the garden of Susie's family home in Hope Ranch, Santa Barbara, California, on August 18, 1963.



Celebrating Christmas 1967 in Cos Cob, Greenwich, Connecticut, and starting the 1968 presidential campaign year. Kimberly is two-and-a-half years old, and Tracy is six months.

Notes from my personal diary on November 6, 1968, in the early morning after election night while in the presidential suite at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York. You can find additional Election Day notes in Exhibit 6 of the Appendix.

4:00am RN called Gov. Rockefeller -
who was sound asleep - try
thank him for effort - although
didn't win N.Y. - said looked
like he would win.

C & H - suggest RN nap - said
he couldn't would have to stay
up till it was settled.

4:30 RN asked that any staff
or friends who were still up
be invited into the suite.
Sort of an open house - ~~any~~
those who come in
- Price, Buchanan, Garment,
Rose, Keyes, Harlow, Mitchell,
Finch, Chotiner, H, C,
these people passed in &
out for the next two
hours
- RN had a beer while
he nursed for at least an hour

4:00 AM
RN called Gov.
Rockefeller—who
was sound asleep—to
thank him for effort—
although didn't win
N.Y.—said looked like
he would win.
C & H—[Chapin and
Haldeman] suggest RN
nap—said he couldn't
would have to stay up
till it was settled.

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RN asked that any
staff or friends who
were still up be invited
into the suite. Sort of
an open house—those
who came in—Price,
Buchanan, Garment,
Rose, Keyes, Harlow,
Mitchell, Finch,
Chotiner, H, C, these
people passed in &
out for the next two
hours. RN had a beer which
he nursed for at least an
hour.



The Waldorf Astoria hotel, the morning after election night 1968. From *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*: “At 8:30 the door burst open and Dwight Chapin rushed in. ‘ABC just declared you the winner!’ he shouted. ‘They’ve projected Illinois. You got it. You’ve won.’” I was the only person with a camera. In the photo, the new president-elect looks at the television in amazement. John Ehrlichman’s arm goes up along with a shout of victory. The morning sun streams through the window. His long wait has ended.



My White House credentials.



The 1972 GOP convention in Miami, Florida. (*From left to right*) Bill Carruthers, Roy Goodearle, Dick Howard, me, and Henry Cashen.



With W. Clement Stone in his studio office at “The Villa.”



*(From left to right) Bart Leddel, Don Segretti, and me
at our USC fiftieth class reunion.*