

NEED **TO** **KNOW**

**WORLD WAR II AND THE RISE
OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE**

NICHOLAS REYNOLDS



MARINER BOOKS

New York Boston

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FIRST EDITION

Designed by Nancy Singer

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for.

ISBN 978-0-06-296747-3

22 23 24 25 26 LSC 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



German Army troops march into Paris on June 14, 1940, an event that changed the world and would bring the United States into the fray.

BUNDESARCHIV,
GERMANY



Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met at sea off Newfoundland for the Atlantic Charter Conference in August 1941. By then Churchill and his government had already spent a year urging the Americans to start matching British intelligence capabilities.

NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND

The prosperous lawyer and
world traveler William J.
Donovan, pictured here in
the late 1920s

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



President
Roosevelt
presides over the
swearing in of
Navy Secretary
Frank Knox in
July 1940.

NAVAL HISTORY
AND HERITAGE
COMMAND



The Japanese Sneak Attack on Pearl Harbor, a drawing by navy
combat artist Griffith Coale that suggests the extent of the
destruction as well as American outrage

US NAVY ART CENTER



A stylishly dressed
FBI director J. Edgar
Hoover posing at his
desk around 1940

FBI

Henry L. Stimson, a man
of many talents and vast
experience. He opposed
codebreaking in 1929
as secretary of state but
supported it in 1940 as
secretary of war.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



Herbert O. Yardley, the
founder of semi-official
American codebreaking

NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC MUSEUM



The US Army's
William F.
Friedman is
widely regarded
as the founder
of modern
American
cryptology.

NATIONAL
CRYPTOLOGIC
MUSEUM



Frank B. Rowlett, a
leading member of
Friedman's team

NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC
MUSEUM



Genevieve Grotjan, the
unassuming civilian who
made the break into a major
Japanese code in 1940

NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC MUSEUM




Laurance Safford,
the officer who
founded the
profession of
codebreaking in
the navy

US NAVY



Both army and navy codebreakers started out in nearly identical
“temporary” buildings on the National Mall.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES



Joseph Rochefort, the largely self-educated officer whose hard
work enabled victory at Midway

NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC MUSEUM



Ensign George H. Gay, Jr., occupied a ringside seat at Midway—in the water after being shot down amid the enemy fleet. He would be the first to confirm that three Japanese carriers had sunk.

US NAVY



Admiral King (*left*) was the demanding commander in chief of the US Navy, while the somewhat more easygoing Admiral Nimitz commanded effectively in the Pacific.

NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND



Alfred T. McCormack, the Wall Street lawyer who added much-needed value to army codebreaking. He dedicated this portrait to William Friedman.

NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC MUSEUM




Major General George V. Strong, the Army G-2 who supported McCormack but had little patience for Donovan

US ARMY



The multitalented British commander Rodger Winn, RNVR (*left*), taught Commander Kenneth Knowles, USN, how to turn information into intelligence and use it to kill U-boats. By late 1943, the US Navy had learned its lessons well, equaling and even outstripping the Royal Navy in lethality at sea.

US NAVY



The Germans famously used the well-designed, sturdy Enigma (*left*) to encode messages. The Allies crafted ingenious devices to defeat German and Japanese codes. Early on, the results looked and sometimes were homemade, like the Purple analog machine (*right*), originally cobbled together by American codebreakers after hours.

Amazingly, it worked.

NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC MUSEUM



The tension is almost palpable in this photo from the deck of a coast guard cutter defending an Atlantic convoy from U-boat attack.

US NAVAL INSTITUTE



Attacked by waves of carrier aircraft in the mid-Atlantic on June 12, 1943, U-118 had little chance against the US Navy's hunter-killer system driven by intelligence.

US NAVY



The manor house at Bletchley Park that served as
British codebreaking central in World War II

EVENING STANDARD, GETTY IMAGES



Inside one of the huts at Bletchley, a workplace without frills

BLETCHLEY PARK TRUST,
GETTY IMAGES



By 1945, American codebreakers worked in far more modern
and well-equipped industrial spaces.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES



Eifler (*left*) and Donovan,
about to risk their lives
on a flight over enemy
territory in Burma

OSS



From Burma, Donovan made his way to wartime Moscow, a
grim and uninviting destination in 1943.

CREATIVE COMMONS, NOVOSTI ARCHIVE



Wartime London, sometimes grim but usually inviting to
Americans from 1940 on

NATIONAL ARCHIVES




A dapper young Allen W. Dulles,
the lawyer who found his calling
in wartime intelligence

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



Dulles associate Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz (*in dark jacket*) looking relaxed in Bolzano, Italy, on May 12, 1945, in the company of Wehrmacht general von Vietinghoff and to his left SS general Wolff (*in light tunic*). Zimmer and Dollmann stand in the background.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES



Harry S. Truman looking confident in the company of two more experienced wartime leaders, at Potsdam in 1945.
Admiral Leahy looks over Truman's right shoulder.

BUNDESARCHIV, GERMANY



General Eisenhower insisted on congratulating army codebreakers after the war. Rowlett and Friedman (*in civilian clothes*) stand at right, Friedman showing signs of the stress he experienced for years.

NSA PHOTO



Farewell to OSS: Donovan (*left*) and Magruder (*clapping*)
at the ceremony in September 1945

US ARMY

PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS

Vincent Astor—Scion of a wealthy family and FDR intimate who ran the Room, a private intelligence agency based in New York City

Adolf A. Berle Jr.—Assistant secretary of state who served as the point man at the Department of State for intelligence matters during World War II; New Dealer with strong ties to FDR

David K. E. Bruce—One of the founders of the Secret Intelligence Branch of OSS, then chief of the OSS base in London in 1943 and 1944, a senior diplomat after 1945

John Franklin Carter—Sometime diplomat, journalist, spy novelist, and FDR confidant who ran a private spy bureau for the president during World War II

William J. Casey—New York lawyer who joined OSS and learned how to run operations against the German homeland in 1944–45; future director of CIA

Carter W. Clarke—Career army officer who supported the work of Alfred T. McCormack in signals intelligence

A. G. Denniston—The first wartime head of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, Britain's codebreaking establishment

PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS

William J. Donovan—World War I hero, Wall Street lawyer, and Republican internationalist who founded COI and then OSS in World War II

Allen W. Dulles—New York lawyer and former diplomat who ran the OSS base in Bern, Switzerland, during World War II; future director of CIA

William A. Eddy—Arabist and educator who served in the Marine Corps in World War I and directed intelligence operations for OSS in North Africa in World War II

Carl F. Eifler—US Army reservist who created OSS Detachment 101 in the China-Burma-India Theater, pioneer of OSS special operations

James Russell Forgan—Chief of the OSS in Europe following David K. E. Bruce

William F. Friedman—The grand old man of army cryptology who laid the groundwork for its success in World War II

Hans Bernd Gisevius—German lawyer and Abwehr officer stationed in Switzerland who, as part of the German Resistance to Hitler, met frequently with Allen Dulles

John H. Godfrey—Royal Navy admiral and director of Naval intelligence early in World War II; with his aide Ian Fleming, instrumental in promoting Donovan's fortunes

Colin M. Gubbins—British Army officer who guided the growth and operations of the Special Operations Executive in London, the rough equivalent of OSS Special Operations Branch

Thomas Holcomb—Commandant of the US Marine Corps during World War II, overseeing its growth from a small landing force to a fourth armed service

J. Edgar Hoover—Longtime FBI director, mainstay of many a Washington intrigue, who directed counterespionage operations at home and in Latin America during World War II

PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS

Cordell Hull—American secretary of state for most of World War II

Joseph P. Kennedy—American ambassador to London, remembered for his defeatism and for being the father of future president John F. Kennedy

Ernest J. King—Strong-willed US Navy admiral who served as both chief of Naval operations and commander in chief of the fleet during World War II

Kenneth A. Knowles—US Navy officer who, with British help, stood up a successful operations center in Washington to combat U-boats in the Atlantic

Frank Knox—Newspaper publisher, Republican politician, and supporter of William J. Donovan while secretary of the navy in World War II

Fritz Kolbe—One of the great spies of World War II, this midlevel bureaucrat in the German Foreign Ministry passed original documents to Allen Dulles in Switzerland

Edwin T. Layton—US Navy officer who served as the fleet intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor for most of World War II

William J. Leahy—US Navy admiral who, during World War II, served as ambassador to Vichy France and then as chief of staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, making him the most senior and influential officer in the US military

Duncan C. Lee—Rhodes scholar, Wall Street lawyer, and Soviet spy who served as an aide to Donovan at OSS; despite overwhelming evidence against him, he never confessed to betraying his country

John Magruder—US Army officer who was one of Donovan's deputies at OSS and head of the successor organization, the Army's Strategic Services Unit

PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS

George C. Marshall—Chief of staff of the US Army during World War II, a pivotal figure in strategic decision-making and a patron of signals intelligence

Joseph O. Mauborgne—Multitalented US Army officer who was a pioneer of cryptology during World War I; future chief signal officer of the army; supportive of Friedman and his work

Alfred T. McCormack—New York lawyer who shaped the system for processing and delivering army signals intelligence in World War II

Stewart Menzies—During World War II, head of Britain's MI6, the agency responsible both for human intelligence and signals intelligence

Chester W. Nimitz—US Navy admiral in command of the Pacific Fleet for most of World War II

John and Joseph Redman—Brothers who were senior officers in the Office of Naval Communications, remembered for centralizing signals intelligence as well as downplaying the role of Joseph Rochefort

Joseph J. Rochefort—US Navy officer responsible for “radio intelligence” at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and 1942, remembered for predicting Japanese movements during the Battle of Midway

James G. Rogers—Distinguished lawyer, educator, and mountain climber who served as a strategic planner for OSS

Frank Rowlett—Cryptologist who was one of Friedman's early hires in army signals intelligence; remembered for his groundbreaking work on Japan's Purple code

Laurance Safford—US Navy officer who, in the 1920s and 1930s, laid the foundations for navy cryptology; the rough equivalent of the army's William F. Friedman

William Stephenson—British spy impresario based in New York during World War II, responsible for operations to increase American sup-

PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS

port for Britain, which included promoting Donovan as US intelligence chief

Henry L. Stimson—Prominent lawyer and Republican statesman who served both as secretary of state and twice as secretary of war, progressed from believing that “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail” to supporting signals intelligence in World War II

George V. Strong—US Army general who promoted signals intelligence and collaboration with Britain but clashed with Donovan and OSS

Telford Taylor—Brilliant legal scholar who served in army intelligence under Carter W. Clarke and liaised with Bletchley Park; joined and eventually headed the prosecution at the trials of German war criminals after the war

Joseph N. Wenger—US Navy officer and cryptologist responsible for strategic planning for the navy’s Op-20-G

Rodger Winn—Brilliant British lawyer and wartime Royal Navy officer who created a very successful operations center in London for the war at sea against U-boats

Sir William Wiseman—British spy impresario based in New York in World War I who set precedents for William Stephenson by winning President Wilson’s confidence

Karl Wolff—SS general who met with Allen Dulles and arranged the “Secret Surrender” in Italy in 1945

Herbert O. Yardley—One of the pioneers of American codemaking and codebreaking in World War I, head of the Black Chamber in New York during the 1920s, the US government’s off-the-books codebreaking enterprise

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book has had many friends. First of all, let me be clear: it stands on the shoulders of many works by practitioners and scholars who have come before me, too numerous to mention here with a few exceptions. Perhaps my greatest debt is to my good friend David Kahn, *the* historian of codebreaking, who started me out on this path by drawing my attention to the fact that no one had written a good overview of American intelligence in World War II. No one I know has been more generous to fellow writers of history than David; his generosity ran from making introductions to other historians to sharing the files he built up over the decades to memorable meals at the Century Club in New York. High on the same list are literary agents Howard Yoon and Dara Kaye at RossYoon in Washington, DC. They patiently listened as I tossed out ideas for my next book, offering wise counsel. Dara later offered much-appreciated editorial rudder. I was of course thrilled when Howard reached out to Peter Hubbard at William Morrow (and now Mariner) to cement the project. I could not have asked for a better editor than Peter. Working along with author and editor were assistant editor Molly Gendell, copyeditor Mark Steven Long, and production editor Laura Brady. All made much-appreciated contributions. Sharyn Rosenblum, vice president and senior director for media relations at HarperCollins, has been uniquely supportive. She has also cheerfully endured more of my book talks than just about anyone else alive.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Early on I had the good fortune to encounter long-lost comrade and fellow historian Chalmers Hood at the Library of Congress. I benefited from his knowledge of the sources and especially his deep knowledge of Vichy France. Chalmers was kind enough to introduce me to Gillian Bennett, formerly chief historian of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who suggested various British collections to search. David Schaefer of King's College London performed yeoman service by sifting through files at the British National Archives in Kew. From Cambridge University, my good friend Dr. Peter Martland generously shared material when our research interests overlapped, as did Dr. Dan Larsen, a scholar at work on World War I intelligence. The incomparable Hayden Peake was kind enough to point me in the direction of other scholars and their works.

On this side of the Atlantic, I am grateful to Richard Busick for sharing his expert knowledge of FBI organization and history. Professor Sarah-Jane Corke and her colleagues at the University of New Brunswick were kind enough to read an early chapter and serve as a focus group on the concept for the book. Thanks to Sarah-Jane and our mutual friend Professor Mark Stout of Johns Hopkins, I was able to continue the process online at a session hosted by the North American Society for Intelligence History. Mark remains a tremendous resource for any intelligence scholar, myself included. Rick Schroeder, Tom Ahern, and Bryan Lintott listened to me carry on about my ideas and shared their reactions. Rick's book on this period was near at hand while I was writing about the end of the war. The same was true of David F. Rudgers's *Creating the Secret State*. Liza Mundy, the author of *Code Girls*, was kind enough to respond to this author's queries, as was Professor Richard Breitman, the eminent scholar of the Holocaust. Christopher Andrew's *For the President's Eyes Only* and Michael Warner's *The Rise and Fall of Intelligence* were both sure guides to the context in which my story is set, to say nothing of the relevant volumes of *The Foreign Relations of the United States*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

produced by the Department of State's incomparable historians of diplomacy.

Much of this book was written during the pandemic, which meant that I had to rely on the kindness of librarians and archivists who did what they could from afar. The standout has been Robert J. Simpson of the National Cryptologic Museum Library. Rob made a series of documents available in drop boxes without which my work would have ground to a halt until the archives reopened (which, as of this writing in the spring of 2022, has yet to happen). Likewise, Melissa Davis, the director of library and archives at the Marshall Foundation, readily responded to my queries and sent me files when she could. A world-class expert on World War II records, Paul Brown of the National Archives in College Park was kind enough to answer my queries, in person before the pandemic and after that online. I salute the archivists at the FDR Library in Hyde Park, New York, who have set the standard by digitizing hundreds of thousands of pages of files.

Perhaps my most far-flung correspondent was Zdzisław Kapera, of the Enigma Press in Krakow, Poland, who unearthed an out-of-date monograph that was important to my work. Annette Amerman and Fred Allison, of my old home team at the Marine Corps' History Division, responded to my searches for digitized records, as did the US Naval Institute's Janis Jorgenson. Sarah Holcomb generously shared records of her father's accomplishments in World War II. CIA Museum experts Toni Hiley, Ann Todd, and Rob Byer were in my corner when I needed them.

I have benefited enormously from readers who gave of their time and expertise, helping me to sharpen my arguments and saving me from a good bit of embarrassment. They include Paul Nevin, who must have been an editor in another life, he is so good at it in this life, and Dr. Jay Ridler, the Swiss Army knife of our profession, equally at home in the fields of writing and military history. Jay Venables

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

was, thankfully, on hand for months on end to apply her expertise to a long manuscript; more than once I would have been lost without Jay. Nor could I have done without the expertise of Chris Buehler, Gil Barndollar, and Thomas Boghardt, who read parts of the manuscript and kept me from straying too far from the truth. The same is true of Jean Bartholomew, Katie Sanders, and Jeff Rogg, who did what only good friends will do—offer constructive criticism. Karen Jensen of *World War II Magazine* expertly edited articles that I spun off from this work; her probing questions prompted me to go back and improve the text itself. So did the discussions I had with fellow writer and historian Andy Kutler, who was writing about World War II at the same time.

Lifelong friends Tom Sancton and Mark Bradley, both accomplished authors in their own right, offered support and encouragement. My uniquely talented wife and partner, Becky, graciously put up with yet another literary enterprise and all of the travail that it entailed. I owe heartfelt thanks to all, but especially to her.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFHQ—Allied Force Headquarters, the regional command responsible for operations in the Mediterranean theater, including Italy

ASA—Army Security Agency, from September 1945, the successor agency to the SSA

BSC—British Security Coordination, a covert office established by MI6 in New York in 1940

CBI—China-Burma-India Theater

COI—Coordinator of Information, title for Donovan and his first intelligence organization, the precursor to OSS

FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation

G-2—Common abbreviation for US military intelligence function or officer

GC&CS—Government Code and Cypher School, British codebreaking operation at Bletchley Park

IJN—Imperial Japanese Navy

JIC—Common abbreviation for the British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, later duplicated by Washington

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff

ABBREVIATIONS

MI5—The British internal security service, primarily responsible for running the Double Cross Program

MI6—The British external intelligence service, responsible during World War II for both espionage and codebreaking

MID—Military Intelligence Division, part of the Department of War in Washington, more or less synonymous with G-2

MO—Morale Operations, a branch of OSS

NARA—US National Archives and Records Administration

NCML—National Cryptologic Museum Library, Ft. Meade, Maryland

NKVD—People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, Soviet spy and security agency, precursor of KGB

ONI—Office of Naval Intelligence

Op-20-G—Navy Department office responsible for codes

OSS—Office of Strategic Services, Donovan's wartime intelligence organization

PHA—Pearl Harbor Attack, a reference to the proceedings of the Joint House-Senate Committee that met in 1945 and 1946

R&A—Research and Analysis, OSS branch

SB—Special Branch, wartime part of G-2 responsible for processing Magic, headed by Clarke and McCormack, first titled Special Service Branch

SHAEF—Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Eisenhower's headquarters from late 1943 to mid-1945, responsible for operations in Northern Europe

SI—Secret Intelligence, OSS branch responsible for espionage

SIS—Signal Intelligence Service, US Army organization responsible for making and breaking codes from 1930 to 1943, part of the Signal Corps

ABBREVIATIONS

SIS—Special Intelligence Service, wartime FBI organization in Latin America, also a title sometimes used for MI6

SO—Special Operations, OSS branch responsible for irregular warfare

SOE—Special Operations Executive, wartime British agency responsible for special operations

SSA—Signal Security Agency, from 1943 to 1945 the successor organization to the Army's Signal Intelligence Service

SSU—Strategic Services Unit, part of the War Department, successor to OSS

TNA—The British National Archives

X-2—OSS counterintelligence branch

PRINCIPAL PRIMARY SOURCES

Sources consulted mostly or partly online are marked with an asterisk.

Central Intelligence Agency*

Freedom of Information Act, Electronic Reading Room
Miscellaneous OSS Files

Department of State*

Foreign Relations of the United States

Federal Bureau of Investigation*

History of the SIS Division (at <https://vault.FBI.gov>)
William J. Donovan File (at <https://vault.FBI.gov>)

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY (FDRL)*

Executive Orders and Presidential Proclamations
Map Room Papers
President's Secretary's File
Presidential Press Conferences

George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, VA

Pogue Collection Interviews

Georgetown University Library Special Collections, Washington, DC

Anthony Cave Brown Papers

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Frank Knox Papers

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Emergency and War Agencies (1939–1949)
Record Group 218 (Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Donovan Organization
Record Group 226 (OSS)
Personnel Files
Donovan Office Papers (M 1642)
Record Group 263 (CIA)
Thomas Troy Papers

The National Archives, Kew, UK (TNA)

Admiralty
Air Ministry
Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
Government Code & Cypher School
Prime Minister's Office
Security Service
Special Operations Executive

National Cryptological Museum Library, Ft. Meade, MD (NCML)

David Kahn Papers
Oral History Collection
Special Research History Collection

University of Maryland Library, College Park, MD

Gordon Prange Papers

US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA

William J. Donovan Papers

US Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD

Oral History Collection

Yale University Library, New Haven, CT

Henry L. Stimson Diary

NOTES

Introduction

1. Depending on context, “intelligence” can refer either to the product, the process, or the organization that collects and analyzes secret information. See for example Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence,’” *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 46, no. 3 (2002).
2. The roots of American intelligence can be traced back to George Washington. See for example Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995) and Jeffrey Rogg, “The Spy and the State: The History and Theory of American Civil-Intelligence Relations” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2020). Michael Warner, *The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014) is an excellent overview of US and foreign intelligence.

I: Friends in Desperate Need

1. George Axelsson, “Reich Flag Raised Over Versailles,” *New York Times*, Jun. 16, 1940. The flag signaled who had conquered whom, but the goose step was apparently a mark of respect for the enemy’s war dead.
2. Clare Boothe, *Europe in the Spring* (New York: Knopf, 1940), 176; Orville H. Bullitt, ed., *For the President, Personal and Secret: Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 469–70; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (New York: Pyramid Books, 1965), 56; and more generally, Herbert R. Lottman, *The Fall of Paris: June 1940* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).
3. John H. Godfrey, *The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J. H. Godfrey*, vol. 5, part 1 (London: privately published, ca. 1964), 27.

NOTES

4. Still the best-known of the many titles of this agency, “MI6” stands for “Military Intelligence 6,” even though it was part of the Foreign Office in 1939. For the sake of clarity, MI6 is the title I will use throughout this text.
5. Malcolm Muggeridge, *Chronicles of Wasted Time: An Autobiography* (Vancouver, British Columbia: Regent, 2006), 396.
6. Nigel West, *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–45* (New York: Random House, 1983), 70–76. For a more recent account, see Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 382–6. For the contemporary sense of the German reaction, see C. Brooke Peters, “Nazis Doubt Diplomatic Good-Will of Dutch over Border ‘Incident,’” *New York Times*, November 25, 1939. Stevens and Best spent the war in captivity in Germany, much of the time in concentration camps.
7. West, *MI6*, 74.
8. See Lynne Olson, *Last Hope Island: Britain, Occupied Europe, and the Brotherhood That Helped Turn the Tide of War* (New York: Random House, 2017), 145–6. Erskine Childers’s novel *The Riddle of the Sands* is an early example.
9. Amanda Smith, ed., *Hostage to Fortune: The Letters of Joseph P. Kennedy* (New York: Viking, 2001), 418.
10. See for example Ernest May, *Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 459.
11. The total number of evacuees approached 340,000, including French and Belgian soldiers, many of whom would soon return home.
12. Winston S. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 114.
13. David Dilks, ed., *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M., 1938–1945* (London: Cassell, 1971), 285, 299.
14. Churchill, *Finest Hour*, 231. Since their 1931 invasion of Manchuria, the Japanese had been expanding on the Asian mainland.
15. Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., *The Maisky Diaries: Red Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s 1932–1943* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 105–6.
16. Quoted in David Nasaw, *The Patriarch: The Remarkable Life and Turbulent Times of Joseph P. Kennedy* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 431–2. Kennedy was likely remembering the social and political consequences of World War I.
17. Nasaw, *Patriarch*, 417.
18. Edward Wood, First Earl of Halifax, Diary, entry for October 10, 1940, Hickleton Papers, Borthwick Institute, University of York.
19. Quoted in Nasaw, *Patriarch*, 431.
20. John F. Kennedy, “Remarks Upon Signing a Proclamation Conferring Honorary Citizenship on Sir Winston Churchill, 9 April 1963,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, audio, accessed Jul. 18, 2020, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKWHA/1963/JFKWHA-175-003/JFKWHA-175-003>.

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21. Churchill, *Finest Hour*, 225–6. For the argument that Churchill and Britain saved western civilization, see Robin Prior, *When Britain Saved the West: The Story of 1940* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).
22. This was a complicated issue, with a range of opinions that are explored in various books. See Lynne Olson, *Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight over World War II, 1939–1941* (New York: Random House, 2014). William K. Klingaman, *The Darkest Year: The American Home Front 1941–1942* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2019), 9, offers this detail: in 1939, “public opinion polls revealed that more than 80 percent of the nation’s voters opposed entry into the war—a number that would remain remarkably stable over the next two years.” This was true even though, in 1940, a majority favored aiding Britain. Prior, *When Britain Saved the West*, 285. The modern American polling industry traces its roots to George Gallup’s startup in the mid-1930s.
23. Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 440–1.
24. Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac, *The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers* (London: William Collins, 2016), esp. 90–91.
25. Gill Bennett, *Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence* (London: Routledge, 2007), 33–35.
26. Churchill, *Gathering Storm*, 80.
27. Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage* (New York: Random House, 2001), 9.
28. On the Room, see Jeffery M. Dorwart, *Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 161–7. During World War II, Roosevelt would make Astor a coordinator of intelligence in the New York metropolitan area.
29. James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, *Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son's Story of a Lonely Man* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), 277. Astor inherited the yacht from his father, who named it *Nourmahal*, which means “palace of light or pleasure” in Arabic and Hindi.
30. Eager to please his friend, Astor set out on this journey with Kermit Roosevelt, but wisely decided not to test the Japanese after they denied his request to sail into waters under their control.
31. Steven T. Usdin, *Bureau of Spies: The Secret Connections between Espionage and Journalism in Washington* (New York: Prometheus, 2018), esp. chapter 5.
32. US Congress, *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, part 2 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), 899. The “above board” remark was by General Sherman Miles, the army’s chief intelligence officer in 1941. Though each service had its own codebreakers in the 1930s, their work would not bear much fruit until the end of the decade.
33. The army and navy considered fighting more important than spying. MID was not a strong organization, but it generally fared better than ONI. A wartime

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- intelligence staffer described it as “a static and bureaucratic organization . . . that . . . worked on . . . humdrum tasks [like] . . . the silhouettes of alien ships and . . . biographical data. . . . It kept tabs on ship movements.” Ladislav Farago, *The Tenth Fleet* (New York: Paperback Library, 1964).
34. See chapter 4 for a discussion of coordination among these agencies and the Department of State.
 35. Rogg, “The Spy and the State,” makes the argument that it was the American tradition of liberalism that was the limiting factor as much as or more than the Puritanical tradition of the city on the hill, as others have suggested. See for example David Kahn, *The Reader of Gentlemen’s Mail: Herbert O. Yardley and the Birth of American Codebreaking* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 101–3.
 36. While he was reporting the war from Madrid in 1937, Ernest Hemingway wrote the first draft of a play about fighting subversion that he called *The Fifth Column*. The play opened on Broadway in March 1940 and ran through eighty-seven performances. He was just one of many writers to publicize the concept.
 37. Boothe, *Europe in the Spring*, 250–1.
 38. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, *Triumph and Turmoil: A Personal History of Our Time* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), 309; Col. William J. Donovan and Edgar A. Mowrer, *Fifth Column Lessons for America* (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), 5–9.
 39. Churchill, *Finest Hour*, 285.
 40. See for example Patrick Howarth, *Intelligence Chief Extraordinary: The Life of the Ninth Duke of Portland* (London: Bodley Head, 1986), 135.
 41. See, for example, George H. Lobdell, Jr., “A Biography of Frank Knox” (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, Champagne-Urbana, 1954).
 42. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 332.
 43. Nigel Nicolson, ed., *Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 1939–1945* (London: Collins, 1967), 324. Greg Robinson, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 77, notes that as early as 1933, Knox called for the internment of Japanese Americans in case of war.
 44. Frank Knox, “Memo of Conference with President Roosevelt dated 12/12/39,” Box 8, Knox Papers, Library of Congress.
 45. Frank Knox to Annie Knox, Jun. 15, 1940, Box 3, Knox Papers.
 46. Knox admitted that he knew little about the navy but was willing to learn and work hard. This he did. He helped to energize the most traditional and hidebound of America’s armed services. Lobdell, “A Biography of Frank Knox,” 328–56.
 47. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, *Special Relationships: America in Peace and War* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 156.
 48. Edmond Taylor, *Awakening from History* (Boston: Gambit, 1969), 344.

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49. Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage* (New York: Free Press, 2011), 200, cites the claim by OSS officer Rolfe Kingsley that “you knew to have women at the receptions Donovan attended. He’d take care of the rest of it.”
50. Mary Bancroft, *Autobiography of a Spy* (New York: William Morrow, 1983), 198–9.
51. For a contemporary portrait of Donovan, see Elizabeth R. Valentine, “Fact-finder and Fighting Man,” *New York Times*, May 4, 1941.
52. A nuanced description of Donovan is in Taylor, *Awakening from History*, 344: a “moderately successful Republican politician and . . . prosperous, able corporation lawyer . . . the perhaps slightly too candid blue of . . . [his] eyes [and] the bland courtesy of his smile sometimes suggested the bridge club shark or even, in cases of extreme provocation, the shady stock promoter.”
53. William J. Donovan, “Should Men of 50 Fight Our Wars?” *New York Herald Tribune*, Apr. 14, 1940.
54. According to two secondary sources, the actual words were “fighting and fucking.” Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (New York: Times Books, 1982), 352, and Rick Atkinson, *The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944* (New York: Henry Holt, 2007), 104. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 175, places the conversation in a prewar setting. The original source is a postwar anecdote recorded by an aide who was considerably more subdued in his own memoirs but conveyed a similar idea: Donovan was like a fire horse waiting for the fire bell to ring. William J. vanden Heuvel, *Hope and History: A Memoir of Tumultuous Times* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 42.
55. One wartime colleague found Donovan to be a warrior “spoiling for a general’s star and a gun,” but one who was willing to leave the technical details of the military profession to others. Thomas F. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers 1942–1943* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987), 15.
56. General Sherman Miles quoted in Mark Riebling, *Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and the CIA* (New York: Knopf, 1994), 14.
57. See for instance William L. Langer, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower* (New York: Neal Watson Academic Publications, 1977), 181.
58. The house would later be owned by Katharine Graham, the publisher of the *Washington Post*.
59. These events are described in: Frank Knox to Annie Knox, Jul. 6 and 14, 1940, Box 3, Knox Papers.
60. See for example Knox to Roosevelt, Dec. 15, 1939, Box 4, Knox Papers.
61. Roosevelt to Knox, Dec. 29, 1939, Box 4, Knox Papers.
62. Theodore Roosevelt and his son, Theodore Jr., a member of Astor’s circle, followed Donovan’s military exploits in World War I. The elder Roosevelt complimented Donovan, “as about the finest example of the American fighting gentleman.” Roosevelt to Donovan, October 25, 1918, facsimile in

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- Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 47. That the TRs were Republicans occasionally made relations tense with FDR and his wife.
63. “Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt Assails Donovan,” *New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1932. While running for governor of New York, Donovan campaigned against the record of the outgoing FDR administration.
64. Quoted at length in Thomas F. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 45.
65. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 45–46. On the same day, July 11, both Hull and Knox prepared letters of recommendation for Donovan to carry to London. The date—just three days before Donovan’s departure—reflects the last-minute nature of this initiative. Facsimiles in Ford, *Donovan*, 92–93.
66. Roosevelt may have done so in passing through a third party or during a meeting around the time Knox was sworn in.
67. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 46.
68. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 59.
69. “Colonel Donovan Leaves on the Atlantic Clipper,” *New York Times*, Jul. 15, 1940.
70. Howarth, *Intelligence Chief Extraordinary*, 130–131.
71. The king mentioned these facts to Lord Halifax, who had been granted the rare privilege of walking through the palace gardens. Halifax asked, a little anxiously, for the king to let him know the schedule for target practice.
72. A. M. Sperber, *Murrow: His Life and Times* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 161–2; Lynne Olson, *Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour* (New York: Random House, 2010), 41–52.
73. Mowrer, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 314. There is more than one story to explain how Donovan got his nickname. The best explanation seems to come out of his dash and energy on the battlefield in World War I.
74. Jeffery, *MI6*, 442.
75. Jeffery, *MI6*, 442.
76. Vansittart to Churchill, Jul. 23, 1940, quoted in Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 52.
77. Mowrer, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 315.
78. No one person handled Donovan’s schedule. The many phone messages and scheduling notes from the time of the trip in the Donovan Papers attest to the impossibly high tempo of the visit—and the conflicting demands on Donovan’s time. Jeffery’s conclusion that “Menziez oversaw all the arrangements” puts too much emphasis on intelligence. Jeffery, *MI6*, 446. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 55, offers a cautionary note: in July 1940, Donovan was still a generalist.
79. For more on the fifth column as a recurring theme during the Donovan-Mowrer visit, see Nigel West, ed., *The Guy Liddell Diaries*, vol. 1, 1939–1942:

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- MI5's Director of Counter-Espionage in World War II* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 86–87.
80. James Leutze, ed., *The London Observer: The Journal of General Raymond E. Lee 1940–1941* (London: Hutchinson, 1971), 26, 34.
 81. Cooper to Donovan, Jul. 30, 1940, and Metcalfe to Donovan, dated “Saturday,” Box 81B, Donovan Papers, US Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, PA.
 82. Andrew Roberts, *“The Holy Fox”: A Biography of Lord Halifax* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991), 302.
 83. Halifax Diary, entry for Aug. 1, 1940.
 84. Kim Philby, *My Silent War* (New York: Ballantine, 1983), 66.
 85. Jeffery, *MI6*, 478. Philby, *My Silent War*, 74, describes Broadway in similar terms.
 86. One topic that Donovan asked about repeatedly was conscription. Leutze, ed., *London Observer*, 21, and Donovan to Menzies, Aug. 27, 1940, Box 81A, Donovan Papers. Menzies remembered stressing the need for equipment, especially ships. Bennett, *Churchill's Man of Mystery*, 369.
 87. In addition to Godfrey, see Donald McLachlan, *Room 39: A Study in Naval Intelligence* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 232.
 88. Godfrey, *Naval Memoirs*, vol. 5, part 1, 128.
 89. Leutze, ed., *London Observer*, 27–28.
 90. Lee to Donovan, Aug. 8, 1940, Box 81B, Donovan Papers.
 91. Bracken to Donovan, Undated, Box 2, Anthony Cave Brown Papers, Georgetown University Library.

2: The British Come Calling

1. “British Plane Here on Regular Flight,” *New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1940.
2. Untitled Article (“Col. William J. Donovan of New York”), *Washington Post*, Aug. 6, 1940, 5.
3. Stark to Roosevelt, Apr. 25, 1941, Box 62, PSF, FDR Library (FDRL).
4. Frank Knox to Annie Knox, Aug. 8, 1940, Box 3, Knox Papers.
5. Henry L. Stimson Diary, entry for Aug. 6, 1940, Yale University Library.
6. This stems from his famous remark: “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail,” an attitude that led him to close America’s first, semiprofessional codebreaking bureau.
7. Much of the evidence for this trip is indirect. On August 6, Roosevelt stated that Donovan would be coming up to Hyde Park with Knox and would join in on the inspection tour. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 57. Roosevelt’s log shows times of departure and arrival: “Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day,” entries for Aug. 9 and 10, 1940, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/august-9th-1940/>. The Associated Press reported that Donovan was only on part of the trip. “Col. Donovan rode the Presidential train from Hyde Park to Portsmouth, and the Potomac from Portsmouth

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- to Boston to report on a confidential mission to Europe on which Knox had sent him.” Associated Press, “President Tours New England Navy Yards and Arsenal and ‘Is Very Well Pleased’; Keeps Silence on Donovan Report,” *Washington Post*, Aug. 11, 1940.
8. The Pullman Company built a series of private cars named after explorers.
 9. Donovan to Godfrey, Aug. 27, 1940, Box 81 B, Donovan Papers.
 10. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 59.
 11. Donovan to Vansittart, Sept. 26, 1940, Box 81 B, Donovan Papers. This was presumably a reference to the Republican nomination for the Senate seat that was being contested in 1940.
 12. Stimson Diary, entry for Aug. 6, 1940.
 13. Mowrer, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 317–8. One version of their work is William J. Donovan and Edgar Ansel Mowrer, *Fifth Column Lessons for America* (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941). The British ambassador, Lord Lothian, reported to London that, being “rather slight,” the articles lacked substance. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 59. They also wildly overplayed the importance of the fifth column. See for example Col. William J. Donovan and Edgar Mowrer, “French Debacle Held Masterpiece of Fifth Columnists Under Hitler,” *New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1940.
 14. “Donovan Backs Conscription Bill,” *New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1940.
 15. Under the agreement, the US was “trading” the destroyers for land rights to British bases. The more formal Lend-Lease Act would not be signed until March 1941.
 16. J. R. M. Butler, *Lord Lothian* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 296, quotes a letter from Lothian to Lady Astor, Aug. 16, 1940; Godfrey to Donovan, Sept. 14, 1940, answers Donovan to Godfrey, Aug. 27, 1940, both in Box 81 B, Donovan Papers.
 17. Donovan to Godfrey, Aug. 27, 1940. See also Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 62.
 18. Quoted in Jeffery, *MI6*, 443. Menzies told a slightly different version of this story in 1941, using the same phrase and taking credit for supporting the Donovan mission that had produced the destroyers. Bennett, *Churchill’s Man of Mystery*, 370n. Stephenson’s comment was puffery. Donovan played a supporting, not a pivotal, role in the destroyer deal.
 19. See for example Henry Hemming, *Agents of Influence: A British Campaign, A Canadian Spy, and the Secret Plot to Bring America into World War II* (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).
 20. Stephenson wrote to Tunney from London, enclosing a letter for Hoover, which Tunney then “arranged to get . . . into the hands of Mr. Hoover, having known him quite well.” Tunney to Troy, 6, Aug. 18 and Sept. 1969, quoted in Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 39.
 21. Jeffery, *MI6*, 439.
 22. Jeffery, *MI6*, 439–40.
 23. Jeffery, *MI6*, 440; Bennett, *Churchill’s Man of Mystery*, 254. Bennett quotes from the original memorandum.

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24. The nature of their relationship is clear from the notes between them in "Justice, J. Edgar Hoover," Folder, Box 57, PSF, FDRL.
25. Stephenson would claim that it was Churchill who sent him to the US. See for example: Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 5; Jeffery, *MI6*, 440; and Bennett, *Churchill's Man of Mystery*, 253, 369n, which offer compelling firsthand evidence that it was "C," not Churchill, who sent Stephenson to New York, and that Stephenson reported only to MI6.
26. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 35, is a facsimile of the landing card.
27. Godfrey, *Naval Memoirs*, vol. 5, part 1, 7.
28. At the time, MI6's official designation was MI 1(c). As noted prior, I will use the designation MI6 throughout this book. The mission for the New York office was to spy on and counter the many anti-British revolutionaries and saboteurs active in the United States. Irish expatriates supported revolution against the empire at home while German spies sought to interrupt the flow of munitions from America to the Allies. The German ambassador to the United States was an intermediary between his government and the Irish revolutionary Sir Roger Casement. In July 1916, German agents caused the massive explosion at Black Tom, a marshaling yard in Jersey City for shipments to Europe through the port of New York. See generally Richard Spence, "Englishmen in New York: The SIS American Station, 1915–21," *Intelligence and National Security* 19:3 (2004), 511–37.
29. Arthur C. Willert, *The Road to Safety: A Study in Anglo-American Relations* (London: Derek Verschoyle, 1952), 64. Willert was the *London Times* correspondent in the United States during the war, and kept in regular touch with Wiseman.
30. Willert, *Road to Safety*, 65.
31. House to Wilson, Jan. 16, 1917, quoted in W. B. Fowler, *British-American Relations, 1917–1918: The Role of Sir William Wiseman* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 8. This book is both a narrative and a reference, containing fifty-three pages of original documents, mostly notes, letters, and cables written by Wiseman to London. Wiseman's reporting is of exceptional quality, capturing detail and nuance.
32. Fowler, *British-American Relations*, 243, 254, 258, 259.
33. Fowler, *British-American Relations*, 22, 25. See also Jeffery, *MI6*, 116.
34. Wiseman to Arthur C. Murray, Aug. 30, 1918, reproduced in Fowler, *British-American Relations*, 280–3. Murray was the assistant military attaché at the British embassy in Washington.
35. Edith Bolling Wilson, *My Memoir* (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 286. She wrote that she had never liked "this plausible little man" who was "a secret agent of the British government."
36. Willert, *Road to Safety*, 62.
37. Quoted in Charles E. Neu, *Colonel House: A Biography of Woodrow Wilson's Silent Partner* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 357.
38. Wiseman to Arthur C. Murray, Aug. 30, 1918.

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39. Willert, *Road to Safety*, 17, describes a meeting between Wiseman and David Lloyd George, who in turn described Wiseman as a remarkable young diplomat. See also *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George: 1917–1918* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936), 575.
40. “Fifth Av. Penthouse Is Leased by Banker,” *New York Times*, Mar. 12, 1937.
41. Alexander Cadogan, Untitled Memorandum, Oct. 11, 1939, FO 1093–139, The National Archives, Kew (TNA).
42. [Wiseman], Untitled Memorandum, Jun. 3, 1940, FO 1093–140, TNA. Although the document is unsigned and untitled, the next document in the file identifies it as Wiseman’s.
43. Untitled Memo, Jun. 5, 1940, FO 1093–140, TNA. Cadogan edited, initialed, and dated the memo, though he does not appear to have written it. Both Cooper and Vansittart had recently met with Donovan.
44. Untitled Memo, Jun. 5, 1940. See also Jeffery, *MI6*, 440; Bennett, *Churchill’s Man of Mystery*, 369n; and Halifax Diary, entry for Jun. 6, 1940: “Sir William Wiseman . . . is occupying himself on Philip Lothian’s behalf with possible publicity action in the States.”
45. Cadogan to Lothian, Jun. 10, 1940, FO 1093–140, TNA.
46. Jeffery, *MI6*, 440. Stephenson did not hesitate to reach out to Wiseman for advice and support. See also H. Montgomery Hyde, *Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York during World War II* (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1962), esp. 62–63. Hyde, who worked with Stephenson in New York, notes that Wiseman “had been in charge of the same security job a quarter of a century before.”
47. See for example Jeffery, *MI6*, 442.

3: Gentleman Headhunters Make a Placement

1. Jeffery, *MI6*, 439–441, is an overview of BSC based on access to still-secret MI6 files. The other works that cover BSC are less authoritative: William S. Stephenson, ed., *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940–1945* (New York: Fromm International, 1999) (hereinafter *BSC*); William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976); and Hyde, *Room 3603*. In his introduction to *The Secret History*, ix–xix, respected historian Nigel West reviews the unusual backstory of these three works, concluding that there is considerable overlap among them and that none is particularly accurate. He notes that Stephenson ordered BSC’s files burned. The most recent entry in the field is Hemming, *Agents of Influence*.
2. Nigel West comments in his introduction to the “official” BSC report that it is worth reading for its “shocking” revelations of BSC’s influence on American radio commentators, who were manipulated into peddling British propaganda. He also praises the ingenuity with which Stephenson outmaneuvered the Nazis in North and South America. It was, he argues,

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- an extraordinary achievement, both for the organization and for its chief. Stephenson, ed., *BSC*, xix. To similar effect, read the excellent overview of BSC and its report by William Boyd, "The Secret Persuaders," *Guardian*, Aug. 19, 2006.
3. Both COI and OSS would occupy space in Rockefeller Center. Much later, Donovan's law firm would move to the thirty-ninth floor of the RCA Building in Rockefeller Center, three stories above the space BSC had occupied.
 4. Stephenson claimed that they met earlier. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 42–44, reviews this matter carefully, and includes a facsimile of a note by Donovan stating that they met after he returned from his first trip to London.
 5. Jeffery, *MI6*, 446. This is a partial quote from a cable dated November 1940.
 6. Jeffery, *MI6*, 444, is a facsimile of the cable as received in London. To the same effect, see Knox to Ghormley, Nov. 16, 1940, Box 4, Knox Papers.
 7. Stimson wrote in his diary that Donovan was once again traveling for Knox with the approval of the British and American governments. Stimson Diary, entry for Dec. 2, 1940. See also Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 78.
 8. Vladimir Petrov, *A Study in Diplomacy: The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane* (Chicago: Regnery, 1971), 137. Cordell Hull, in *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 200, found the administration's practice of dispatching unofficial emissaries disturbing. "Col. Donovan Flies over Atlantic on Secret Mission Tied to France," *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1940.
 9. Halifax to London, Nov. 27, 1940; Halifax to Sinclair, Dec. 5, 1940, Air 8/368, TNA. Halifax announces Donovan's trip, mentioning Knox as "the prime mover." See also Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 78–79; Jeffery, *MI6*, 447.
 10. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 87.
 11. See for example "Spain, Central," February 12, 1941, FO 371–26966, TNA. Bureaucrats at the Foreign Office circulated cables about Donovan's travels, debating policy in the margins.
 12. Jeffery, *MI6*, 447, is a facsimile of the first page of a memorandum by "C," dated December 7, 1940, summarizing the cable from Stephenson for the prime minister. Emphasis in the original.
 13. "Col. Donovan Flies over Atlantic on Secret Mission Tied to France"; Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 79–80.
 14. Richard Dunlop, *Donovan: America's Master Spy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), 233.
 15. Edward R. Murrow, *This Is London* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941), 228.
 16. Ghormley to Knox, Oct. 11, 1940, Box 4, Knox Papers.
 17. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 80, quotes Cadogan to Halifax, Dec. 17, 1940.
 18. Halifax Diary, entry for Dec. 17, 1940; "In London on a Mission for the U.S.," *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1940, shows a photo of Donovan departing

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- 10 Downing Street after lunch. There is no evidence that Stephenson attended.
19. Morton to "C," Dec. 1940, quoted in Bennett, *Churchill's Man of Mystery*, 258.
20. Morton to "C," Dec. 1940.
21. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 81.
22. Alex Danchev, ed., *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes* (London: Brassey's, 1990), 2–5. See also Dykes, "Diary upon Arrival in Jerusalem," n.d. [1941], Box 94A, Donovan Papers.
23. The estimates and an overview of the schedule are in the preface of Dykes, "Diary upon Arrival in Jerusalem." See also Various, "Balkan Trip 1941 of William J. Donovan," Box 94A, Donovan Papers.
24. Malcolm Muggeridge, *Chronicles of Wasted Time* (Vancouver, British Columbia: Regent College Publishing, 2006), 453. The details of the Donovan-Clarke meeting are lost to history, but it is fair to surmise that Donovan was taken by this unusual and imaginative man who promoted irregular warfare. He was also a transvestite who would be arrested in Madrid a few months later for dressing as a woman in clothes that seemed to fit all too well. Ben Macintyre, *Rogue Heroes: The History of the SAS, Britain's Secret Special Forces Unit That Sabotaged the Nazis and Changed the Nature of War* (New York: Crown, 2017), 27. He is the star of Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (New York: Skyhorse, 2007).
25. John O. Iatrides, ed., *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933–1947* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 281–3.
26. London to Cairo, Jan. 30, 1941, FO 371–29792, TNA.
27. Cairo to London, Feb. 8, 1941, FO 371–29792.
28. Churchill to Foreign Office, Feb. 12, 1941, FO 371–26966, TNA.
29. Nicholas Rankin, *Ian Fleming's Commandos* (New York: Faber & Faber, 2011), 101–2; Andrew Lycett, *Ian Fleming: The Man behind James Bond* (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1995), 124–6. Gibraltar's prime features are its harbor and a 1,200-foot hill known as the Rock.
30. See for example John Colville, *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939–1955* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1985), 359, 364. Max Hastings, *The Secret War: Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas, 1939–1945* (New York: HarperCollins, 2016), 98, recounts the impression of Major General John Kennedy, who found Donovan likable but was put off by the "fat & prosperous lawyer" who wanted "to lay down the law so glibly about what we . . . should" do. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 89, details the visit with SOE.
31. Anon., "Churchill Dines Winant, Col. Donovan and Gen. de Gaulle are Received by the King," *New York Times*, March 5, 1941.
32. Martin Gilbert, ed., *The Churchill War Papers* vol. 3, *The Ever-Widening War, 1941* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2000), 337.

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33. "Col. Donovan Back; Has Seen 'a Lot'," *New York Times*, Mar. 19, 1941.
34. "Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day," entry for March 19, 1941, accessed July 4, 2019, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/march-19th-1941/>; Frank L. Kluckhohn, "President on Way to Florida Vacation; Hears Donovan Report on Europe's Trend," *New York Times*, Mar. 20, 1941.
35. Stimson Diary, entry for Mar. 19, 1941.
36. This is not the standard interpretation. See for example Danchev, ed., *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance*, 23: "He was undeniably impressed with the benefits of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation . . . fired with the need for . . . some kind of central intelligence agency."
37. Balfour to Lothian, Nov. 28, 1940, cited in Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books, University Publications of America, 1981), 34.
38. Stimson Diary, entry for Dec. 2, 1940. In 1940, the secretary of war portfolio included the army and Army Air Corps.
39. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper, 1948), 230. Roosevelt believed that it would be disastrous for these tensions to come to a head; it would risk turning millions of Irish Americans against Britain. At issue was neutral Ireland's role in the war.
40. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 118, 123; Stimson Diary, entry for Apr. 17, 1941, 169–70. Fiorello La Guardia was appointed to head civil defense. "La Guardia to Head Home Defense," *New York Times*, May 20, 1941. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau offered a defense savings position.
41. Knox spoke to Justice Frankfurter about Donovan. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 123. Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Relations with Reich Under Greater Strain," *New York Times*, Apr. 6, 1941.
42. Stephenson to Menzies, Jun. 18, 1941, quoted in Stephenson, ed., *BSC*, 25.
43. Donovan to Knox, Apr. 26, 1941, reproduced in part in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 417–8. A copy of the original is in Box 119, Donovan Papers, USAHEC.
44. Stephenson, ed., *BSC*, 24; Jeffery, *MI6*, 448, both quoting from a cable with the same date.
45. He would complain that he took a job in intelligence because Stephenson had intrigued on his behalf and pressured him into taking the job. Stephenson to Menzies, Jun. 18, 1941, quotes Donovan's complaint.
46. Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC), "Minutes," Jun. 17, 1941, CAB 81–88, TNA.
47. JIC, "Minutes," Jun. 17, 1941, refer to the Godfrey mission and the desire "to stimulate interest amongst United States Intelligence Departments in joint intelligence machinery." JIC, "Minutes," Jun. 6, 1941, CAB 81–88, TNA, state that Admiral Godfrey proceeded to Washington to examine, "on an inter-service basis, the whole problem of the exchange of intelligence with the United States." See also Howarth, *Intelligence Chief Extraordinary*, 148, to the effect that the various American intelligence functions should fall under one single body.

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48. "Mme. Schiaparelli Arrives on Clipper," *New York Times*, May 26, 1941; Lycett, *Ian Fleming*, 127.
49. Jeffery, *MI6*, 448–9; New York to Foreign Office, Jun. 25, 1941, FO 371–26231, TNA, both stating that Godfrey stayed with Donovan.
50. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 59. McLachlan, *Room 39*, 234, discusses the extent to which Stephenson, Godfrey, and Fleming contributed to the memorandum. It is impossible to pinpoint who contributed what, but highly likely that Donovan accepted British input.
51. Jeffery, *MI6*, 449. To the same effect, see: J. H. Godfrey, "Intelligence in the United States," Jul. 7, 1941, quoted in Nelson MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London: The Story of the OSS* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 46–47: "Colonel Donovan was persuaded to increase his personal interest in Intelligence."
52. Jeffery, *MI6*, 449. Jeffery quotes extensively from this cable but does not give its date.
53. See for example Aldrich and Cormac, *Black Door*, 110–111.
54. Lycett, *Ian Fleming*, 129; Godfrey, *Naval Memoirs*, vol. 5, part 1, 132–3.
55. Godfrey, *Naval Memoirs*, vol. 5, part 1, 133.
56. Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 307.
57. "Capital Stunned by Hood's Sinking," *New York Times*, May 25, 1941.
58. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 295.
59. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Proclamation 2487," The American Presidency Project, May 27, 1941, accessed July 14, 2019, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2487-proclaiming-that-unlimited-national-emergency-confronts-this-country>. Roosevelt gave himself almost unlimited authority to deal with the crisis as he saw fit, including the power to create government agencies. See for example: Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Wide Executive Powers in Reserve, Proclamation Makes Them Available If and When Needed," *New York Times*, June 1, 1941.
60. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 298.
61. Donovan to Roosevelt, May 28, 1941, quoted in Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 123.
62. Godfrey, *Naval Memoirs*, vol. 5, part 1, 134.
63. Godfrey, *Naval Memoirs*, vol. 5, part 1, 133. Sulzberger was an occasional guest at the White House. See for example: "Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day," entry for May 26, 1941, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/may-26th-1941/>.
64. Godfrey, *Naval Memoirs*, vol. 5, part 1, 135–7, is the principal source for this meeting. Jeffery, *MI6*, 449, puts the meeting on June 11, quoting from Godfrey's cable of June 12. The White House logs put the meeting on June 10, and list Godfrey as an attendee. "Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day," entry for Jun. 10, 1941, accessed Jul. 12, 2019, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/june-10th-1941/>. Godfrey's memoirs, written in the

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- 1960s, appear remarkably accurate. For example, he remembered watching a film after dinner about members of the Roosevelt family in the Far East. The logs show that dinner guests watched *Wheels Across India*, produced by Armand Denis and Leila Roosevelt.
65. Jeffery, *MI6*, 449. A flywheel is a mechanical device that both restrains and distributes energy.
66. The original memorandum is William J. Donovan, "Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information," Box 128, Coordinator of Information Subject File, PSF, FDRL. It is signed but undated, except for a note in pencil on the first page: "Memorandum for the Pres. Of the United States, 6-10-41." Robert Sherwood mentioned "your memo of June 10 to the President" in a note to Donovan on Oct. 20, 1941, Roll 123, Frame 92, Microfilm 1642, NARA II, affirming that he had roughed out the organization of an intelligence agency like COI. Troy is probably wrong that Roosevelt requested the memorandum. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 125.
67. Donovan's ideas dovetailed with his belief that the fifth column was a form of psychological warfare. By now, governments on both sides of the Atlantic were using radio broadcasts to convey information and propaganda.
68. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 61. See generally: William Lasser, *Benjamin V. Cohen: Architect of the New Deal* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
69. Henry Morgenthau Jr. Diary, Book 411, 67, accessed August 12, 2019, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/morg/md0552.pdf: "I just wanted to tell you myself that along the lines you and I talked, the President accepted in totum."
70. Donovan, "Memorandum," Jun. 10, 1941. Donovan told Cohen that he had persuaded the president that his organization should be distinct from the civilian Office of Emergency Information (OEM). B. L. Gladieux, "Conversation with Ben Cohen on Strategic Information," Jun. 19, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51. As noted, the president claimed broad new powers to create government bodies in an emergency and made liberal use of them.
71. Edward A. Tamm, "Memorandum for the Director," Jun. 27, 1941, Part 6, William J. Donovan File, accessed August 11, 2020, <https://vault.fbi.gov/William%20J%20Donovan%20/>. See also Donovan to William D. Whitney, Aug. 19, 1941, Folder 2, Box 1, Troy Papers, RG 263, NARA II, College Park.
72. These are largely the same conditions as those in Donovan's June 10 "Memorandum," with the exception that the president's office would secretly fund the new agency. Tamm was clearly not impressed, pointing out that there was already "complete coordination" among G-2, ONI, and the FBI.
73. Jeffery, *MI6*, 449. The same cable is quoted at greater length in Stephenson, ed., *BSC*, 25. Jeffery dates the cable June 19, and Stephenson June 18, which may be the difference between time sent and time received.
74. New York to Foreign Office, Jun. 25, 1941. Donovan apparently used similar language in conversations with Knox and Stimson. Stimson Diary, entries

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for Jun. 20 and 22, 1941. In any event, the British continued to believe what they wanted to believe.

4: J. Edgar Hoover

1. See their correspondence in Part 6, William J. Donovan File, accessed Sept 1, 2020, <https://vault.fbi.gov/William%20J%20Donovan%20/>.
2. Hoover to Tolson and Tamm, Nov. 29, 1940, Part 6, Donovan File.
3. Tamm to Hoover, Jun. 11, 1941, Part 6, Donovan File.
4. Tamm to Hoover, Jun. 27, 1941, Part 6, Donovan File. Donovan said he was worried that Hoover would misinterpret the press reports about the COI's powers.
5. Kenneth D. Ackerman, *Young J. Edgar: Hoover and the Red Scare, 1919–1920* (New York: Da Capo, 2007) is a detailed narrative.
6. The ACLU grew out of the National Civil Liberties Bureau, founded in 1917 to protect the rights of antiwar advocates, especially free speech, which were then threatened by the Palmer Raids.
7. He also took a commission in the army reserves, serving in the Military Intelligence Corps from 1922 to 1942.
8. See for example Brown, *Last Hero*, 95.
9. One letter, from Hoover to Missy LeHand, informed the presidential intimate that sitting next to her at dinner made for “one of the most delightful evenings [he] . . . had ever spent.” Hoover to LeHand, Feb. 12, 1936, Hoover Folder, Box 10, Grace Tully Archive, FDRL. Presidential logbooks show the first one-on-one meeting between Hoover and Roosevelt as occurring on August 24, 1936, and additional personal meetings over lunch on February 5, 1937, and June 16, 1938. See “Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day,” <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/> for these dates (accessed Aug. 23, 2020). Especially after 1940, Hoover also performed small favors for the president, sending him tidbits of information—often political gossip—and occasionally small gifts. See for example Richard Gid Powers, *Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover* (New York: Free Press, 1987), 233–4.
10. Hoover, “Confidential Memorandum,” Aug. 24, 1936, quoted extensively in US Senate, *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), 394. See also Raymond J. Batvinis, *The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 48.
11. Hoover, “Confidential Memorandum,” Aug. 25, 1936.
12. A persistent story spread by historians and journalists has it that Hull responded, “Go ahead and investigate the cock-suckers.” See for example Powers, *Secrecy and Power*, 229; Don Whitehead, *The FBI Story: A Report to the People* (New York: Random House, 1956), 158.

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13. US Senate, *Intelligence Activities*, 396. The director stated in 1939 that the General Intelligence Division had “compiled extensive indices of individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in . . . subversive activities, in espionage activities, or any activities that are possibly detrimental to the internal security of the United States.” US Senate, *Intelligence Activities*, 408–9. In May 1940, FDR would authorize the FBI to add wiretaps to its repertoire. This violated US law at the time.
14. These suspects were not confined. When Turrou told them that they would have to appear before a grand jury, they fled the country and did not return. Only four out of eighteen appeared in the dock.
15. “Hoover and Hardy Clash in Spy Case,” *New York Times*, June 2, 1938; “Hoover Jealous, Turrou Declares,” *New York Times*, July 2, 1938.
16. Press Conference #469, Jun. 24, 1938, Press Conferences of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933–1945, FDRL. Roosevelt noted that he was not advocating for the US to enter the field of foreign intelligence—that is, spying by Americans on foreigners. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The Nazi Spy Ring in America: Hitler’s Agents, the FBI, and the Case That Stirred the Nation* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020) is the most up-to-date, detailed treatment of the Rumrich case.
17. Press Conference #489, Oct. 7, 1938, Press Conferences of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933–1945, FDRL. September had brought the Munich Agreement whereby Great Britain and France allowed Hitler to seize part of Czechoslovakia, which he did on October 1. See also Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 11, to the effect that the FBI was now investigating hundreds instead of tens of espionage cases.
18. US Senate, *Intelligence Activities*, 397.
19. US Senate, *Intelligence Activities*, 397–8.
20. US Senate, *Intelligence Activities*, 409. The exact timing is not clear, but it appears that Hoover added the offices prior to appearing before a Senate appropriations committee in 1939.
21. US Senate, *Intelligence Activities*, 402–3.
22. Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal Jacobs, eds., *Navigating the Rapids, 1918–1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 320.
23. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 17.
24. Raymond J. Batvinis, *Hoover’s Secret War against Axis Spies: FBI Counterespionage during World War II* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2014), 8–10; Cartha D. DeLoach, *Hoover’s FBI* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1995), 12, 14, 88. Hoover did not design the New Deal–era building; he merely occupied part of it. He did much of his work in a smaller adjoining office decorated with knickknacks from his mother’s estate. His desk was raised on a dais, which meant that he literally looked down on his visitors.

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25. Berle, ed., *Navigating the Rapids*, 320. Preliminary talks occurred between Berle and Hoover earlier in May; it was Berle who first suggested that the FBI take on the responsibility of running the new service. FBI, *History of the S.I.S. Division* part 1 (Washington, DC: unpublished, 1947), 46–47, available at <https://vault.fbi.gov/special-intelligence-service> (accessed Sept 1, 2020). Berle had a number of portfolios, including Latin America.
26. G. Gregg Webb, “Intelligence Liaison Between the FBI and State,” *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 3 (2005): 25–38.
27. Berle, ed., *Navigating the Rapids*, 321, 323.
28. FBI, *S.I.S. History*, part 1, 42; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Memorandum Prepared by Assistance Secretary of State Berle,” June 24, 1940, reproduced in G. Gregg Webb, “New Insights into J. Edgar Hoover’s Role,” *Studies in Intelligence* 48, no. 1 (2004): 48.
29. Berle, “Memorandum,” June 24, 1940.
30. SIS would be funded by White House discretionary funds. Roosevelt would not sign a more formal order until December 23, 1941. Even then, it was a DOJ initiative; Hoover and the attorney general drafted a suitable document for his signature. FBI, *S.I.S. History*, part 1, 53.
31. FBI, *S.I.S. History*, part 1, 2.
32. Berle, ed., *Navigating the Rapids*, 337. Miles also referred to Hoover by his rank in the army reserves—a mere lieutenant colonel at the time. Batvinis, *Origins*, 72. Hoover maneuvered Miles into retracting his comment.
33. Quoted in Webb, “New Insights,” 49.
34. Berle, ed., *Navigating the Rapids*, 298.
35. FBI, *S.I.S. History*, part 1, 92, 141–3. The discussion to follow relies on this contemporary official history, especially part 1, 1–10, 44–47. Batvinis, *Origins*, 207–25, is a more recent, comprehensive discussion of SIS, as is Batvinis, *Hoover’s Secret War*, 106–25.
36. Batvinis, *Origins*, 217.
37. One estimate has the number of Special Agents on duty at the beginning of 1940 as 898, then doubling during that year. Powers, *Secrecy and Power*, 218.
38. FBI, *S.I.S. History*, part 1, 5.
39. FBI, *S.I.S. History*, part 1, 4–7.
40. Batvinis, *Origins*, 220–1.
41. Batvinis, *Origins*, 222–3.
42. Webb, “New Insights,” 52. A few months later, he even appeared open to transferring SIS to Donovan’s control.
43. Webb, “New Insights,” 52.
44. FBI, *S.I.S. History*, part 1, 8.
45. FBI, *S.I.S. History*, part 1, 8. As much as anyone else, Berle would keep the faith, defending SIS from potential raiders and even bolstering FBI morale. Almost Pollyannaish, he wrote in September 1941 that it had done “an excellent job, with such great efficiency, completely without friction.” Quoted in Webb, “New Insights,” 54.

5: The Oil Slick Principle

1. Lycett, *Ian Fleming*, 130.
2. Ian Fleming, "Memorandum to Colonel Donovan," Jun. 27, 1941, Box 2, Folder 19, Troy Papers.
3. Robert L. Benson, *A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II: Policy and Administration* (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, 1997), esp. 21. Donovan was never particularly security conscious, but even he would not have allowed a foreign national to direct his communications.
4. Fleming to Menzies, Jul. 19, 1941, quoted at length in Bennett, *Churchill's Man of Mystery*, 257.
5. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 11, 160. In September 1941, Berle would describe Ellis in almost exactly the same terms—but intending to complain. Nicholas J. Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War II* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 174. In a strange twist, Ellis was accused after the war of having betrayed MI6 secrets to the Nazis before the war—and then to the Soviets after the war. He confessed to the first charge in writing, but denied the second. Nigel West, *The Friends: Britain's Postwar Secret Intelligence Operations* (London: Coronet Books, 1988), 211–5.
6. The Bureau of the Budget was the forerunner of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Gladieux was chief of the War Organization Section of the Bureau, which some detractors viewed as "a sort of parens patriae, Gestapo, school principal, and scold for all the Government" that pretended to know administrative principles but actually wallowed in "gossip and espionage." Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 16, 62n.
7. The drafts are in Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51, NARA II.
8. Stimson Diary, entry for Jun. 24, 1941.
9. See for example H. D. Smith to Roosevelt, Jul. 3, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51.
10. Stimson Diary, entry for Jun. 25, 1941.
11. Stimson Diary, entry for Jul. 3, 1941.
12. B. L. Gladieux, "Conference with Colonel J. [sic] Donovan and Ben Cohen on Coordinator of Defense Information," Jul. 3, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51.
13. "Dictated by Ben Cohen's Secretary," n.d., Box 80A, Donovan Papers.
14. Federal Register, vol. 6, no. 136, Jul. 15, 1941. The president signed the designation on July 11. The BoB history would refer to it as "a presidential order," which appears to have been a lesser life-form. Bureau of the Budget, *The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), 523, suggesting a rough hierarchy of orders: Executive, Military, Presidential, and Administrative.

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15. Was this an oversight, or was it intentional in the interests of discretion? The drafters might have thought about spying, sabotage, and propaganda, but might not have wanted to put it in writing. Or—just as likely—no American, including Donovan, was entirely sure just what the COI *should* do.
16. “Donovan is Named Information Head,” *New York Times*, Jul. 12, 1941. This document and a letter about COI, sent by Roosevelt to members of his cabinet, were drafted by BoB. Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51.
17. The BoB described the original intent in the same terms: the proposal, as approved by Roosevelt in 1941, called for a small staff to carefully review, analyze, and collate strategic information and data collected by other agencies. “Analysis of the 1942 Budget, Coordinator of Information,” Oct. 12, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51.
18. Hitler had always been interested in Eastern Europe where vast territories could supply the *Lebensraum*—room for expansion—that he believed Germany needed. He would have preferred to defeat Britain first, but had tired of waiting for that to happen. Hitler and Stalin were unnatural allies, but they had had an agreement that was mutually beneficial. Olson, *Those Angry Days*, 95.
19. Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 88.
20. Quoted in Riebling, *Wedge*, 31.
21. Stanley P. Lovell, *Of Spies and Stratagems: Incredible Secrets of World War II Revealed by a Master Spy* (New York: Pocket Books, 1964), 4. Riebling, *Wedge*, 32, describes its “secret boys-only-after-school treehouse charm,” where you could hide out from your wife, drink bad coffee, and think of crazy ways to save the world.
22. Mowrer, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 323.
23. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 78.
24. James B. Reston, “Rebutting Dr. Goebbels,” *Washington Post*, Oct. 6, 1941. For this purpose the COI had set up ten shortwave transmitters in the United States.
25. Langer was serving as the chairman of the History Department at Harvard in 1941, and would succeed Baxter as head of OSS research and analysis. He was also the brother of psychoanalyst Walter C. Langer who would create a psychological profile of Hitler for OSS. Barry M. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services 1942–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) is an excellent overview of R&A.
26. Alden Whitman, “James P. Baxter 3d Dies,” *New York Times*, Jun. 19, 1975.
27. FDR to WJD, Jul. 23, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51. See also: T. G. Early to H. D. Smith, Jan. 23, 1942, Box 2, Folder 21, Troy Papers. Working for the government as well as a law firm or a newspaper, as Knox continued to do, was not considered to be a conflict of interest at the time.

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28. Brig. Gen. James Roosevelt, USMCR, "Record," Reference Branch, History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico. During the second half of 1941, Roosevelt was attached to the office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, which in turn seconded him to COI. He left COI in 1942 to fight in the Pacific Theatre, where he distinguished himself in combat.
29. James Roosevelt to Grace Tully, Dec. 1, 1941, "Coordinator of Information," Box 128, PSF, FDRL.
30. William O. Hall, "Conference with Robert Sherwood," Jul. 16, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51. Hall went on to a distinguished career with the State Department, rising to the level of director general of the Foreign Service.
31. William O. Hall to Bernard L. Gladieux, "Functional Confusion in the Office for Coordination of Information," Aug. 28, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51. Hall was not reassured when, on November 2, Donovan stated that "the only way to develop an effective team, when individualists are being utilized in a program, is to let the organization break down through a lack of direction. Then all the individuals will recognize the need for supervision." W. O. Hall, "Conference with Colonel Donovan," Nov. 2, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51.
32. Langer, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower*, 182. A report on R&A's initial accomplishments is James Baxter, "Report on the Research and Analysis Branch," Oct. 20, 1941, Box 128, PSF, FDRL.
33. For examples see "Office of Strategic Services—Reports—"The War This Week," March 26, 1942- January 7, 1943" in Box 154, PSF, FDRL.
34. W. O. Hall, "Conference with Colonel Donovan, Coordinator of Information, and Staff," Jul. 16, 1941, Box 37, Entry 107A, RG 51, reflects the early discussions about COI. Later developments are reflected in W. O. Hall, "Scope and Function of the Office of the Coordinator of Information," Sept. 11, 1941, Box 1, Folder 3, Troy Papers; Donovan to V. Stefanson, Oct. 28, 1941, Box 1, Folder 2, Troy Papers.
35. In the fall of 1941, both services were committed to a combination of business as usual—mostly drawing conclusions about enemy capabilities from attaché reports and open sources—as well as signals intelligence, a field they wanted very much to protect and deny to the upstart COI. See chapters 6 and 7 below.
36. See for example Stark to Knox, Sept. 25, 1941, Box 1, Folder 2, Troy Papers: "the secret intelligence of the services should be consolidated under the Coordinator of Information. . . . [This function would be] much more effective if under one [civilian] head rather than three."
37. Wyman H. Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Navy Department, 1996), 45.
38. W. O. Hall, "Scope and Function," Sept. 11, 1941.
39. Donovan to Roosevelt, Oct. 10, 1941, Folder 2, Box 1, Troy Papers. Roosevelt noted his approval with a characteristic "OK"—so long as Donovan also obtained the approval of the Department of State.

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40. See for example "Hearing on Office of Coordinator of Information Second Quarter Budget," Oct. 20, 1941, Box 1, Folder 3, Troy Papers.
41. FDR's reactions are recorded in T. G. Early to Rex Johnson, Nov. 8, 1941, Folder 2, Box 1, Troy Papers. He was reacting to: Director, BoB to FDR, "Budget Request for the Coordinator of Information," Nov. 5, 1941, Box 1, Folder 3, Troy Papers.
42. The president did not, however, involve Donovan in the Arcadia Conference with Churchill in August, when the two leaders met and crafted a joint declaration known as the Atlantic Charter.
43. Frames 101–123, Roll 123, M1642 Microfilm, NARA II, contain the documentation for this event, starting with [William J. Donovan], "Memo on Matters to Take Up at Conference with President 3:30 pm," Oct. 21, 1941. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 115, also lists agenda items.
44. [Roosevelt], "President Roosevelt's Navy Day Address on World Affairs," *New York Times*, Oct. 28, 1941. This text is a transcription from an on-site recording.
45. Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Nazi Ire over 'Secret Map' is a 'Scream' to Roosevelt," *New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1941.
46. Fireside Chat No. 17, Box 62, Master Speech File, FDRL. This speech includes mention of a Nazi plot in Bolivia reported in another secret BSC forgery that found its way into Roosevelt's inbox. See also Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), 102.
47. Who was lying to whom? Was London involved? Did Stephenson tell Donovan that the map was a forgery? Did Donovan alert the president or string him along? The answers are not clear. See for examples Bennett, *Churchill's Man of Mystery*, 255; Hemming, *Agents of Influence*, 202–65; and John F. Bratzel and Leslie B. Rout Jr., "FDR and the 'Secret Map,'" *Wilson Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (1985), 171. An undated translation of the map's legend (but not the map itself) is in the folder for "Germany July 1941–1944," Box 3, PSF, FDRL, where it is sandwiched in with notes from Donovan. A memo dated November 3, 1941, shows signs that someone investigated the origins of the map. Donovan's name appears in the upper right-hand corner. Henry S. Sterling to Preston E. James, Nov. 3, 1941, Germany 1940–1941, Box 31, PSF, FDRL.
48. Desmond Morton to Ian Jacob, Sept. 18, 1941, PREM 3/463, TNA; also quoted in Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 132. There is scant evidence for the claim that Stephenson was in direct touch with Roosevelt. Although he overstates Stephenson's influence, Troy lays out the evidence. Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid*, 186–8.
49. Quoted in Cull, *Selling War*, 174. Berle would go on to attempt to limit BSC's unilateral powers.
50. See Jordan A. Schwarz, *Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era* (New York and London: Free Press, 1987), 164–74. See also quotations

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- from Berle's diary in Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 128. Andrew, 101–2, states the case: “Never before had one power [GB] had so much influence in the development of the intelligence community of another independent state [the US].”
51. The president's schedule is online at “Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day,” <https://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/>; Box 1, Folder 2, Troy Papers, contains copies of Donovan's agenda and supporting documentation. Roosevelt's copies of some of the same documents appear in Box 128, Folder for “Coordinator of Information, 1941,” PSF, FDRL.
 52. Copy of Donovan, Untitled Note, Nov. 28, 1941, Folder 2, Box 1, Troy Papers.
 53. Whether Roosevelt was masterminding a conspiracy to land the United States in the war is a matter that has sparked lasting controversy. The overwhelming weight of evidence is against any such conspiracy theory. See for example Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 103. Andrew points out that a conspiracy would have required a degree of organization that the Roosevelt administration did not have when it came to intelligence.
 54. L. Effrat, “Tuffy Leemans Receives the Gifts, but Two Dodgers Steal Spotlight,” *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1941.
 55. An excellent firsthand description of the day at the White House is in Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 432–4. Another equally good description comes from the highly observant secretary of labor Frances Perkins. Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York: Penguin, 2011), 362–4.
 56. Frank K. Kluckhohn, “Guam Bombed; Army Ship Is Sunk,” *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1941.
 57. Charles Hurd, “1 Battleship Lost,” *New York Times*, Dec. 9, 1941. Connally was proud of his temper tantrum. Senator Tom Connally with Alfred Steinberg, *My Name Is Tom Connally* (New York: Thos. Y. Crowell, 1954), 249–50.
 58. Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew*, 363.
 59. Langer, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower*, 184.
 60. On December 2, Roosevelt sent Murrow a telegram acknowledging the debt that millions of Americans owed him for his reporting, and inviting him and his wife to dinner on the seventh. Olson, *Citizens of London*, 142.
 61. Edward Bliss Jr., ed., *In Search of Light: The Broadcasts of Edward R. Murrow 1938–1961* (New York: Knopf, 1967), 108–9, is Murrow's 1945 memory of December 7. The White House logs show the meeting ran from 12:00 to 12:25. “Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day,” entry for Dec. 8, 1941, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/december-8th-1941/>. See also Grace Tully, *F.D.R.: My Boss* (New York: Scribner's, 1949), 258, and Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 116. Troy has Donovan remembering, almost eight years later, that on that night the president said he was glad Donovan had gotten him started on intelligence. This comment seems too good to be true.

6: Spying or Riding to the Sound of the Guns?

1. This was not an idle worry in 1941. The army officers dispatched to investigate their service's role in the Pearl Harbor disaster would die in a plane crash on December 12.
2. Frank E. Beatty, "Secretary Knox and Pearl Harbor: The Background of the Secret Report," *National Review* (December 13, 1966), 1261–1265, is the firsthand account written by Knox's aide. For an earlier version, see [Gordon Prange], "Excerpts from Beatty's Report on Knox's Visit, Written in 1953," Box 57, Pearl Harbor Collection, Gordon Prange Papers, University of Maryland Special Collections.
3. The *Arizona*, *California*, and *West Virginia* were listed as "sunk at berth"; the *Nevada* was severely damaged but beached; the *Oklahoma* had capsized.
4. Beatty, "Secretary Knox and Pearl Harbor," 1263.
5. Edwin T. Layton with Roger Pineau and John Costello, *"And I Was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets* (New York: Quill / William Morrow, 1985), 328–333, is Layton's account of the Knox visit. Kimmel was both commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and commander in chief of the US Fleet, but is remembered most for the former title.
6. [Knox], "Report of the Secretary of the Navy to the President," *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), part 24, 1749–1756. The "alibi" remark is on page 1753. Hereinafter, this voluminous document will be cited as: *PHA*, part:page.
7. The actual number was higher. There was still a good bit of confusion among American officials at this point.
8. Charles Hurd, "Knox Reports One Battleship Sunk at Hawaii," *New York Times*, Dec. 16, 1941. The *Times* also printed this handout in the same edition: Associated Press, "Knox Statement on Hawaii."
9. There would be a series of wartime inquiries and investigations as well as seemingly unending controversy after the war. The most comprehensive examination was the PHA that would begin on November 15, 1945. A mercifully clear summary of the many investigations is in Craig Nelson, *Pearl Harbor: From Infamy to Greatness* (New York: Scribner's, 2016), 437–54. A comprehensive narrative is in the magisterial book by Gordon W. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), esp. 582–738.
10. Kimmel and Short were relieved on the same day, December 16, and entered that purgatory that attends government investigations. For the rest of their lives, they had to endure the agony of having their every action and motive questioned in the public eye. By most accounts, they were competent, dedicated officers who made errors of omission but did not deserve to be vilified. Nor were they the only leaders who should have been blamed. Douglas MacArthur's performance in the Philippines on December 8 was

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not unlike that of Kimmel or Short, except that Pearl Harbor occurred first and he had the benefit of that foreknowledge. MacArthur was never held to account.

11. Quoted in Nelson, *Pearl Harbor*, 443. Such crude phrases were common in 1941 and 1942, and suggest that for the United States, Pearl Harbor was a failure of imagination as much as a failure to collect, analyze, and disseminate information. The November 27 message did not specifically point to Pearl Harbor but, more generally, to the possibility of war in the Pacific. Under these circumstances, a reasonable precaution would have been to aggressively patrol the air and sea approaches to Oahu.
12. Kimmel's and Short's defenses boiled down to the charge that Washington had withheld information that would have made a difference. Revisionist historians, and longtime Roosevelt haters, would take this farfetched defense further, alleging that the administration knowingly withheld information, and even provoked the Japanese into attacking. See Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 839–850.
13. Stimson Diary, entry for Dec. 22, 1941.
14. What appear to be 1941-vintage carbons of these reports are in Box 2, Anthony Cave Brown Papers, Georgetown University Library.
15. Donovan to Roosevelt, Dec. 22, 1941, Folder 2, Box 1, Troy Papers. At this point Donovan's strategic vision included propaganda, fifth column subversion, guerrilla warfare, and finally, conventional operations—in that order.
16. Donovan, Memorandum on British Commandos, n.d. (sent to Roosevelt Dec. 22, 1941), COI, 1941 Folder, Box 128, PSF, FDRL.
17. Roosevelt to Donovan, Dec. 23, 1941, OSS Reports-Donovan-1941–3, Box 153, PSF, FDRL.
18. Stimson Diary, entry for Jan. 12, 1942, describes a dinner at the British embassy with Churchill, Knox, and Donovan in attendance. Stimson was irked at Knox for supporting Churchill's ideas without having done his homework. He added that Donovan supported Knox during the conversation.
19. This officer was one Colonel Robert Solborg, who reported back to Donovan on the state of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), now eighteen months old. Solborg to Donovan, Jan. 12, 1942, Box 2, Folder 19, Troy Papers. As early as the fall of 1941, Donovan had dispatched a similar mission to explore the potential for cooperation between COI and SOE. See R. M. J. Fellner to Donovan, Nov. 2, 1941, Box 2, Anthony Cave Brown Papers.
20. King to Holcomb, Jan. 8, 1942, reproduced in Robert E. Mattingly, *Herringbone Cloak: GI Dagger Marines of the OSS* (Washington, DC: USMC History and Museums Division, 1989), 237.
21. King to Holcomb, Jan. 8, 1942.
22. T. Holcomb to S. W. Meek, Jan. 19, 1942; facsimile in Mattingly, *Herringbone Cloak*, 254.

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23. T. Holcomb to C. B. Vogel, Feb. 10, 1942; facsimile in Mattingly, *Herringbone Cloak*, 265. These units would ultimately be known as Marine Raiders and include James Roosevelt among their officers.
24. Donovan to Knox, Feb. 6, 1942, Folder 21, Box 2, Troy Papers.
25. Donovan to Roosevelt, Feb. 21, 1942, Folder 21, Box 2, Troy Papers.
26. Marshall to Donovan, Feb. 27, 1942, Folder 21, Box 2, Troy Papers. Stimson also heard about Donovan's idea of "guerrilla fighting in the Philippines to support our present forces," and invited the colonel over for lunch to discuss them before concluding that his ideas were "mostly wind." Stimson Diary, entry for Feb. 21, 1942.
27. Donovan to Roosevelt, Jan. 3, 1942, Box 2, Folder 21, Troy Papers.
28. Thomas Moon and Carl F. Eifler, *The Deadliest Colonel* (New York: Vantage Press, 1975), 324.
29. Yasutaro Soga, *Life behind Barbed Wire: The World War II Internment Memoirs of a Hawai'i Issei* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2008), 31–32. See also: Gail Honda, ed., *Family Torn Apart: The Internment Story of the Otokichi Muin Osaka Family* (Honolulu: Japanese Culture Center of Hawaii, 2012), 21–23.
30. Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 339.
31. Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 31.
32. Before the war, the US armed forces had a group known as "the Joint Board" that dealt with interservice matters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a far more robust structure, emerged in the early months of 1942, at first as a semiofficial body. The JCS breathed life into the American JIC that had been a dead letter before the war.
33. There were memos on March 4, 7, 16, and 30. See Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 124 and 137.
34. Sherwood to Roosevelt, Mar. 19, 1942, Box 128, PSF, FDRL.
35. Hall to Gladieux, Mar. 21, 1942, Folder 23, Box 3, Troy Papers.
36. W. B. Smith to H. Hopkins, Mar. 26, 1942, Box 37, RG 51. The same was now true of Stimson, who worried that Donovan would upset the work of his G-2. Stimson Diary, entry for May 26, 1942.
37. W. B. Smith to King, Mar. 23, 1942, Folder 23, Box 3, Troy Papers.
38. A different version blames a drunk driver who turned out to be an FBI employee. This colorful story, allegedly told by Donovan to a British friend, is unsupported. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, *Special Relationships: America in Peace and War* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 167–8.
39. Wheeler-Bennett, *Special Relationships*, 168. Donovan was only an occasional drinker, and unlike so many generals and government officials during the war, he did not smoke.
40. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 114, describes these events and offers general source notes, which can make it difficult to pinpoint specific facts.
41. See for example "New Information Unit Reported Delayed by Status of Donovan, Coordinator Insists on Being Responsible Only to President,"

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- Washington Evening Star*, Apr. 3, 1942, and Raymond P. Brandt, "Coordinator of Wartime News Being Sought by White House," *Washington Evening Star*, Apr. 5, 1942.
42. Copies of the notes from both Roosevelts can be found in Folder 23, Box 3, Troy Papers.
 43. Donovan to Roosevelt, Apr. 14, 1942, COI 1942 Folder, Box 128, PSF, FDRL.
 44. Carter to Roosevelt, Jan. 19, 1942, Box 98, PSF, FDRL.
 45. Berle, ed., *Navigating the Rapids*, 396–7.
 46. The charge was that Donovan was operating in Latin America despite the presidential directive reserving that continent for others. Donovan was indeed interested in expanding to Latin America but hoped to do so in tandem with the FBI. See Webb, "New Insights," 54.
 47. Donovan to Roosevelt, May 9, 1942, discussed and quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 142, and Brown, *Last Hero*, 221.
 48. "Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day," entry for May 15, 1942, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/may-15th-1942/>.
 49. Donovan to H. D. Smith, Jun. 9, 1942, Folder 22, Box 3, Troy Papers, citing COI's current strength as 1,796.
 50. OSS would still be able to beam "black" propaganda at the enemy overseas—that is, false or misleading information—while OWI would focus on "white" propaganda, that is, the dissemination of accurate information, generally favorable to the war effort. See Clayton D. Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996).
 51. Donovan to Wavell, Jun. 13, 1942, Box 3, Folder 22, Troy Papers.
 52. OWI was created by executive order, OSS by military order—both more powerful instruments than the hybrid instrument that had created COI.
 53. See for example: Maj. J. K. Woolnough to Col. A. C. Wedemeyer, Jun. 24, 1942, Folder 24, Box 3, Troy Papers, which proposes quick action to implement the president's order before Donovan's return from overseas on the grounds that "he might upset the apple cart." Donovan had informed Roosevelt (and presumably others) that he would be out of town. Donovan to FDR, Jun. 8 and 10, 1942, Box 149, PSF, FDRL. Journalist Irving Pflaum remembered Donovan's surprise at hearing the news: Pflaum to Edward P. Lilly, Jan. 26, 1949, Box 3, Folder 22, Troy Papers.
 54. [Hambro], "Note on Conversation with G.50.000 [Donovan]," Jun. 15, 1942, HS 8/13, TNA. Donovan knew that by early 1942, SOE had grown to a strength of approximately five hundred officers and one thousand enlisted personnel. It had its own laboratories, training camps, and dedicated aircraft, and claimed to have conducted thirty-two successful and three unsuccessful operations on the continent. Solborg to Donovan, Jan. 12, 1942, Box 2, Folder 19, Troy Papers.
 55. "Collaboration between British and American S.O.E.," Jun. 26, 1942; "Relations with the American S.O.E.—Now Known as O.S.S.," Jul. 27, 1942, both in HS 8/13, TNA. In the latter document, the writer notes that "there

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is no doubt that Donovan intends to be very active in setting up subversive organizations.”

56. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes, Jun. 16, 1942, CAB 79/21, TNA.
57. To the same effect, Churchill’s intelligence advisor Desmond Morton reported that Donovan had “a mandate covering all SOE and SIS work in all parts of the world other than North and South America and the Pacific Islands.” Director, SOE Circular, “G.50,000,” Jun.10, 1942, HS 8–13, TNA.

7: Army Cipher Brains

1. One explanation for the term is that Army Signal Corps general Mauborgne referred to his SIS codebreakers as magicians. Frank Rowlett, quoted in Layton et al., “*And I Was There*,” 80. David Kahn offers a more general explanation in *The Codebreakers* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 3.
2. Miles to Marshall, Jul. 14, 1941, Folder 2, Box 1, Troy Papers.
3. *PHA*, 40:253.
4. King Directive, Jun. 20, 1942, quoted in Stephen Budiansky, *Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 261. “Radio intelligence” is a more general term, akin to signals intelligence or communications intelligence.
5. Individual letters could also be transposed (rearranged). If numbers were substituted for letters, the process could get infinitely more complicated. “Additives,” for example, were numbers that could be tacked onto codes. They would have to be stripped away before anyone could read the code. Perhaps the most accessible explanation of basic codemaking and -breaking for the layman is in John Keegan, *Intelligence in War* (New York: Knopf, 2003), 146–9. Two other very good explanations are in Kahn, *Codebreakers*, xiii–xxvi, and Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 62–88.
6. A recent scholarly overview of Friedman’s life and work is: Rose Mary M. Sheldon, “William F. Friedman: A Very Private Cryptographer and His Collection,” *Cryptologic Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2015): 4–30. The only full biography of Friedman is somewhat dated and does not contain source notes: Ronald W. Clark, *The Man Who Broke Purple: The Life of Colonel William F. Friedman, Who Deciphered the Japanese Code in World War II* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
7. An excellent, recent biography of Elizebeth is Jason Fagone, *The Woman Who Smashed Codes: A True Story of Love, Spies, and the Unlikely Heroine Who Outwitted America’s Enemies* (New York: Dey Street, 2017). Her mother insisted on spelling her daughter’s name with three *e*’s because she did not like the nickname “Eliza,” a usage that the conventional spelling invited.
8. William F. Friedman, “A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service,” June 29, 1942, Special Research History (SRH) 029, National Cryptologic Museum Library (NCML), Ft. Meade, MD. This history also contains basic

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- facts about Friedman's career. The SRH series is also available at NARA II in College Park, MD.
9. See for example [William Friedman], *The Friedman Legacy: A Tribute to William and Elizebeth Friedman* (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center For Cryptologic History, 2006), 108.
 10. For much of its existence, MID was virtually synonymous with G-2, the highest level of the intelligence branch of the army. In the 1930s and '40s, despite various reorganizations, G-2's assistant chief of staff remained the army's chief intelligence officer and head of MID.
 11. Here the US was following the British model for organizing military intelligence. One of the British officers advising the startup was Lieutenant Colonel C. G. Dansey, who would conflict with his American colleagues in the next world war. Bruce W. Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), 121.
 12. Herbert O. Yardley, *The American Black Chamber* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 241.
 13. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 would go further, imposing penalties for intercepted messages between foreign countries and the United States. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, 11. The way around the prohibition was to make private arrangements with the telegraph companies, usually through their directors.
 14. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 313. Pages 273-317 cover this period and include the actual messages decrypted and passed to Washington.
 15. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 317.
 16. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 318.
 17. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 323; Kahn, *Reader of Gentlemen's Mail*, 81-82.
 18. Friedman, "A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service," 9; Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 369-70.
 19. Stimson Diary, entry for Jun. 1, 1931.
 20. Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, 188. See also Louis Kruh, "Stimson, the Black Chamber, and the 'Gentlemen's Mail' Quote," *Cryptologia* 12, no. 2 (April 1988): 65-89.
 21. Kahn, *Reader*, 129.
 22. Kahn, *Reader*, 102-3.
 23. Friedman, "A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service," 11.
 24. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 372.
 25. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 247.
 26. Both Friedman and Yardley would be buried in Arlington, but in different sections.
 27. Rowlett would later say, "We knew it was illegal and therefore we better keep quiet about it." Frank Rowlett, Oct. 1, 1976, NSA Oral History, 350.
 28. Friedman, "A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service," is a useful overview.

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29. Rowlett, NSA Oral History, 37–38.
30. Solomon Kullback, Aug. 26, 1982, NSA Oral History, 16–17; Frank Rowlett, *The Story of Magic: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer* (Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1998), 34–36.
31. Rowlett, *Story of Magic*, 36. Also described in Kullback, NSA Oral History, 16–17.
32. When generated by hand from a codebook, a code might have a one-to-one solution (as in “Golfplatz” meaning “Britain”); a machine could generate a vast number of possible substitutions according to its design, with the letters for the word “Britain” becoming numbers or letters that might vary. Perhaps the best-known machine was the Enigma, invented in Germany in 1923.
33. The words “code” and “cipher” are not interchangeable, but overlap and are often used imprecisely. Usually machine generated, a cipher is a kind of code, but not all codes are ciphers. Nevertheless, codebreakers remain codebreakers whether they are breaking old-fashioned codes or modern ciphers.
34. Thomas H. Dyer, “The Reminiscences of Capt. Thomas H. Dyer, USN (Ret.),” August–September 1983, US Naval Institute Oral History, Annapolis, MD, 228. Although Dyer was a navy officer, his comments apply to most codebreakers in the 1930s and early 1940s.
35. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 120–1.
36. Dyer, USNI Oral History, 278.
37. Rowlett, *The Story of Magic*, 88–89.
38. William F. Friedman, “Expansion of the Signal Intelligence Service from 1930 to 7 December 1941,” 1945, SRH 134, NCML, 7.
39. Rowlett, NSA Oral History, 343; Rowlett to Kahn, Feb. 21, 1987, David Kahn Papers, NCML.
40. Friedman, “Expansion of the Signal Intelligence Service from 1930 to 7 December 1941,” 7.
41. Friedman, “Expansion,” 7–8. This is an approximation. Exact comparisons are difficult given different accounting methods.
42. Rowlett, NSA Oral History, 450. William F. Friedman, “Preliminary Historical Report of the Solution of the ‘B’ Machine,” Oct. 14, 1940, SRH 159, NCML 9, puts the date of his discussion with Mauborgne in August 1939. The word “it” apparently refers to Friedman’s work as a manager.
43. Rowlett, NSA Oral History, 452.
44. Rowlett, *Story of Magic*, 114.
45. Yardley’s employees had reported disturbing themes: trying to catch a bulldog that had gotten into their bedroom and had the word “code” on his side, or carrying an enormous sack of pebbles on a lonely beach and looking for matches. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 320–1.
46. Rowlett states that the event occurred “shortly before Labor Day,” which was September 2 in 1940. Rowlett, *The Story of Magic*, 151–2. Friedman,

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- “A Brief History,” writes “by September.” Kahn argues for September 20. Kahn, “Pearl Harbor and the Inadequacy of Cryptanalysis,” *Cryptologia* 15, no. 4 (October 1991): 46. Grotjan would stress teamwork, and that her insight was just one step in a long process. Genevieve Grotjan Interview, Jun. 25, 1995, David Kahn Papers.
47. Rowlett, *Story of Magic*, 151–3.
48. She would not receive full recognition until after her death. In 2011 Grotjan was inducted into NSA’s Cryptologic Hall of Honor. In 1946 she received a far lesser, though not unwelcome, award for exceptional civilian performance. Ann Whitcher Gentzke, “An American Hero,” *At Buffalo*, Spring 2018, University at Buffalo, accessed Oct. 3, 2020, <http://www.buffalo.edu/atbuffalo/article-page-spring-2018.host.html/content/shared/www/atbuffalo/articles/Spring-2018/features/an-american-hero.detail.html>.
49. This was irregular but apparently not forbidden; security regulations lagged behind the technology. Rowlett himself was hired without any formal clearances.
50. Their prototypes would morph into the army’s SIGABA and the navy’s Electric Cipher Machine II, which served the United States well in World War II. Timothy J. Mucklow, *The SIGABA/ECM II Cipher Machine: “A Beautiful Idea”* (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, 2015).
51. Yardley, *Black Chamber*, 318; Kahn, *Codebreakers*, 22–23. Rowlett, NSA Oral History, 422–6, 457–65 makes the point that it was a combination of factors, not just the pressure of breaking Purple, that caused Friedman’s breakdown. Colin MacKinnon, “William Friedman’s Bletchley Park Diary,” *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 4 (2005): 657–8, fn. 9.
52. Rowlett, NSA Oral History, 465.
53. MacKinnon, “William Friedman’s Bletchley Park Diary,” 657–8; Fagone, *Woman Who Smashed Codes*, 219–21.
54. Edward A. Tamm to Director, Jul. 5, 1940, File 62–9798–88, FBI, Reply to 2019 FOIA Request By Author. Here Tamm describes a meeting with Miles and Mauborgne, during which Mauborgne described his intervention with Watson.
55. Tamm to Director, Jul. 5, 1940. At the same meeting, ONI director Walter S. Anderson reported that he had personally discussed “what the Navy Department was doing” and that the president had “indicated his desire that this program continue.”
56. Stimson Diary entry for Sept. 25, 1940.
57. Rowlett, *Story of Magic*, 172–3.
58. Stimson Diary, entry for Oct. 23, 1940.
59. Japanese Army messages were hard to acquire in the first place—being relatively weak signals typically sent over land in Asia—let alone decrypt.
60. Kahn, “Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA,” *Cryptologia* 16, no. 4 (October 1992). Friedman dates the first complete decrypts to November 27,

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1940. Quoted in Frederick D. Parker, *Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941* (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2013), 23–24.
61. See for example: L. G. Safford, Untitled Memorandum, July 20, 1940; Safford and S. B. Akin, “Directive to Joint Army-Navy Committee,” July 31, 1940, SRH 200–001, NCML.
62. S. Miles and J. James, “Handling and Dissemination of Certain Special Material,” Jan. 25, 1941, SRH 200–001.
63. There are many discussions of this arrangement. Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division*, 446–8 hews closely to the original sources, as does Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 13–14.
64. Frank Rowlett to David Kahn, Feb. 21, 1987, David Kahn Papers. Bratton’s full title was chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch in the MID. He was dual-hatted: responsible for processing Magic and for producing analyses of the situation in the Pacific—in other words, hopelessly overworked.
65. Joseph P. Rochefort Interview, August 26, 1964, Prange Collection.
66. Smith would serve as chief of staff to Dwight Eisenhower in Europe in World War II, ambassador to the Soviet Union, and director of the CIA; Taylor would command the 101st Airborne during the war and eventually serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
67. PHA, 29:2450–1. This was Bratton’s testimony about the procedure in 1944. It is consistent with S. Miles and J. James, “Handling and Dissemination of Certain Special Material,” January 25, 1941, SRH 200–001.
68. Bratton commented in 1944 that, by late 1941, General Marshall had decreed that customers would see the actual text. PHA, 29:2450. Secretary Hull and the president himself expressed the same preference. Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division*, 449. Bratton had included cryptic references to Magic in more general analyses before Marshall’s decree. Department of Defense, *The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), hereinafter *MBPH*, contains many, if not most, of the messages that customers saw in 1941.
69. Other offices in G-2 did produce and circulate analyses, but they were not always worth reading, since many of their authors were not cleared to see Magic.
70. PHA, 2:447–8.
71. William F. Friedman, “Certain Aspects of ‘Magic’ in the Cryptological Background of the Various Official Investigations into the Attack on Pearl Harbor,” 1957, SRH 125, NCML, 55.
72. Rowlett, NSA Oral History, 315. See also PHA, 29:2450. In other countries the situation was not far different. Stalin insisted on seeing raw reports and famously relied on his own intuition, with disastrous results in the spring of 1941 when he dismissed at least eighty-four separate warnings from many different kinds of sources that the Germans were about to attack. Churchill,

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- too, was, as often as not, his own analyst. He wanted to see the raw reports and make up his own mind. But he also had the wisdom to listen to his intelligence officers, and to support a system that produced joint analyses.
73. PHA, 11:5373.
 74. PHA, 2:447.
 75. Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1068.
 76. Stimson Diary, entry for Jan. 2, 1941. Discussed in Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 108. See also Carl Boyd, *Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Ōshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941–1945* (Lawrenceville, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993).
 77. Alfred McCormack, "Memorandum for General Lee, Colonel Bratton," Feb. 12, 1942, SRH 141, NCML.
 78. Kahn, "Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA." By comparison, Churchill would seize on particular Enigma intercepts and demand "action this day."
 79. Churchill insisted on receiving raw decrypts in a locked box to which only he had the key. He would take the documents out, read them, and replace them. Most days the box was delivered by the chief of MI6 in person.
 80. PHA, 11:5474–6. See also Kahn, "Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA."
 81. Accordingly, the army, navy, and White House agreed on a new routine on Nov. 10. PHA, 11:5475.
 82. PHA, 11:5476.
 83. See for example: MBPH, vol. 4, 132.
 84. MBPH, vol. 4, 208–9.
 85. MBPH, vol. 4, 209–12.
 86. See Roger B. Jeans, *Terasaki Hidenari, Pearl Harbor, and Occupied Japan: A Bridge to Reality* (Lanham, MD, and Boulder, CO: Lexington Books, 2009), esp. 123–5.
 87. Terasaki's widow, Gwen, is the secondhand source for the president's pledge. Gwen Terasaki, *Bridge to the Sun: A Memoir of Love and War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), 68–69. Jeans suggests that the quote is too good to be true, but that the other details are plausible: Jeans, *Terasaki Hidenari*, esp. 123–5.
 88. Dispatched on December 6, the appeal differed more in tone than in substance from American policy over the past few months. See MBPH, vol. 4, 98.
 89. Quoted in Layton et al., "And I Was There," 270. A December 5 message to Tokyo praised Terasaki's work as the embassy's intelligence coordinator. MBPH, vol. 4, 139.
 90. Jeans, *Terasaki Hidenari*, 61, 122, 129.
 91. Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 115. The message went to Joseph Grew, the American ambassador in Tokyo who requested an audience with the emperor but settled for the foreign minister's pledge that he would deliver the message.

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92. The events of the following few days are well known. An integral part of any history of intelligence in World War II, I retell them here in abbreviated form. See Kahn, *Codebreakers*, esp. chapter 1; Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*; and Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*. Most rely on the voluminous contemporary records of the 1946 congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack.
93. Rowlett, NSA Oral History, 325.
94. Hull, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 1096–7.
95. Friedman, “Expansion,” 29.

8: More Wall Street Lawyers

1. Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, 393. This was not an unusual reaction. Admiral William H. Standley, a member of the Roberts Commission, commented that three thousand casualties was not a high price to pay for national unity. Quoted in Joseph J. Rochefort, *The Reminiscences of Capt. Joseph J. Rochefort, U.S. Navy (Retired)*, 1983, US Naval Institute Oral History, Annapolis, MD, 172.
2. Stimson Diary, entry for Dec. 31, 1941.
3. This line of reasoning is embodied in Alfred McCormack, “Origin, Functions and Problems of the Special Branch, M.I.S.,” April 15, 1943, SRH 116, NCML, 6.
4. Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy & the Making of the American Establishment* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 106.
5. Stimson Diary, entry for Dec. 31, 1941.
6. McCormack, “Origin, Functions and Problems.” See also David Kahn, “Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA” in *Selections from Cryptologia*, eds. Cipher A. Deavours, David Kahn, Louis Kruh, Greg Mellen, and Brian J. Winkel (Boston and London: Artech House, 1998), esp. 128–30; Bird, *Chairman*, esp. 142; and Bruce Lee, *Marching Orders: The Untold Story of World War II*. (New York: Crown, 1995), 8.
7. Stimson Diary, entry for Jan. 19, 1942.
8. McCormack, “Memorandum for General Lee,” Feb. 12, 1942, SRH 141, NCML.
9. McCormack, “Memorandum for General Lee.”
10. McCormack, “Draft of Memorandum,” Feb. 5, 1942, SRH 141, NCML. McCormack was one of the few to claim that Pearl Harbor could have been predicted through logical analysis. Today there is general agreement that nothing in Magic specifically pointed to Pearl Harbor. Kahn, “Pearl Harbor and the Inadequacy of Cryptanalysis,” 35–51. Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 119–120, observes that, *if* the navy had been able to decrypt and translate all the IJN traffic that it had intercepted, it would have found messages that pointed to the impending attack. However, the relevant Japanese Navy Codes were not broken until years later.

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11. McCormack, "Memorandum for General Lee."
12. Alfred T. McCormack, "Origin, Functions and Problems of the Special Branch," Apr. 15, 1943, SRH 116, NCML, 9.
13. McCormack, "Memorandum for General Lee."
14. McCormack, "Origin, Functions and Problems," 9.
15. McCormack, "Origin, Functions and Problems," 34.
16. [Alfred T. McCormack], "War Experience of Alfred McCormack," July 31, 1947, SRH 185, NCML, 6; McCormack, "Origins, Functions and Problems," 8. French prime minister Georges Clemenceau commented that "war was too important to be left to the generals."
17. McCormack, "Organization of Work in Hand," April 21, 1942, SRH 141, NCML.
18. [McCormack], "War Experience," 7.
19. Thomas Ervin Interview, March 11, 1986, David Kahn Papers.
20. Kahn, "Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA," 128; Telford Taylor Oral History, Jan. 22, 1985, NSA-OH-1-85, 21; Thomas Ervin Interview.
21. George V. Strong, "Reorganization and Expansion of Special Service Branch," May 27, 1942, SRH 141, NCML. The title would be shortened to "Special Branch" (SB).
22. Carter W. Clarke Interview, July 6, 1959, George C. Marshall Library and Archives, VMI, 9.
23. "History of the Special Branch, MIS, War Department, 1942-1944," n.d. [ca. 1944], SRH 035, NCML, 8.
24. Benjamin R. Shute Interview, Mar. 8, 1986, David Kahn Papers.
25. [McCormack], "War Experiences," 7-8.
26. Thomas Ervin Interview. See also [McCormack], "War Experience," 9. "History of the Special Branch," 60, which puts the number in June 1944 at 140 officers, 142 civilians, and 100 enlisted.
27. Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 98. Reischauer would one day become the US ambassador to Japan.
28. They initially failed to bring SIS under SSB, which, as McCormack had pointed out, would have improved communication between these two components. See McCormack to McCloy, Mar. 1, 1942, SRH 141-1, NCML.
29. Kahn, "Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA." There would be more specialized summaries later in the war, as well as longer studies on particular subjects.
30. Magic was also the only source on Japanese-Soviet relations, and a rich source of information on such diverse topics as Japanese Army supply lines and German fortifications on the French coast. For its value as perceived by George Marshall, see chapter 20 to follow.
31. See for instance James L. Gilbert and John P. Finnegan, eds., *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History* (Washington, DC: US Army, Center of Military History, 1993), esp. 134.
32. To optimize his time, G-2 and ONI agreed that they would limit Roosevelt's reading to big-picture topics from Magic. Kahn, "Roosevelt, MAGIC, and

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ULTRA,” 127. They did not know that he was wasting a good deal of time reading the reports that J. F. Carter continued to produce during the war. Usdin, *Bureau of Spies*, 185–200.

9: Navy Cipher Brains

1. The operators are identified with Room 40, where they worked when the war began under the aegis of a younger Winston Churchill, then first lord of the Admiralty. See Thomas Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into World War I* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012).
2. Quoted in Kevin Wade Johnson, *The Neglected Giant: Agnes Meyer Driscoll* (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2015), 8. See also Laurance F. Safford, “A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the U.S.,” March 1952, SRH 149, NCML, 2–3.
3. Safford, “A Brief History,” 3–4. To the same effect, “The Birthday of the Naval Security Group,” ca. 1968, SRH 150, NCML.
4. Quoted in Johnson, *Neglected Giant*, 8. The “more by accident” phrase is from the 1935 official navy history. See also Safford, “A Brief History,” 4.
5. See Elliot Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 31–32, for a description of Safford and his career.
6. Johnson, *Neglected Giant*, 3–12. A British officer would describe her as a difficult interlocutor. “Interview with Brigadier [John] Tiltman,” Dec. 17, 1978, Oral History Collection, NCML, 9.
7. Safford, “A Brief History,” 4–5.
8. Johnson, *Neglected Giant*, 3, 20–21. As a woman in the 1920s, Driscoll was placed in clerical positions and consistently paid at lower rates than comparable male codebreakers like Friedman. Being embittered about pay and status might have led her to sell a US device to German intelligence before World War II, an allegation made by a German spy in a confession reported in a 1938 FBI document. Jeffreys-Jones, *Nazi Spy Ring in America*, 6, 244n; Tamm to Hoover, Apr. 5, 1938, FBI FOIA Release (courtesy of Prof. Jeffreys-Jones).
9. Op-20-G was divided into the following sections: Cryptographic, Communications Security, Radio Intercept and Tracking, Cryptanalytic, and Translation. “The Birthday of the Naval Security Group.”
10. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 33.
11. Rochefort, “The Reminiscences of Capt. Joseph J. Rochefort, USN (Ret.),” 53.
12. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 255–6.
13. See for example: Durwood G. Rorie, NSA Oral History Interview, Oct. 5, 1984, NCML, 17.
14. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 90.

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15. Quoted in Johnson, *Neglected Giant*, 20. Lieutenant Commander Wenger conducted the study. He would only go so far as to suggest adding two more civilian positions, hardly a full-throated expression of support.
16. See for example Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 50.
17. Written Japanese is made up of some two thousand "ideographs," or characters, which were hard to send electronically. One solution was to come up with syllables for the sounds that the characters represented.
18. Rowlett, *Story of Magic*, 112. Wenger was head of Op-20-G from 1935 to 1938.
19. This was the machine that the United States built to decode Japanese messages. William F. Friedman, "Preliminary Historical Report on the Solution of the B Machine," Oct. 14, 1940, SRH 159, NCML.
20. See Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 93–95, as well as W. J. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets* (New York: Berkeley Books, 1981), esp. 143. Though published decades later, Holmes's memoir is based on an official history that he wrote in 1946. See W. J. Holmes, "Narrative of the Combat Intelligence Center, JICPOA," Nov. 8, 1945, SRH 306, NCML, 33–36.
21. See Edwin T. Layton, NSA Oral History, 1983, NCML, 110–111, for a description of Rorie. For Rorie's own testimony: Rorie, NSA Oral History, NCML.
22. The word "solve" implies that the enemy code has been made completely transparent, while "break" suggests a more limited compromise, like insight into part of the target system. Estimates vary on the degree to which the US Navy had made inroads into JN-25 before December 1941, but most sources agree that they were limited, in part because the navy devoted resources to Magic. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 204.
23. Edwin T. Layton, "The Reminiscences of Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton, U.S. Navy (Retired)," 1975, US Naval Institute Oral History, Annapolis, MD, 93–94.
24. Holmes estimated that only one in ten intercepted messages yielded information. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 79.
25. Quoted in Carlson, *Joe's Rochefort's War*, 138. Parker, *Pearl Harbor Revisited*, 66–74, includes a more comprehensive listing and abstracts of summaries. Combat Intelligence, War Diary, 1942, SRH 279, NCML, is a slightly abbreviated version of daily findings.
26. Up until this point, the senior combatant commander and his staff had been based on the battleship *Pennsylvania*, which was based at Pearl, ready in case the admiral made the traditional decision to deploy with the fleet. Thus, although he served on shore, the fleet intelligence officer was considered a deployable staff member.
27. One measure of ONI's weakness was that it had four different directors in 1941. This turbulence almost guaranteed lack of effectiveness.
28. Ellis M. Zacharias, *Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1946), 254.
29. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 123.

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30. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 137.
31. The IJN had a deception plan, but Hypo apparently did not intercept the signals generated by that plan. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 213.
32. Layton, et al., "*And I Was There*," 244.
33. Layton, USNI Oral History, 79.
34. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 235.
35. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 61.
36. Dyer, USNI Oral History, 233.
37. Dyer, USNI Oral History, 220, 206.
38. Dyer took phenobarbital, which was a "downer," and benzedrine sulphate to counteract its effects. Rochefort himself helped to perpetuate the myth. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 124.
39. Rochefort admitted this in his oral history, calling it a practical matter rather than an expression of eccentricity. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 125.
40. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 262.
41. Rorie, NSA Oral History, 35. According to Layton, Nimitz personally authorized the band's assignment. Layton, NSA Oral History, 88.
42. Dyer, USNI Oral History, 233. Rochefort stated that his work was usually not like breaking out the enemy's secrets from a book, but "more like finding a bit of information here, a little more there and then deciding what he might do and hope you are right." Prange, Rochefort Interview, August 26, 1964, Prange Papers.
43. Prange, Rochefort Interview, September 1, 1964, Prange Papers.
44. Edward Van Der Rhoer, *Deadly Magic: A Personal Account of Communications Intelligence in World War II in the Pacific* (New York: Scribner's, 1978), 83. The title of the book is misleading; the author spent the war in Washington as a civilian at Op-20-G.
45. Layton, NSA Oral History, 143-4.
46. Layton, USNI Oral History, 124-5; Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 310-2. He meant that they had become part of the same radio net.
47. Layton later claimed the navy was working from the decrypted enemy operations order. Layton, USNI Oral History, 125. But no such order was ever found in Hypo's files. A contemporary analysis conveys the impression that Layton and Rochefort assembled the picture themselves from the rich assortment of messages at their disposal. Op-20-G, "The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War," vol. 1, Sept. 1, 1942, SRH 012, NCML.
48. King had replaced Kimmel as commander in chief in December 1941, and Stark as chief of naval operations in March 1942, becoming "dual-hatted."
49. See Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 2007), 433.
50. J. W. Holmes made a plausible claim to have been the first to propose the plan. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 101.

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51. See for example Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, *Miracle at Midway* (New York: Penguin, 1982), 77. There was no one person who made the broadcasts, but rather a number of very good English speakers who were women.
52. Japanese ships were more flammable than American ships because they were, amazingly, built partly of wood, and because their fire control procedures were inferior. Parshall and Tully, *Shattered Sword*, 244–8.
53. Van Der Rhoer, *Deadly Magic*, 98. The author remembered reading distress signals from the Japanese carriers after they had been hit.
54. Combat Intelligence Unit, War Diary, entry for June 6.
55. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 112–4. Nimitz eventually visited Gay and sat by his hospital bed, listening to his story. He was the only survivor from his squadron.
56. When he decided to move his staff from its confined spaces on a flagship (which happened to be the USS *Pennsylvania*) to offices on land, Kimmel picked Facility 661 because it was available. A new headquarters was soon under construction and would be occupied after the Battle of Midway.
57. See Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 362–82; Layton et al., “*And I Was There*,” esp. 448; and Rochefort, USNI Oral History, esp. 234.
58. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 235.
59. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 265–6. The venue might have been J. W. Holmes's home at 4009 Black Point Road. Holmes does not, however, mention the party in his memoirs. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*.
60. See Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, esp. 442–56; Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 120–1.
61. Although he was junior to most officers who typically received the award, Rochefort otherwise met the criteria. The DSM and the Navy Cross were at the same level, one usually awarded for noncombat service, the other for combat service.
62. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 65; Willson considered cryptology a dead-end career choice.
63. Willson to King, Jun. 22, 1942, facsimile in Layton et al., “*And I Was There*,” 528. Whether he dictated or drafted the letter, Willson signed it—and made liberal use of the pronoun “I.”

10: Reorganizing Naval Intelligence

1. Secretary of the Navy, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1941* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1941), 26, 31.
2. See for example the comparative production tables in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937–1945* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 535.

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3. US Army Center of Military History, "Mobilization," accessed Mar. 18, 2020, <https://history.army.mil/documents/mobpam.htm>; Naval History and Heritage Command, "U.S. Navy Personnel in World War II," accessed Mar. 18, 2020, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-navy-personnel-in-world-war-ii-service-and-casualty-statistics.html>.
4. Van Der Rhoer, *Deadly Magic*, 48–49.
5. Walter Muir Whitehill, "A Postscript to 'Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record,'" *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Third Series, vol. 70 (1950–1953), 219, 222. Roosevelt enjoyed hearing that King had received a model of a blowtorch—supposedly what he used to shave every morning. This in turn led to other jokes, like giving King an iron bar and calling it a toothpick.
6. Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw Jr., *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1958), 235.
7. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 123, remembers Holcomb as the first to advance the idea, writing that it was "well in advance of anyone else's at that time." See also Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 63.
8. Holcomb to King, "Establishment of Advanced Joint Intelligence Centers," Mar. 24, 1942, quoted in Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 385.
9. Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*, 229–30.
10. Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*, 230.
11. See the discussion in Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 387–91. As noted, the Fourteenth Naval District was headquartered at Pearl Harbor along with the Pacific Fleet and was already the administrative home for Hypo. The Pacific theater was divided into the Pacific Ocean Areas under Nimitz, and the Southwest Pacific Area under MacArthur, who opted out of any system he could not control.
12. Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*, 230.
13. Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*, 230; Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 124.
14. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 123–4.
15. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 254. "Clowns" is the word he used in his postwar oral history. He spoke as if there was one message that amounted to this declaration of independence after Midway. Rochefort's biographer did not find a copy of the actual message. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War*, 527.
16. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 43.
17. Dyer, USNI Oral History, 269. The talented British cryptographer and historian F. H. Hinsley agreed. On a visit to Washington, he found Redman "was chock full of grievances largely because he likes grievances for their own sake." Monthly Letter (Washington to London), May 28, 1944, HW 14/142, TNA.

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18. John R. Redman to Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, June 20, 1942, SRH 268, NCML. Redman noted that both King and Nimitz had endorsed the basic concept.
19. Redman to Horne, June 20, 1942.
20. Dyer, USNI Oral History, 263; Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 126–8; Alva B. Lasswell, USMC Oral History, 33, Marine Corps History Division, 1968. Nimitz objected to the intrigue against Rochefort; for two weeks he was so angry that he refused to speak to Redman.
21. Redman would stay in the job until March 1945.
22. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 258. “Flatly refused” is likely an overstatement. The navy culture allowed regulars some leeway in negotiating assignments.
23. Rochefort, USNI Oral History, 268–72. Rochefort did serve in one more intelligence assignment toward the end of the war.
24. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 126–8; Dyer, USNI Oral History, 265–6.
25. Rorie, NSA Oral History, 18, NCML.
26. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, 563, 573. Kahn put its strength at approximately 1,000 in 1945. Holmes estimates the number was 1,300 or more in January 1945. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 211.
27. Dyer, USNI Oral History, 286. In addition to the codes, Dyer calculated that Hypo defeated something like twenty keys. Dyer would wind up establishing another record by serving from July 1936 to December 1945 in the same job at Pearl.
28. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 137. For most of 1942, protecting the source was easy for a simple reason. American torpedoes were defective and sank few Japanese ships; the Japanese had no reason to be suspicious.
29. Dyer, USNI Oral History.
30. Layton et al., “*And I Was There*,” 471–2.
31. Layton, et al., “*And I Was There*,” 472. Force commander Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood also refers to “special internal codes” carried only by submarines which, one can only hope, were more sophisticated. Lockwood to CNO, “Contribution of Communication Intelligence to the Success of Submarine Operations against the Japanese in World War II,” June 17, 1947, SRH 306, NCML.
32. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 138.
33. Op-20-G-7, “The Role of Communication Intelligence in Submarine Warfare in the Pacific (January 1943–October 1943),” vols. 1–8, November 1945–January 1946, SRH 011, NCML; Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Free Press, 1985), esp. 452–3, 478–85. Spector follows the argument laid out in SRH-011, esp. vol. 1, ii–ix. The more positive testimony by Vice Admiral Lockwood lacks the precision of the Op-20-G-7 analysis. Lockwood to CNO, June 17, 1947, SRH 306, NCML.
34. Dyer’s judgment was that “the information [about convoy routings] was useful but not critical.” Dyer, USNI Oral History, 287.

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35. J. N. Wenger, "Admiral Yamamoto, the Death of," May 23, 1945, SRH 306, NCML.
36. Lasswell, USMC Oral History, 39. The multiple addressees on the message suggested that it might be worth the effort to decrypt.
37. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 149; Layton et al., "*And I Was There*," 474.
38. Wenger, "Admiral Yamamoto," May 23, 1945. Hypo and Negat routinely shared intercepts and decrypts.
39. Layton et al., "*And I Was There*," 475, states that Nimitz obtained presidential approval before acting. John Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 460, points out that Roosevelt was out of town for much of the time between April 13 and 18.
40. Van Der Rhoer, *Deadly Magic*, 144. Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded*, 460, mentions a similar memory by Ladislav Farago.
41. This was quite a feat of airmanship and navigation given the technology of the day.
42. Adonis C. Arvanitakis, "Killing a Peacock: A Case Study of the Targeted Killing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Master's Thesis, 2015, 1–3. The author cites a postwar interview with the officer who led the patrol. Yamamoto's seat became a museum artifact.
43. Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded*, 459–63, is a good discussion of the operation and its aftermath.
44. Wenger, "Admiral Yamamoto," May 23, 1945.
45. FDR to "Bill," May 24, 1943, Box 11, PSF, FDRL.
46. Layton et al., "*And I Was There*," 475.
47. Layton et al., "*And I Was There*," 476. In 1950, Captain Roger Pineau, USNR, conducted an interview with one of Yamamoto's aides who was convinced that the breach had come from a message transmitted by the Imperial Japanese Army. British intelligence officers were aghast at the risk the Americans took with their equivalent of the Ultra secret. Richard W. Cutler, *Counterspy: Memoirs of a Counterintelligence Officer in World War II and the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004), 15.
48. Hough et al., *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, 242–6. The Solomons were a British protectorate between the Coral Sea and the South Pacific. The Marines discovered that "not a single accurate or complete map of Guadalcanal or Tulagi existed in the summer of 1942." Most of what the Marines knew of the Japanese forces they learned from "coastwatchers," the mostly Australian, rugged individualists, brave beyond measure, who operated on their own in the jungle behind Japanese lines. See Martin W. Clemens, *Alone on Guadalcanal: A Coastwatcher's Story* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012).
49. See Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded*, 411–5.
50. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets*, 135–6.

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51. The situation changed as the war progressed and more Japanese were captured. Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded*, 495–8. Paradoxically, Japanese who were captured through no fault of their own often proved willing to talk, like the survivors from the doomed aircraft carrier *Hiryu* at the Battle of Midway. No one had thought to call down to the engine room when the order to abandon ship had been given; its crew emerged from the bowels of the ship onto the deserted hangar deck minutes before she sank—managing to save themselves only to be captured by the US Navy. Parshall and Tully, *Shattered Sword*, 357–9.
52. Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*, 231–5. The postwar official history found JICPOA to be unique among field intelligence organizations for its jointness and outstanding strategic studies.
53. Layton et al., “*And I Was There*,” 470; Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*, 231. As noted prior, Nimitz commanded the Pacific Ocean Areas while MacArthur held sway in the Southwest Pacific. The focus here is on POA and institutions that represent broad trends. SWP had its own codebreakers in Central Bureau but did not develop its own fusion center. See Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded*, 422–4, and Edward J. Drea, *MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 20–22.
54. Layton et al., “*And I Was There*,” 470.

II: Army and Navy Codebreakers in Washington

1. Steven E. Maffeo, *U.S. Navy Codebreakers, Linguists, and Intelligence Officers against Japan, 1910–1941: A Biographical Dictionary* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 178–186 et seq., is a short biography of Wenger relying on original sources. Bradley F. Smith, *The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946* (Shrewsbury, UK: Airline, 1993), 126, describes Wenger as a man with a sensitive stomach given to worry but not, unlike his brother officers, to drink. According to Liza Mundy, *Code Girls: The Untold Story of the American Women Code Breakers of World War II* (New York: Hachette, 2018), 279, Wenger would eventually suffer a nervous breakdown and be sidelined for six months, not unlike Yardley and Friedman. A British officer commented on “the draught of Wenger’s illness” at that time. Director Monthly Letter (Washington to London), Oct. 28, 1943, HW 14/142, TNA.
2. Joseph N. Wenger, “Future Cooperation between Army and Navy,” June 1, 1943, SRH 403, NCML.
3. The father of the field was becoming too senior for working-level assignments and was apparently considered too eccentric for higher command.
4. To the same effect, see VCNO to Fourteenth Naval District, “Communication Intelligence Activities,” April 19, 1943, SRH 279, NCML, a document

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- drafted by Wenger or one of his subordinates: "After more than a year of war operation, it has become clear that consolidation of effort should be the aim whenever possible."
5. Joseph N. Wenger, "Reorganization of Section 20-G," January 26, 1942, SRH 279. Wenger literally underlined his main point: "There must be a central coordinating authority for all intelligence communication activities." Another requirement, enabled by advances in technology, was excellent and quick communication among the various stations.
 6. Quoted in Mundy, *Code Girls*, 12–13. Comstock has been celebrated as one of the pioneers of women's education in the United States.
 7. Op-20-G, "Historical Review of Op-20-G," February 17, 1944, SRH 152, NCML.
 8. Quoted in Mundy, *Code Girls*, 13.
 9. Op-20-G, "Historical Review."
 10. Redman to Horne, June 20, 1942. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 45, puts the number of personnel at 475 in April 1942, 750 by June 1942, and 1,000 by the end of the year. See also Op-20-G, "Historical Review of Op-20-G."
 11. VCNO to Fourteenth Naval District, "Communication Intelligence Activities," April 19, 1943, SRH 279. WAVES were Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service. Op-20-G, "Historical Review," puts the number of female officers at 406 and WAVE enlisted at 2,407 as of February 1944.
 12. According to Maffeo, Wenger played a leading role in the initiatives to acquire machines and bring women on board. Maffeo, *U.S. Navy Codebreakers*, 183–4.
 13. See for example David Brinkley, *Washington Goes to War* (New York: Knopf, 1988), 117. Sources differ somewhat on the additional amount the navy paid.
 14. Wenger to Redman, "Future Cooperation between Army and Navy," June 1, 1943, SRH 403. In this document Wenger begins by addressing past cooperation.
 15. John R. Redman to VCNO, "Cryptanalytical and Decryption Operations on Diplomatic Traffic," June 25, 1942, SRH 200–1, NCML.
 16. Wenger to Redman, "Future Cooperation between Army and Navy." See also Wenger to John Redman, January 27, 1945, SRH 200–2, NCML, specifically referring to the "gentlemen's [*sic*] agreement." ONI, which was conspicuous by its almost total absence from Wenger's plans, does not appear to have played an important role in the negotiations. See Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*, 24.
 17. This sometimes-complicated round of negotiations is described by Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 49–53. John Redman would later take credit for suggesting the agreement. See Redman to Wenger, Feb. 9, 1945, SRH 200–2.
 18. W. O. Hall to B. L. Gladieux, July 20, 1942, Box 6, RG 51, NARA II.
 19. See for example John Redman to Frederick J. Horne, June 16, 1942, SRH 200–1, calling for "an executive memorandum or executive order."

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20. JCS, "Memorandum for the President," July 6, 1942, SRH 403.
21. FDR, "Memorandum for the Director of the Budget," July 8, 1942, SRH 403.
22. Hall to Gladieux, July 20, 1942. See also Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 54.
23. Op-20-G, "Report of Meeting of Standing Committee for Coordination of Cryptanalytical Work," [August 25, 1942], SRH 200-1.
24. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 34. The army went through a complicated reorganization of its intelligence in March 1942 and again in 1944. Throughout the war, the push-pull between Communications and G-2 would continue; G-2 did not run SIS, but the two maintained cordial relations, especially compared to Op-20-G and ONI.
25. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, "The Achievements of the Signal Security Agency in World War II," Feb. 20, 1946, 22, SRH 349, NCML. As noted, the enemy's army signals, typically beamed over distant land masses, were more difficult to intercept than his navy signals, and were largely unbroken until mid-1943.
26. G-2, "Achievements of the Signal Security Agency," 4.
27. G-2, "Achievements of the Signal Security Agency," 6. A court apparently forced the army to accept this price. Thomas L. Burns, *The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA: 1940-1952* (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2005), 13.
28. SIS would be renamed three times between 1942 and 1944. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 40. For the sake of clarity, this text uses SIS. The analysts under McCormack and Clarke stayed at the Pentagon.
29. SIS had thirteen machines and twenty-one operators at the beginning of the war, and 407 machines with 1,275 operators by the spring of 1945, reckoning that the machines could do the work of thousands of codebreakers. G-2, "Achievements of the Signal Security Agency," 16. The prime contract for building the army machines was with AT&T.
30. G-2, "Achievements of the Signal Security Agency," 6.
31. Mundy, *Code Girls* is a recent exploration.
32. Brinkley, *Washington Goes to War*, 243. Sally F. Reston wrote a series of articles on the role of women in the war. See for example: Sally Reston, "Women Officials Aid U.S. in London," *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1943. Reston was married to another accomplished journalist, James B. "Scotty" Reston.

12: Jeeping into Action

1. Robin Winks, who studied OSS for years, concluded that haste and chance were the original drivers for recruitment. Robin W. Winks, "Getting the Right Stuff: FDR, Donovan, and the Quest for Professional Intelligence," in George C. Chalou, ed., *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records

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- Administration, 1992), 26. As the war went on, more sophisticated processes would be introduced, some of them scientific and innovative.
2. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence*, 13, citing John H. Herz.
 3. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, xx, xxi, 8. This underappreciated book contains the diary Rogers kept while he was with OSS. It is a contemporaneous source, written by a relatively disinterested party.
 4. Alpine Club Library to the author of this book, May 20, 2020.
 5. The writer Malcolm Cowley, who worked for Archibald MacLeish during the war, quipped that “Washington in wartime is a combination of Moscow (for overcrowding) . . . and Hell (for its livability).” Quoted in Brinkley, *Washington Goes to War*, vii.
 6. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 3.
 7. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 4.
 8. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 4, 5.
 9. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 5.
 10. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 8.
 11. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 9; Langer, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower*, 181–2.
 12. Quoted in Chalou, ed., *Secrets War*, 20.
 13. Originally “Special Activities/Bruce,” the branch was known for most of its existence as Secret Intelligence.
 14. The Army Air Corps became the Army Air Forces in 1941 and the US Air Force in 1947.
 15. Elizabeth Peet McIntosh, *Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 41.
 16. The original name of the branch was Special Activities/Goodfellow. For most of its existence, it was known as Special Operations. Morale Operations, responsible for black propaganda, would eventually split off from Special Operations.
 17. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 4n; “Col. M. P. Goodfellow, 81 Dies,” *New York Times*, September 6, 1973.
 18. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 9, 14. Goodfellow considered employing renegade codebreaker Herbert O. Yardley and John V. Grombach, a right-wing West Point graduate with an uneven record, probably to establish an OSS black chamber. Donovan vetoed Goodfellow’s plans on the grounds that these two men were not trustworthy. Donovan to Goodfellow, April 28, 1942, Folder 19, Box 2, Troy Papers, RG 263. Compare Timothy Naftali, “X-2 and the Apprenticeship of American Counterespionage, 1942–1944” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1993), 84–85. In the first half of 1942, Grombach was on temporary loan from the army to COI. See Mark Stout, “The Pond: Running Agents for State, War, and the CIA: The Hazards of Private Spy Operations,” *Studies in Intelligence* 48, no. 3 (2004).
 19. See for example Brian M. Hayashi, *Asian American Spies: How Asian Americans Helped Win the Allied Victory* (New York and Oxford: Oxford

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- University Press, 2021), esp. 38–39, focusing on Asian Americans in the general context of OSS personnel policies.
20. OSS management considered formally employing Ernest Hemingway but decided against the proposal on the grounds that he was too independent. Leicester Hemingway, who lived in Ernest's shadow, applied to COI/OSS but wound up doing radio intelligence for the FCC. He would eventually found an independent country on a coral reef in the Caribbean in order to mint and sell unique postage stamps. Looking for more glory than he was finding in the military police, John (Jack) Hemingway chanced upon an OSS unit in Northern Africa and became a full-fledged member of SO. See Nicholas Reynolds, *Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway's Secret Adventures, 1935–1961* (New York: William Morrow, 2017).
 21. Donovan was willing to employ women but had old-fashioned notions of where they should work and what they should do. For the conclusion that his approach was “not regressive,” see Katherine Breaks, “Ladies of the OSS: The Apron Strings of Intelligence in World War II,” *American Intelligence Journal* 13, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 91–96. There would ultimately be some 4,500 women in OSS, dozens of whom would see overseas service, but only a few of whom would work in enemy or neutral countries. Perhaps the most well-known female veteran of OSS was Julia McWilliams, who became Julia Child when she married another OSS veteran. See Jennet Conant, *A Covert Affair: The Adventures of Julia Child and Paul Child in the OSS* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011). See generally McIntosh, *Sisterhood of Spies*, and Ann Todd, *OSS Operation Black Mail: One Woman's Covert War against the Imperial Japanese Army* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017).
 22. Counting the members of OSS is tricky given the various types of affiliation and transfers in and out. It appears that on any given day, the number of employees and detailees never exceeded thirteen thousand. However, a good many more, perhaps as many as twenty thousand, were affiliated with OSS at some point. See Michael Warner, *The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000), 4. SOE, the wartime British paramilitary service, was of comparable size to OSS. SIS, or MI6, the British intelligence service, peaked at well over ten thousand during the war but included both codebreakers and spies. By comparison, a US Army division numbered about fifteen thousand.
 23. See for example a 1943 request by OSS for 454 army officers, 1,805 enlisted soldiers, and 89 members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. Director, OSS to Chief of Staff, US Army, May 20, 1943, Box 375, Entry UDI, RG 218, NARA II.
 24. Roger Hall, *You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 16. This is one of the better-known—and most irreverent—OSS memoirs.
 25. William J. Morgan, *The O.S.S. and I* (New York: Norton, 1957), 6. This book rivals Hall's for a sense of what it was like to sign up for OSS.

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26. The JIC produced a weekly roundup, but it did not contain any reporting from signals intelligence, while McCormack's Magic Summaries focused primarily on Magic intercepts. G-2 and ONI produced other, very specific reports such as summaries of ship sinkings. See for example John Patrick Finnegan and Romana Danysh, *Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: US Army, Center of Military History, 1998), 63.
27. See "OSS—Reports" in Box 154, PSF, FDRL.
28. Barry M. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 55.
29. See Richard Breitman with Norman J. W. Goda, "OSS Knowledge of the Holocaust," in Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), esp. 11–13. From 1943 on, OSS had a one-man desk gathering information on the Holocaust. S. Aronson, "Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial: The OSS, Charles Dwork, and the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 12, no. 2 (1998). Even though J. F. Carter and others reported accurately on the subject as early as 1942, the Roosevelt administration did not take action until January 1944 when it established the War Refugee Board. Usdin, *Bureau of Spies*, 185–6; Rebecca Erbelding, *Rescue Board* (New York: Doubleday, 2018). See also Richard Breitman, *Official Secrets, What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), esp. 116–120.
30. WJD to FDR, January 9, 1943, "OSS—Reports," Box 154, PSF, FDRL, advised that the digest was being discontinued by order of the JCS; Langer, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower*, 182–3. A "PW [Psychological Warfare] Weekly" with a narrower focus would be a partial replacement. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Life in the 20th Century* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 297–8. Schlesinger lamented that OSS reports went unread.
31. Rogers was also a member of a bewildering variety of other committees which were part of the staffs of JCS and OSS. See Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, xxiii–xxv.
32. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 21.
33. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 18.
34. His daily routine appears in various places in Rogers's diary. A good summary is at Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 181.
35. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 21.
36. The OSS mandate included the dissemination of black propaganda behind enemy lines—an operation usually associated with the Special Operations or Morale Operations Branches—which was split off from SO in March 1943. Complicating matters was a tendency by the military to define the term "psychological warfare" more broadly to include other types of unconventional warfare.
37. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 14–15.
38. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 112.

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39. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 156, 42. Lovell was largely free to invent as he pleased. However, both he and his staff lamented the general disorder, claiming that OSS was “wasting the time of scientists by unplanned orders for research.” Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 157. Lovell’s own memoir is *Of Spies and Stratagems*.
40. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 80.
41. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 66. See also p. 81: “neither Bill [Donovan] nor his loyal operators welcome planning or interference by authority, and they are by-passing the board.”
42. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 49.
43. For general information on Strong, see his personnel file in Box 1763, Entry NM 418, RG 165 (Records of the War Department General and Specific Staffs), NARA II; Rogers’s and Troy’s comments in Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 17, 17n, and 21; and Holt, *Deceivers*, 250.
44. It is possible that Strong and Donovan met during the First World War; they both fought in the Battle of Saint-Mihiel.
45. This is the thrust of Strong’s official complaints, as laid out in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, esp. 165–8.
46. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 17, 21. The date of their conversation was November 14, 1942.
47. Donovan Memo to Members of JPWC, Oct. 31, 1942, Box 371, RG 218, NARA II.
48. Donovan, Memoranda to JIC, October 21 and 22, 1942, quoted in Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 54. At this point, Strong was chairman of the JIC.
49. See Stout, “The Pond,” *Studies in Intelligence*.
50. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 80.
51. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 19. Rogers would work on a special plan for “military psychological warfare” in case Germany invaded Spain, a good example of a contingency plan. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 62, 64, 68.
52. Under what was known as the Murphy-Weygand Accord, the US would permit the French to buy goods on deposit. Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (New York: Pyramid Books, 1965), 99.
53. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 20. Rogers was off the mark here. OSS played a role in the political planning—but it was not the principal role, which was played by Roosevelt, Murphy, and Eisenhower.
54. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, 109–10. Murphy was grateful for the help but noted the danger in Donovan’s repeated failure to coordinate with other agencies. Another—and very casual—plan that Donovan hatched was to empower an American soldier named Charles Sweeney to go to French Morocco and explore the potential for organizing resistance against the Axis. Donovan asked the president’s approval to launch Sweeney. Roosevelt wrote “OK, Go Ahead” and initialed the document. Donovan to Roosevelt, January 9, 1942, Box 128, PSF, FDRL.

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55. Thomas W. Lippman, *Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East* (Vista, CA: Selwa Press, 2008), 7; “Colonel William A. Eddy, USMC (Retired),” ca. 1947, Biographical Files, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, VA.
56. Multiple sources mention a prosthesis. See for example Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961* (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 190. Still, his biographer Lippman does not. Amputation would not normally be indicated in ankylosis, Eddy’s condition.
57. C. A. Prettiman, “The Many Lives of William Alfred Eddy,” *Princeton University Library Chronicle* 53, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 206–7.
58. Lippman, *Arabian Knight*, 59.
59. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, 110. Murphy was accredited to the government in Vichy but spent much of 1942 moving around French North Africa.
60. Lippman, *Arabian Knight*, 62.
61. See Lippman, *Arabian Knight*, 64, quoting Eddy; Anthony Cave Brown, ed., *The Secret War Report of the OSS* (New York: Berkley, 1976), esp. 135–42.
62. See for instance Carleton S. Coon, *A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 1941–1943* (Ipswich, MA: Gambit, 1980).
63. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, 110. Eddy described Murphy as “the policy man.” Lippman, *Arabian Knight*, 65.
64. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 134–5; Lippman, *Arabian Knight*, 81–82. Dunlop, *Donovan*, 369, portrays Buxton as the host of the dinner in London, and the other guests as Generals George S. Patton and Jimmy Doolittle.
65. Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York: Enigma Books, 2007), 85.
66. Germany and Italy placed armistice commissions on French territory to monitor compliance with the terms of the French surrender in 1940. Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 85, quotes a lengthy passage from Eddy’s memo. Richard Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), 57, reports on Eddy’s proposal, and adds a citation to a postwar letter from Eddy.
67. William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), 112.
68. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, 110. This would have upset the French, not to mention the market for subversion. The French did not want anyone to interfere in the internal affairs of their colonies. \$50,000 was more than Murphy’s entire budget.
69. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, 127.
70. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 20, records Rogers’s belief that OSS played an important role in deceiving the Germans. Similarly, the War Report credits OSS with effecting this “large scale deception plan.” Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 145. An exhaustive study of Allied deception in World War II shows that the OSS initiative was but a small part of a complicated (and more successful) British campaign. Holt, *Deceivers*, 254–70.

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71. Frank Holcomb had received a direct commission into the Marine Corps Reserves. Like Eddy, he suffered from a leg injury that made him unfit for duty on the front lines. Nicholas Reynolds, "The 'Scholastic' Marine Who Won a Secret War: Frank Holcomb, the OSS, and American Double-Cross Operations in Europe," *Marine Corps History* 6, no. 1 (Summer 2020): 18–29. Malavergne kept a diary of his wartime experiences. Leon B. Blair, "Rene Malavergne and His Role in Operation Torch," *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* 4 (1979): 206–12.
72. Blair, "Rene Malavergne," 210.
73. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 144–5.
74. Lippman, *Arabian Knight*, 95; Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 140.
75. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 142. He also received the Silver Star. Frank Knox signed the citation for Malavergne's award.
76. Quoted in Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943* (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 123. Robert L. Melka, "Darlan between Britain and Germany 1940–41," *Journal of Contemporary History* 8, no. 2 (April 1973): 57–80, is a review of Darlan's views and policies highlighting his Anglophobia.
77. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, 162–3.
78. See for example Olson, *Citizens of London*, esp. 195, and Lynne Olson, *Last Hope Island: Britain, Occupied Europe, and the Brotherhood That Helped Turn the Tide of War* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2017), 224. Roosevelt's attitude was pragmatic; Darlan had given him Algiers, and that was all that mattered.
79. Brown, *Last Hero*, 254. Rogers's diary reflects the tension that he and others felt. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 19–20.
80. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 141; Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 144–5.
81. Quoted at length in Brown, *Last Hero*, 261–2. Brown notes that it is unclear for whom the memorandum, dated December 7, 1942, was intended, or even if it was delivered.
82. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 30, 28. What Rogers had in mind is not clear. During a meeting of the Planning Group, he used the phrase "disposing of Darlan," which appears to cover a range of possibilities from sidelining him to killing him. Taken together with Donovan's earlier memorandum, it is more likely that he was thinking of a political solution.
83. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 145.
84. See for example Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 140.
85. Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 191.
86. Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 191.
87. Since Murphy found Darlan useful, he had no motivation to sanction his killing. Nor did Roosevelt, to whom almost all US government officials deferred on life-or-death decisions. The president might have been guarded about Darlan's political legacy and future, but his chief of staff, Leahy, appreciated the benefits that Darlan conferred. Roosevelt was sympathetic

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- to a man whose son suffered from polio, the same disease that had crippled him. Roosevelt had even written to Darlan about his son, and would arrange for the young man to spend time in Warm Springs, Georgia, the spa that he owned and ran for polio victims. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, 164; Leahy, *I Was There*, 132.
88. One theory is that he was part of a conspiracy to restore the French monarchy in North Africa. The conspiracy might have been real even though the goal was not realistic. See for example Taylor, *Awakening from History*, 329.
 89. Taylor, *Awakening from History*, 330–1.
 90. It was Cordier who heard Bonnier de la Chapelle's confession and gave him absolution *before* he murdered Darlan.
 91. Coon, *A North Africa Story*, 47–48, 61–62. According to Brown, *Last Hero*, 269–70, 847n, Coon wrote a memorandum to Donovan in 1943 arguing for OSS to develop a capability for political assassination.
 92. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 32.
 93. Taylor, *Awakening from History*, 318.
 94. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, xxvi, 57; Dunlop, *Donovan*, 384–7.
 95. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 197. Roosevelt's calendar shows a thirty-five-minute meeting with Strong on February 18, 1943: "Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day," <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/february-18th-1943>.
 96. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 57.
 97. Donovan to Roosevelt, February 23, 1943, OSS Reports-Donovan-1941–3, Box 153, PSF, FDRL.
 98. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 201–3, is an excellent, carefully documented reconstruction of the bidding.

13: Traveling the World

1. The lines between OSS and military intelligence were always blurred. Generally speaking, the military used physical and aerial reconnaissance to gather information about the short-term and near distance, while OSS used spies and foreign contacts to look further out.
2. Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*. This is something like an autobiography written in collaboration with Moon, who served with Detachment 101. See also Carl F. Eifler Personnel File, Box 214, Entry 224, RG. 226, NARA II; Troy James Sacquety, "The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942–1945" (PhD diss., Texas A&M University, 2008); and Troy Sacquety, *The OSS in Burma: Jungle War against the Japanese* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2014).
3. War Department Travel Order for Major Carl F. Eifler, May 6, 1942, Eifler Personnel File.
4. Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 58.

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5. Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 25.
6. Eifler to Goodfellow, September 28, 1942, quoted in Smith, *OSS*, 248.
7. Quoted in W. R. Peers, "Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101," n.d., accessed July 13, 2020, CIA, <https://cia.gov/static/d09cbe41d73881b12671a029186525fc/Operations-of-OSS-Detachment101.pdf>. Stilwell's orders to the Detachment called for operations in the vicinity of the airbase at Myitkyina in northern Burma.
8. Mentioned in Eifler to Stilwell, November 11, 1942, Box 74, Entry 99, RG 226.
9. Brown, *Last Hero*, 412, quotes this report authored by an officer on Stilwell's staff, who apparently had limited expectations for the Detachment.
10. There are numerous accounts of this operation. The best is Eifler to Donovan, April 6, 1943, Folder for "CBI-OSS Under Stilwell," Box 74, Entry 99, RG 226. See also Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 115–9.
11. Citation for Legion of Merit, July 14, 1943, Eifler Personnel File. Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 332, is a contemporary letter written by Eifler about the incident. Sacquety, "Organizational Evolution," 77, discusses the group's fate.
12. Eifler to Donovan, April 6, 1943.
13. Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 120; Mark A. Bradley, *A Very Principled Boy: The Life of Duncan Lee, Red Spy and Cold Warrior* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 81. Sources vary on timing. Lee was with the Detachment in July and then again at the end of August, most likely into September.
14. Dunlop, *Donovan*, 421.
15. Lee to Donovan, October 20, 1943, quoted in Brown, *Last Hero*, 413. To similar effect, Peers, "Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101," and Sacquety, "Organizational Evolution," esp. 186, 203, 209–10. Under Peers, the Detachment would improve the quality of its intelligence reporting—which was primarily tactical—about enemy strength and location, roads and trails, or bombing targets. Later in the war, an R&A detachment would produce reports and briefings about Burma.
16. Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 120, 266–7. Eifler left little doubt that he and his men used harsh methods.
17. For the complete text of the October 1943 letter from Wingate, see Tom Moon, *This Grim and Savage Game: O.S.S. and the Beginning of U.S. Covert Operations in World War II* (Los Angeles: Burning Gate Press, 1991), 163–4. See also Hayashi, *Asian American Spies*, 115–6; Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 107–8. Another member of Detachment 101, Roger Hilsman, *American Guerrilla: My War behind Japanese Lines* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990), esp. 137–40, 187 discusses the related topic of tolerating torture by America's Kachin allies.
18. R. H. Oliver to "Miss Smith," June 20, 1944, Eifler Personnel File.
19. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 153. Their intent was also to generally streamline operations.

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20. Magruder to Donovan, September 11, 1943, "Letter to William J. Donovan," Electronic Reading Room (ERR), accessed January 19, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090004-7.pdf>.
21. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 153.
22. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 108.
23. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 156.
24. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 160.
25. Donovan to Magruder, November 8, 1943, quoted in Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 203.
26. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 174–5. According to Rogers, OSS played no part in the operation. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 131.
27. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 141; Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 178–9.
28. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 170.
29. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 79.
30. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 61.
31. Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington*, 170. Rogers would leave Washington and OSS on December 3, 1943.
32. Taylor, *Awakening from History*, 343–4.
33. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 204–5. Leahy, *I Was There*, 189, 491, mentions Donovan's briefing to Roosevelt. Dai Li, by most accounts a ruthless operator often likened to Heinrich Himmler, exchanged threats with Donovan. In the summer of 1943, Stilwell was still enamored with Eifler but did not fully trust Donovan, who, he told subordinates, was "out to screw us." "Meeting held Wed. June 16, 1943 at Gen. Stilwell's Home/Subject: OSS," reproduced in *NAPKO Project of OSS* (Seoul: South Korean Patriots and Veterans Administration Agency, 2001), 87–90.
34. Hilsman, *American Guerrilla*, 70. See also William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road* (New York: Avon Books, 1963), 26.
35. Dunlop, *Donovan*, 423.
36. Dunlop, *Donovan*, 423–5. Donovan and Eifler's combined weight was around 450 pounds. Dunlop conducted interviews with four of the officers involved in the Donovan visit: Eifler, Curl, Nicol Smith, and John Coughlin.
37. Vincent L. Curl Personnel File, Box 214, Entry 224, RG 226, NARA II.
38. Legion of Merit Award Citation, Oct. 12, 1944, Curl Personnel File.
39. Dunlop, *Donovan*, 425.
40. Donovan may have made up his mind to replace Eifler as early as October. Sacquety, "Organizational Evolution," 107n.
41. Yu, *OSS in China*, 134.
42. Sacquety, "Organizational Evolution," 114.
43. Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 178.
44. See Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, esp. 120, 266–7.
45. Detachment 101 was credited with killing some 5,500 Japanese and rescuing 574 Allied personnel at a minimal cost in American lives. Sacquety,

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- “Organizational Evolution,” 280–1; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, 252–5.
46. Sacquety, “Organizational Evolution,” 106. In 1944 and 1945, Eifler would run two missions impossible. Both were ill-conceived and fruitless. One was to stalk and possibly kill Werner Heisenberg, one of Germany’s principal atomic scientists, and the other was to launch a guerrilla war in Japanese-occupied Korea from mini semisubmersibles. See *NAPKO Project*; Nicholas Reynolds, “Missions Impossible: The Stranger than Fiction Career of the OSS’s Carl Eifler,” *World War II Magazine*, August 2019, 30–39.
 47. Stilwell had been the American China-Burma-India commander. After he was relieved in 1944, his command was split into China and Burma-India. Peers reported to Sultan, the Burma-India commander.
 48. Hilsman, *American Guerrilla*, 289–96, is a discussion of Detachment 101’s contribution to the war effort, concluding that guerrillas can never be more than a complement to conventional forces in a war between states.

14: The OSS, the NKVD, and the FBI

1. John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia* (New York: Viking, 1947), 50–51.
2. See for example Deane to Marshall, October 22, 1942, Section 1, Part 1, Box 371, RG 218.
3. Brown, *Last Hero*, 419–22, is a good discussion of these plans, with lengthy quotes from official memoranda. Beyond reporting atmospherics, those odd jobs would presumably become clear once the officer had assumed his position. A number of American companies were operating in the Soviet Union as part of the Lend-Lease Program.
4. Harriman to Roosevelt, March 18, 1944, Box 11, Map Room Papers, FDRL. In this cable, Harriman reviews the history of Donovan’s visit. See also W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946* (New York: Random House, 1975), 291–2.
5. Harriman to Roosevelt, March 18, 1944.
6. Earlier initiatives to establish a connection with Soviet intelligence had not borne fruit. Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era* (New York: Random House, 1999), 239–40.
7. Jenny and Sherry Thompson, *The Kremlinologist: Llewellyn E. Thompson, America’s Man in Cold War Moscow* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 31.
8. Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 292. According to Deane, Roosevelt spoke to Stalin at the Tehran Conference about the need for Soviet assistance against Japan and was rewarded with “the first hint that Russian help would be forthcoming.” Deane, *Strange Alliance*, 40–41.

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9. [Donovan], "Memorandum of Conversation at the Commissariat for Internal Affairs," December 27, 1943, in "Memoranda for the President: OSS-NKVD Liaison," CIA Historical Review Program Release, 1993, accessed September 17, 2020, CIA, <https://cia.gov/static/96846efedb50b770061aca98ae18d2c0/Memoranda-OSS-NVKD-Liaison.pdf>. The Soviet version tracks with Donovan's 1944 and Deane's postwar versions: "Report by G. Ovakimyan of 28.12.43 on Conversation Held by Fitin and Ovakimyan with Donovan and General Deane 27.12.43," White Notebook No. 1, 85, Vassiliev Papers, LoC.
10. Deane, *Strange Alliance*, 51.
11. [Donovan], "Memorandum of Conversation."
12. Deane, *Strange Alliance*, 53.
13. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 224.
14. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History 1929–1969* (New York: Norton, 1973), 155–6.
15. The exact date of Donovan's departure is not clear. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 224, places it on January 6, 1944. Deane and Harriman suggest a later departure.
16. "Red Agent Seized by FBI Men Here," *New York Times*, May 6, 1941.
17. These operations are the subject of Weinstein and Vassiliev, *Haunted Wood*, and John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, *Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
18. Hiss was a special assistant to the leadership at State, privy to the formation of US foreign policy. He was primarily handled by the GRU, but was well-known to the NKVD. White was second only to the secretary at Treasury for much of the war, drafting key policies. Both have been the subjects of biographies and lasting controversy even though the evidence of their espionage is now overwhelming.
19. There were at least twelve, and likely more. Haynes et al., *Spies*, 293, 328.
20. Bradley, *Very Principled Boy*, 37.
21. Not until after World War II did Soviet spies or Americans who spied for them face long jail terms—or even execution—if apprehended.
22. Bradley, *Very Principled Boy*, 68–73, describes the process. Lee can be said to have taken his social cover to the next level by having an affair with one of his contacts, Mary Price.
23. "Message from 'Koch' dated 17.1.44," White Notebook #1, 92–93. "Koch" was Lee's code name.
24. Donovan's purchase of a Soviet codebook from the Finns late in 1944 was not the act of a man who now believed in Soviet good will. See for example: Bradley F. Smith, *Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941–1945* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Press, 1996), 232–3.
25. A dispute concerning OSS operations against foreign embassies in Washington is cited as evidence of "visceral hatred" between Donovan and Hoover. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 127. See also Donald Downes, *The Scarlet*

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- Thread: Adventures in Wartime Espionage* (Cabin John, MD: Wildside Press, 2020), 93–94.
26. Hoover to Donovan, April 5, 1943, and Donovan to Hoover, April 9, 1943, Part 6, William J. Donovan File, accessed Mar. 28, 2022, <https://vault.fbi.gov/William%20J%20Donovan%20/>. To similar effect, see a courteous exchange of notes between Donovan and Hoover in November 1942 about “The War This Week,” 30, Part 3, William J. Donovan File, accessed Mar. 28, 2022, <https://vault.fbi.gov/William%20J%20Donovan%20/>.
 27. Hoover to Hopkins, February 10, 1944, printed in Whitehead, *FBI Story*, 228. Whitehead had access to FBI files when he wrote this book. Hoover wrote the foreword.
 28. “Message from ‘Koch’ dated 17.1.44.”
 29. Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 294–5; “Message from ‘Koch’ dated 17.1.44.”
 30. Bradley, *Very Principled Boy*, 88. See also: “Transcript of a Conversation Held by P. M. Fitin, Chief of the First Dir. of the USSR NKGB, and Ovakimyan, Deputy Chief of the First Dir. of the USSR NKGB, with Deane on 7.04.44,” White Notebook #1, 88. Some have read a threat into Hoover’s memo—namely, that he himself might leak the information. See Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 224–5.
 31. “Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day,” March 7, 1944, accessed September 17, 2020, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/march-7th-1944/>.
 32. Roosevelt to Harriman, March 15, 1944, Box 11, Map Room Papers, FDRL.
 33. Harriman to Roosevelt, March 18, 1944; Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 294. They had not actually penetrated the NKVD in the same sense that the NKVD had penetrated the US government; they had simply begun to establish a liaison relationship.
 34. Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 294.
 35. This is clear from various entries in Vassiliev, White Notebook #1, 95–102; Deane, *Strange Alliance*, 57.
 36. “‘Koch’ 11.12.44,” Vassiliev White Notebook #1, 97.
 37. “Message from ‘Koch’ dated 17.1.44.”
 38. For context, see: Smith, *Sharing Secrets with Stalin*. Smith argues that no one ally could produce the information needed to defeat Germany; reluctant allies needed to overcome their suspicions of each other for the duration of the war—and did so to a limited extent.
 39. CINRAD stood for Communist Infiltration of Radiation Laboratory, and COMRAP for Comintern Apparatus, the former to defend American technology, the latter to defend against political subversion. Well-placed white-collar spies like Duncan Lee were safe from the FBI for the time being.
 40. Tim Weiner, *Enemies: A History of the FBI* (New York: Random House, 2013), 97; Powers, *Secrecy and Power*, 254–5. Powers, who had early access

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- to FBI files, states the FY 1941 number as 1,596, and the corresponding 1944 number as 4,886.
41. See for example Weiner, *Enemies*, 83–86, 122; Batvinis, *Origins*, 94–95. Biddle was more successful than Jackson, but Hoover circumvented and outlasted both. Japanese Americans were not automatically included in the CDP; Hoover was against the administration's 1942 relocation program, which targeted ethnic groups regardless of citizenship. Powers, *Secrecy and Power*, 249–50.
 42. Roosevelt to Jackson, May 21, 1940, Jackson Folder, Box 57, PSF, FDRL.
 43. Batvinis, *Origins*, 127–34, 258, is a thorough discussion of this issue.
 44. Powers, *Secrecy and Power*, 257.
 45. Batvinis, *Origins*, 226–56, is an excellent description of the case.
 46. See for example: Samuel A. Tower, "FBI's Hidden Struggles against Spies Continues: J. Edgar Hoover," *New York Times*, February 11, 1945, a useful contemporary summary of the FBI's wartime accomplishments according to Hoover.
 47. FBI, "SIS Annual Report 1942–3," in FBI, *History of the SIS Division*, part 5, 7–8, accessed Sept. 1, 2020, <https://vault.fbi.gov/special-intelligence-service>.
 48. On the actual (and limited) danger from Nazi spies in Latin America, see David P. Mowry, *German Clandestine Activities in South America in World War II* (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, 1989), esp. v, 7–14, 57–58.
 49. Thomas D. Schoonover, *Hitler's Man in Havana: Heinz Lüning and Nazi Espionage in Latin America* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2008). Unless otherwise noted, Schoonover is the source for information on Lüning.
 50. Anon., "J. E. Hoover Praises Cuba on Spy Arrest," *New York Times*, Nov. 1, 1942.
 51. FBI, *SIS History*, part 3, 378–9. Of two leads described in this source, one turned out to be an unwitting Chilean, the other an Argentine whom the Abwehr never actually used. Per Schoonover, the FBI initially feared that Lüning could be "a master spy," instrumental in U-boat successes in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Schoonover, *Hitler's Man in Havana*, 11. Lüning did not in fact supply any actionable information to the Abwehr.
 52. Schoonover, *Hitler's Man in Havana*, xvii. The Bureau's disproportionate response to the Lüning case was evidence that the US exaggerated the Nazi threat in Latin America. Mowry, *German Clandestine Activities in South America in World War II*, esp. v.
 53. FBI, *SIS History*, part 3, 378.
 54. FBI, "SIS Annual Report 1943–1944," 63.
 55. FBI, *SIS History*, part 1, 63–65.
 56. FBI, *SIS History*, part 1, 65–68.
 57. FBI, "SIS Annual Report 1943–1944," 8–9.
 58. FBI, *SIS History*, part 1, 68–69.
 59. FBI, *SIS History*, part 1, 69. Berle did not, however, change his mind about the principal thrust of SIS's work. After the war he was effusive in his praise

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- of SIS's work, but primarily for its achievements in counterintelligence, "breaking one espionage ring after another." Berle to Hoover, September 17, 1946, quoted at length in FBI, *SIS History*, part 4, 659. The same source, from pages 645–67, contains testimonials from Foreign Service officers.
60. Powers, *Secrecy and Power*, 238, 247, 544n.
 61. Powers, *Secrecy and Power*, 237, 252. Powers made an approximate count of the reports in the FDRL.
 62. See Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 317. See also Katz, "The OSS and the Development of the Research and Analysis Branch," in Chalou, ed., *Secrets War*, esp. 46.
 63. See for example folders for "Justice—J. Edgar Hoover," Box 57, PSF, FDRL; "Office of Strategic Services: Donovan Reports," Boxes 147–154, PSF, FDRL.
 64. In 1944 General Marshall chided the president for seldom taking time to read the Magic Summaries. Marshall to Roosevelt, Feb. 12, 1944, copy in SRH 111, NCML.
 65. Even absent enemy action, long-distance wartime travel was risky.
 66. This was James Grafton Rogers's term for one of Donovan's brainstorm.

15: Breaking Codes, Forging Links

1. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, the target of a BSC intrigue, happily joined in the campaign, which would end in a démarche to the British ambassador in March 1942 that curtailed many of BSC's activities. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 37.
2. West, ed., *The Guy Liddell Diaries*, vol. 1, 116. The FBI would apply what Clegg learned to its operations in Latin America.
3. See Ewan Montagu, *Beyond Top Secret Ultra* (London: Peter Davies, 1977), 75–81, for the point of view of the British officer on the case, and Batvinis, *Hoover's Secret War*, 141–58, for that of an FBI case officer. Popov's German handlers asked him for information about Pearl Harbor a few months before the Japanese attack. Batvinis shows that the FBI did inform the navy of the German's request, absolving the Bureau of any implied blame. See also Aldrich and Cormac, *Black Door*, 100. However, one unevaluated bit of information was unlikely to have changed the outcome. Pearl Harbor was a systemic failure on many levels.
4. C. T. Edwards, "Exchange of Information with the United States Authorities," Sept. 1, 1940, CAB 81/98, TNA. Strong almost certainly exceeded his brief, making commitments that he was not authorized to make. Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 173.
5. Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 172–74, is a good overview.
6. Abraham Sinkov, NSA Oral History, May 1979, National Security Agency, accessed Oct. 31, 2020, <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/15/2002763513/-1/-1/0/NSA-OH-02-79-SINKOV.PDF>, is a good description of the various phases of the trip. See also David Sherman, *The First*

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- Americans: The 1941 US Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park* (Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2016).
7. Prescott H. Currier, NSA Oral History, Nov. 14, 1980, National Security Agency, accessed Oct. 31, 2020, <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/15/2002763432/-1/-1/0/NSA-OH-02-72-CURRIER.PDF>. The suspicion was that he might have other, unnamed assistants, perhaps including a native speaker of Japanese.
 8. Prescott H. Currier, "My 'Purple' Trip to England," *Cryptologia* 20, no. 3 (July 1996) in Deavours et al., *Selections from Cryptologia*, 288.
 9. Currier, NSA Oral History, 51.
 10. Currier, NSA Oral History, 34, 53, 55. He implied that the fact that Sinkov and Rosen both happened to be Jewish while he and Weeks were Gentiles was another limiting factor.
 11. There has been some dispute about the number of machines transported across the Atlantic. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 55–56. The number of machines is almost immaterial; the key fact is that the Americans were sharing hardware at all.
 12. He was the former foreign secretary who met Donovan in London in 1940.
 13. Currier, NSA Oral History, 60.
 14. Landis Gores, *Ultra: I Was There* (Morrisville, NC: Lulu, 2008), vol. 1, 7–8.
 15. Jeffery, *MI6*, 319. The deed named him as the owner. In 1939, GC&CS had something like one hundred employees.
 16. Prescott Currier and John Tiltman, "Presentation Given to Members of the Cryptanalysis Field," ca. 1974–5, 150, appended to Currier, NSA Oral History. Edward Travis, who would succeed Denniston as head of GC&CS, was also present. For a description of Denniston and his work, see Robin Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years: A. G. Denniston's Work in Signals Intelligence, 1914–1944* (Clifton-upon-Teme, UK: Polperro Heritage Press, 2007). The lifelong athlete Denniston played field hockey for Scotland at the Olympics before World War I.
 17. Tiltman would even move to the United States after the war, work for the US government, and die in Hawaii.
 18. The British were acutely aware of the difference between the two delegations. Sinkov and Rosen compared notes with Currier and Weeks, but only in a general way. Currier, NSA Oral History, 70.
 19. Michael Kerrigan, *Enigma Code Breakers* (London: Amber Books, 2018), 139, 148.
 20. John Tiltman, NSA Oral History, Dec. 17, 1978, National Security Agency, accessed Oct. 31, 2020, <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/15/2002763524/-1/-1/0/NSA-OH-07-78-TILTMAN.pdf>.
 21. F. H. Hinsley, "Introduction: The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War," in *Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park*, eds. F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 2. Hinsley also

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- wrote and edited an exhaustive official history of British intelligence in World War II. Keegan, *Intelligence in War*, 160–1, discusses which German codes were broken, and when and how they were broken.
22. Sinkov, NSA Oral History, 4.
 23. Denniston to “Director” [Menzies?], Aug. 5, 1941, HW 14/45, TNA. Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 178, discusses the presentation to the chiefs of staff and Churchill. See also Jeffery, *MI6*, 443.
 24. Tiltman, NSA Oral History, 6.
 25. Sinkov, NSA Oral History, 10.
 26. Weeks to Denniston, Mar. 3, 1941, HW 14/45, TNA.
 27. Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 359–62, uses the term “Rapid Analytic Machinery” and explains how they worked and why they were not exactly lineal ancestors of early computers.
 28. Currier and Tiltman, “Presentation,” ca. 1974–5.
 29. Currier, NSA Oral History, 65–66.
 30. Leo Rosen, NSA Oral History, Aug. 26, 1984, National Security Agency, accessed Oct. 31, 2020, <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/15/2002763514/-1/-1/0/NSA-OH-16-84-ROSEN.pdf>.
 31. GC&CS took their first steps thanks to the Polish codebreakers who had made the first inroads into German codes and shared their findings with their French and British counterparts before the Nazis invaded.
 32. The same was true on modern ships of the Royal Navy in 1941. American sailors were taken aback to discover that the brand-new battleship *Prince of Wales* did not carry typewriters. When the US transferred the fifty overage destroyers to Britain, they apparently had to be “de-modernized” to conform to British standards. Farago, *Tenth Fleet*, 152.
 33. Currier, NSA Oral History, 68.
 34. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 60–61.
 35. Denniston to Director, Aug. 8, 1941, HW 14/45, TNA; Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 208. SIS might have initiated the letter, but Op-20-G would have supported the request.
 36. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 89; Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years*, 21.
 37. Denniston, Notes, Aug. 14, 1941, HW 14/45, TNA. He later commented that “this feud between army and navy in USA” seemed incredible to him. Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years*, 18.
 38. [Denniston?], “Notes on Conference Held August 15th,” HW 14/45, TNA.
 39. [Denniston?], “Minutes of Conference, August 16, 1941,” HW 14/45, TNA.
 40. Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years*, 21.
 41. Denniston to A. J. L. Murray, Nov. 3, 1941, HW 14/45, TNA; Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 211.
 42. Denniston, “Impression,” [? Sept. 9, 1941], HW 14/45, TNA. He noted that his proposal for Anglo-American cooperation had been generally accepted by the army but not by the navy. In Denniston to Murray, Nov. 3, 1941, he commented favorably on Friedman’s reputation.

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43. Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years*, 19–20, 76–77, describes his father’s medical problems in 1941 and how treatment almost bankrupted him, a sad commentary on the low pay that the head of Bletchley Park received. His net monthly pay was roughly equivalent to \$140. A comparable American official would have earned roughly \$500 a month in 1941.
44. Alfred Dillwyn Knox was a brilliant but difficult British codebreaker. Denniston, “Impression,” [? Sept. 9, 1941]; Denniston to E. G. Hastings, Oct. 9, 1941, HW 14/15, TNA: “As to the famous Mrs. D. I have sent her nearly all she has asked for and asked her to prove her methods by success where we have failed.” She would continue to exasperate and even humiliate the British in 1942. GC&CS officer John Tiltman remembered going to a meeting with her that turned out to be a confrontation, after which he concluded that “she was rather like a conventional witch.” Tiltman, NSA Oral History, 9.
45. Denniston to Murray, Nov. 3, 1941.

16: Admiral Dönitz’s Unintended Contribution to Allied Victory

1. Walter R. Borneman, *The Admirals* (New York: Back Bay, 2013), 92. The British perception of King is captured by Patrick Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre 1939–1945* (New York: Ballantine, 1977), 111: the admiral was determined that the US Navy “should not again play second fiddle to the Royal Navy.”
2. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, 599. This was quite an admission considering all the other setbacks Churchill faced during the war. Military historian John Keegan approvingly quotes a comment by naval historian Clay Blair that Churchill’s fears were exaggerated, that the Germans could not have won the Battle of the Atlantic because the economic power of the Allies was too great; the *Kriegsmarine* would never be able to sink enough ships fast enough. This is not helpful for the historian interested in what the participants were thinking at the time. John Keegan, *Intelligence in War: The Value—and Limitations—of What the Military Can Learn About the Enemy* (New York: Knopf, 2003), 242.
3. Murray and Millett, *War to Be Won*, 244. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, 714, offers comparable statistics for 1940, including seventy-nine ships sunk in December for a total of 357,314 tons.
4. Churchill, *Grand Alliance*, 150.
5. Murray and Millett, *War to Be Won*, 246, conclude that “Ultra’s contribution to the anti-submarine battle now became the most significant intelligence victory of the war, and the only episode in which intelligence alone had a decisive impact on military operations.” Remembering Midway, Joe Rochefort might have disagreed that it was the *most* significant intelligence victory. Recent scholarship has modified Murray and Millett’s judgment somewhat, arguing that while signals intelligence was an important factor,

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- it was one among many. John Ferris, *Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History of GCHQ, Britain's Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency* (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2020), esp. 241–2.
6. Washington to C.S.S., Nov. 27, 1941, HW 14/45, TNA.
 7. C.S.S. to Washington, Dec. 1, 1941, HW 14/45, TNA. The British may have believed that they were being forthcoming, but once British and American codebreakers began to work more closely together, it became clear how much more there was to share.
 8. Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 126; Murray and Millett, *War to Be Won*, 250.
 9. A telling story that made the rounds among naval aviators in Florida was that the Coast Guard found a ticket stub from a Miami Beach theater in the pocket of a dead German sailor after his submarine sank. True or not, it reflected American perceptions of German prowess that were not far off the mark.
 10. Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, 117–20.
 11. Borneman, *Admirals*, 177.
 12. David Kohnen, *Commanders Winn and Knowles: Winning the U-Boat War with Intelligence, 1939–1943* (Krakow, POL: Enigma Press, 1999), 45–48.
 13. Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, 118.
 14. Tiltman, NSA Oral History, 8–9. He was presumably referring to solved Enigma messages especially relating to the German Navy.
 15. Kohnen, *Commanders Winn and Knowles*, 56.
 16. Kohnen, *Commanders Winn and Knowles*, 51–52.
 17. Kohnen, *Commanders Winn and Knowles*, 49.
 18. Farago, *Tenth Fleet*, 76, 203.
 19. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 78.
 20. FNU Barrett, “The Americans, the Navy Department and U-Boat Tracking” in “Operational Intelligence Centres, Formation and History,” [1945?], ADM 223/286, TNA. This appears to be part of a Royal Navy war report written soon after the receipt of a corresponding US Navy War Report in May 1945. This document quotes earlier reports by Winn, who made additional comments and corrections in his own hand. As Jason S. Ridler points out in *Mavericks of War: The Unconventional, Unorthodox Innovators and Thinkers, Scholars, and Outsiders Who Mastered the Art of War* (Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books, 2018), the British often seemed best at unorthodox ways of war.
 21. David Syrett, ed., *The Battle of the Atlantic and Signals Intelligence* (London: Routledge, 2018) is a collection of the Tracking Room’s remarkable reports.
 22. Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence*, 58–59.
 23. Kohnen, *Commanders Winn and Knowles*, 76–77.
 24. Barrett, “The Americans, the Navy Department and U-Boat Tracking.”
 25. Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence*, 114. Beesly was Winn’s wartime deputy, and presumably heard this story from him.

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26. Barrett, "The Americans, the Navy Department and U-Boat Tracking."
27. Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence*, 114.
28. Barrett, "The Americans, the Navy Department and U-Boat Tracking."
29. Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence*, 114.
30. Farago, *Tenth Fleet*, 205; Kohnen, *Commanders Winn and Knowles*, 78; Kenneth A. Knowles, Aug. 19, 1986, NSA Oral History, NCML.
31. Knowles, Oral History Interview, 2. Most covers portrayed sailors, but after Knowles left for Texas, the September 1, 1941, cover portrayed a female dancer from the Ziegfeld Follies in a bathing suit and yachting cap.
32. Knowles, Oral History Interview, 3.
33. Farago, *Tenth Fleet*, 205. Eachus and Ely were at Bletchley from July to October. They received "complete wiring diagrams and blueprints of the actual [British] bombs." Stephen Budiansky, "Bletchley Park and the Birth of the Very Special Relationship," in *Action This Day*, eds. Michael Smith and Ralph Erskine (London: Bantam, 2001), 226.
34. Knowles, Oral History Interview, 5–6.
35. Kohnen, *Commanders Winn and Knowles*, 84–116, contains a wealth of detailed information on its operations.
36. One two-by-eight-by-seven-foot bombe would cost roughly \$48,000—at a time when a brand-new destroyer cost about \$6,000,000. In 1943, the navy would order ninety-three bombs. Ralph Erskine, "Breaking German Naval Enigma on Both Sides of the Atlantic," in Smith and Erskine, eds., *Action This Day*, esp. 191–2. The German Navy had upgraded to a four-rotor system in early 1942.
37. This agreement has been called both the Travis-Wenger agreement (after Edward Travis, Denniston's replacement as head of GC&CS, and Joe Wenger of Op-20-G) and the Travis-Holden agreement (after Captain Carl F. Holden, the then director of Naval Communications). Erskine, "Breaking German Naval Enigma," in Smith and Erskine, eds., *Action This Day*, esp. 191. Under the agreement, the Japanese Navy would remain the primary responsibility of the US Navy. See also Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, esp. 61, and Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 237–9.
38. The US would come to have more—and faster—bombs than the British, able to process the sophisticated four-rotor U-boat traffic by the end of 1943. Kohnen, *Commanders Winn and Knowles*, 72, 104.
39. Knowles, Oral History Interview, 7. See also Kenneth A. Knowles, "The American View" in "Ultra and the Battle of the Atlantic," Symposium at USNA, October 28, 1977, National Security Agency, accessed Nov. 20, 2020, <https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-spectrum/Ultra.pdf>.
40. Farago's *Tenth Fleet* is an excellent description of the subject, based in part on the author's firsthand experience. Knowles incorporated his own firsthand insights when he reviewed Farago's book: Kenneth A. Knowles, "The *Tenth Fleet* by Ladislav Farago," book review, *Studies in Intelligence* 7,

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- no. 2 (Spring 1963): A19–A23. The British broke into the four-rotor U-boat code in December 1942; the American bombs came online in the spring and summer of 1943. Paul Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War* (New York: Random House, 2013), 5–73, discusses the Atlantic War and the Allies' array of weapons.
41. Knowles, "The American View," 14; Knowles, NSA Oral History. Exactly which sinkings prompted Winn's comment is not clear from either Knowles's interview or Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence*, 195–1. David Syrett, *The Defeat of the German U-Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 145–80, 271–2, is a detailed description of the battles in the summer of 1943.
 42. Knowles, "The American View," 14. To the same effect, see Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence*, 195–6.
 43. Over time, the British were increasingly inclined to the American point of view, accepting the need to eliminate the threat, not just avoid it, even if it entailed some risk to Ultra. See for example Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence*, 196.
 44. Knowles, "Tenth Fleet" book review.
 45. This correlated with British success at rerouting convoys out of harm's way.
 46. Keegan, *Intelligence in War*, 236, offers a good discussion of this ongoing process and how the German position was not unreasonable. To read Enigma messages, the Allies had to have the machine itself (or an analog), the rotors, the settings, and the bigrams—the codes that designated grid squares in the ocean—all of which the British eventually acquired.
 47. In early 1942, the B-Dienst broke into Naval Cipher No. 3, a joint system used by the British, Americans, and Canadians for routing convoys. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 118. Warner, *Rise and Fall of Intelligence*, 92–93, 103–4, makes the point that, like their allies, the Germans enjoyed occasional success at the tactical and operational levels, but could not compete with American and British intelligence at the strategic level.
 48. Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 248–50, 290–4. The British had been careful to not reference information that could have come only from a compromised German message in general message traffic.
 49. During World War II, both the US Navy and Army used the multirotor devices originally designed by Friedman and Rowlett that the enemy never broke. Especially while in enemy waters, US Navy submariners sent far fewer messages than their German counterparts, who were required to report almost daily. More air cover also might have helped the Germans. The Allies' advantage came from combined arms, especially coordination among air and sea forces. See Theodore R. Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations in World War II* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1949) and Mucklow, *SIGABA/ECM II Cipher Machine*.
 50. Knowles, "Tenth Fleet" book review.

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51. Though parts of the building were still under construction, some spaces were ready for tenants beginning in mid-1942.
52. Telford Taylor, NSA Oral History, Jan. 22, 1985, National Security Agency, accessed Dec. 4, 2020, <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/15/2002763518/-1/-1/0/NSA-OH-01-85-TAYLOR.pdf>.
53. A pioneer in artificial intelligence, Turing played a key role in applying his knowledge to codebreaking. At Bletchley Park, he was for a while the head of Hut 8, which was responsible for German naval codes.
54. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 97.
55. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 136–41. The army and the navy both had a stake in its development at Bell Laboratories.
56. Tiltman, NSA Oral History, Dec. 17, 1978, 16.
57. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 99–100. The Strong-Tiltman meetings occurred in late December, roughly the same time as Clarke approached Taylor. Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 297, has Tiltman generally advocating for collaboration.
58. Quoted in Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 138.
59. A well-documented version of the story is Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 97–103.
60. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 103. In December 1942 the army had contracted with AT&T to build bombes. The navy was contracting with National Cash Register for the same purpose. Friedman turned down a navy offer to join in the NCR contract. Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 297.
61. Tiltman, NSA Oral History, Dec. 17, 1978, 11.
62. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 145.
63. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 107.
64. Taylor to Clarke, Apr. 5, 1943, quoted at length in Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 298. See also Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 103–8.
65. Colin MacKinnon, ed., “Bletchley Park Diary, William F. Friedman,” 2013, accessed Dec. 10, 2020, Colin MacKinnon (website), https://colinmackinnon.com/attachments/The_Bletchley_Park_Diary_of_William_F._Friedman_E.pdf. The original is at NCML. I have also relied on MacKinnon, “William Friedman’s Bletchley Park Diary.”
66. For McCormack’s official explanation, see Alfred McCormack, “War Experience of Alfred McCormack,” 9–10, SRH 185. See also Louis T. Stone Jr., “Memorandum Describing American Liaison,” Oct. 12, 1945, SRH 153, NCML.
67. MacKinnon, ed., “Bletchley Park Diary, William F. Friedman,” 4; Taylor, NSA Oral History.
68. Denniston was the GC&CS managing director through 1941. In early 1942, he became duty director (C) for civilian traffic and moved to the London office, while Edmund Travis took over at Bletchley as deputy director (S) for military traffic. In 1944, Travis would become director of GC&CS.

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69. As implied above, the army's dispute with GC&CS was not over diplomatic traffic, but over German military traffic and the technology used to break it.
70. Alastair Denniston, "Informal Memorandum by Cmdr. Denniston Outlining His Original Concept of the American Liaison," May 1943, reproduced in Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years*, 158–62.
71. Taylor, NSA Oral History.
72. London to Washington, May 21, 1943, reproduced in Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years*, 123.
73. London to Washington, May 21, 1943; London to Washington, May 22, 1943, reproduced in Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years*, 137–41.
74. London to Washington, June 6, 1943, reproduced in Denniston, *Thirty Secret Years*, 144–5.
75. D. R. Nicoll, "Sir Edward Wilfrid Harry Travis," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed Dec. 18, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/61098>; F. H. Hinsley, "Alexander Guthrie (Alastair) Denniston," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed Dec. 18, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/32783>.
76. MacKinnon, ed., "Bletchley Park Diary, William F. Friedman," 13.
77. For Friedman's detailed and highly technical report, see: William F. Friedman, "Report on E Operations of the GC&CS at Bletchley Park," Aug. 12, 1943, accessed Dec. 10, 2020, Colin MacKinnon (website), https://colinmackinnon.com/attachments/Report_bw_200_dpi_all_pages.pdf. US Navy codebreakers had, of course, already established a foothold at Bletchley and were cooperating successfully with the British. Friedman's unique background enabled him to see and understand more than they had.
78. MacKinnon, ed., "Bletchley Park Diary, William F. Friedman," 31 *passim*.
79. MacKinnon, ed., "Bletchley Park Diary, William F. Friedman," 73. As director of naval communications, Redman oversaw the work of Op-20-G, Wenger's home base.
80. The original title of the document was "Agreement between the British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department." It has also been known as the BRUSA agreement, an abbreviation the British originally used for a British-USA communications circuit. See MacKinnon, "Bletchley Park Diary, William F. Friedman," 6n, and Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 108–9. The agreement was signed by Strong and Travis on May 17, but not ratified by Marshall's office until June. The inclusion of Japanese and German traffic made the agreement two-sided, with each party contributing its flagship product. The agreement covered intelligence and counterintelligence traffic but not diplomatic or naval traffic.
81. MacKinnon, ed., "Bletchley Park Diary, William F. Friedman," 79.
82. MacKinnon, ed., "Bletchley Park Diary, William F. Friedman," 123.

17: Intelligence and the Main Event

1. MacKinnon, ed., “Bletchley Park Diary,” 155–7.
2. Taylor’s approach was to trust but verify. To ensure important material was getting through, he violated the agreement once or twice, sending it through both British and American channels. Taylor, *NSA Oral History*.
3. Asa Briggs, *Secret Days: Codebreaking in Bletchley Park* (S. Yorkshire, UK: Frontline Books, 2011), 23.
4. Alfred Friendly, “Confessions of a Code Breaker,” *Washington Post*, Oct. 27, 1974. See also Gores, *Ultra: I Was There*, esp. vol. 1, 3–90.
5. Under various agreements negotiated in 1942 and 1943, OSS obtained access to counterintelligence decrypts. OSS would not, however, receive access to other Axis traffic. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 109; Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 131–72.
6. Section V’s duties included: developing all-source information on hostile intelligence services, running double agents overseas, and controlling the analysis and use of intercepts. Naftali, *X-2*, 82; Muggeridge, *Chronicles*, esp. 401. “Counterintelligence” is the more general term for this function; “counterespionage” is the specific term for combatting enemy spies.
7. Jimmy Burns, *Papa Spy: Love, Faith, and Betrayal in Wartime Spain* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 158–9.
8. MI6 to MI5 teleprinter message, Jan. 26, 1941, Ángel Alcázar de Velasco File, KV 2–3535, TNA.
9. Extracts from Foreign Office Files, January 1941, in Alcázar File, KV 2–3535.
10. Burns, *Papa Spy*, 166–7; Philby, *My Silent War*, 60–61.
11. J. C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System: The Incredible True Story of How Nazi Spies Were Turned into Double Agents* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 57–58.
12. Holt, *Deceivers*, 163. Masterman in *Double-Cross System*, 59, contented himself with a discreet reference to “a study of secret sources” that had unmasked the spy.
13. Masterman expanded this list to seven goals. Masterman, *Double-Cross System*, 58. See also Ben Macintyre, *Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies* (New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2013).
14. See for example Naftali, *X-2*, 46–47, 67. Donovan barely tolerated those who wanted to conduct background investigations of employees. Some members of MI6 also held the opinion that counterintelligence was less important in wartime. See for example Philby, *My Silent War*, 59.
15. Naftali, *X-2*, 13, 66–67.
16. Naftali, *X-2*, 80–81.
17. Donovan to Strong, Sept. 7, 1942, quoted in Naftali, *X-2*, 101.
18. Naftali, *X-2*, 139–40; Robin W. Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961* (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 261.

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19. Naftali, *X-2*, 141–2.
20. Winks, *Cloak & Gown*, 251, 262.
21. Naftali, *X-2*, 95–96, 174, 195–6.
22. Winks, *Cloak & Gown*, 263.
23. Philby, *My Silent War*, 85.
24. Winks, *Cloak & Gown*, 286–7; Muggeridge, *Chronicles*, 398–9.
25. Cowgill and Pearson eventually formed a strong personal friendship that included their families. Winks, *Cloak & Gown*, 288–9; Naftali, *X-2*, 212.
26. Muggeridge, *Chronicles*, 401. Naftali, *X-2*, 213, and Winks, *Cloak & Gown*, 267–8, describe a similar process for the Americans.
27. For example, a 1943 decrypt revealed a German plan to deceive Eisenhower about Axis troop movements in Tunisia. Naftali, *X-2*, 219. See also Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 89.
28. Winks, *Cloak & Gown*, 274.
29. Cutler, *Counterspy*, 13.
30. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 89; Naftali, *X-2*, 300. Donovan signed the order at the urging of his longtime assistant, James R. Murphy.
31. Cutler, *Counterspy*, 13.
32. See chapter 11 prior and Nelson D. Lankford, *The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of Ambassador David K. E. Bruce* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996), 130. Initially known as “Special Activities/Bruce,” it had by now morphed into the Secret Intelligence Branch.
33. Nelson D. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich: The World War II Diaries of Colonel David K. E. Bruce* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 17.
34. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 23–24.
35. For the months before D-day, see US Office of Strategic Services, “Report on OSS Activities for the Month of June 1944,” OSS Monthly Activity Reports—May [*sic*] 1944, ERR, accessed Jan. 19, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140008-1.pdf>.
36. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 335. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, puts the total at 2,900 in July 1944. MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London* is a detailed scholarly study of the base. The unpublished, more specific war report is US Office of Strategic Services, “History of London Station,” Roll 10, Microfilm 1623, RG 226, NARA II. OSS London’s original mission was maintaining relations with foreign intelligence agencies and channeling useful reports back to Washington.
37. See chapter 1 prior.
38. See chapter 1 prior. One of the best German cases was run by the Czechoslovak secret service. František Moravec, *Master of Spies: The Memoirs of General František Moravec* (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 165–75. See also Jeffery, *MI6*, 475–506, and Olson, *Last Hope Island*, esp. chapter 10.
39. Section V’s Philby was just one member of a large spy ring. Similarly, Duncan Lee was but one of many Soviet spies in the US government. Richard Sorge was a communist posing as a loyal German correspondent in Tokyo.

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40. Moravec, *Master of Spies*, 194–211. See also Callum MacDonald, *The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich* (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2007) and Douglas Dodds-Parker, *Setting Europe Ablaze* (Windlesham, UK: Springwood Books, 1983), 96. Neither SIS nor SOE favored targeted killings after the Heydrich operation. Jeffery, *MI6*, 538–40.
41. While committing unconscionable errors in tradecraft, like dressing two agents in matching outfits and ignoring danger signals built into communication plans, SOE fell victim to a well-run German double agent operation. See for example: M. R. D. Foot, *SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940–46* (London: London Bridge, 1984), 130–4, and Olson, *Last Hope Island*, esp. chapters 11, 15, and 16. The Dutch debacle and its effects ripple through the classic memoir by SOE codemaker Leo Marks, *Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War, 1941–1945* (London: Free Press, 2000). On page 148, he recounts how SOE oversold its capabilities to OSS.
42. Dodds-Parker, *Setting Europe Ablaze*, 104. Though the date of the visit is not clear, it may have been in June 1942.
43. London to Gibraltar, Jul. 19, 1942, HS 8–13, TNA.
44. Compare for example Dodds-Parker, *Setting Europe Ablaze*, 86–87, with Lovell, *Of Spies and Stratagems*, 23, 29–66. The two services developed almost identical gadgets that ran the gamut from the murderous to the ridiculous.
45. CD [Hambro] Minute on DCDO to CD, Jan 12, 1943, HS 8–37, TNA.
46. Draft of letter from Gubbins to Cadogan, Sept. 1943, HS 8–7, TNA. See also chapter 6 prior for the 1942 agreement that divided the world geographically, basically granting OSS rights to parts of the world that the British were less interested in.
47. Occupied by Germany in 1941, Yugoslavia was the scene of a three-way guerrilla war among Josep Tito's communists, Dragoljub Mihailović's noncommunist irregulars, and the Nazis. The British and the Americans struggled over whether they should support one or both of the anti-Nazi groups. Smith, *OSS*, 129–62, is an admirable overview. See also Franklin Lindsay, *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).
48. The diplomat Maclean was a temporary brigadier, favored by Churchill and generally considered to be the senior British officer in Yugoslavia. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 186–7, describes the personal conflict. Donovan's attack on Maclean included the threat that, if pressed, the Americans would treat the British like the enemy. Even after seventy-five years, the hostility is almost palpable in files such as Cairo to London, Nov. 20, 1943, HS 8–7, TNA, which begins "General Donovan has demanded . . ." Another document in the same file attests to SOE's sense that Donovan could not be trusted to honor Anglo-American agreements. CD to Cadogan draft, Sept. 1943, HS 8–7, TNA.

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49. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 334–62, is an overview of “the principal OSS effort of the European war.” R&A supplied “necessary basic information” about France and Germany. OSS, “European Theater Report Digest, November, 1943” in OSS Monthly Activity Reports, European Theater, 1943, ERR, accessed Jan. 19, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140002-7.pdf>. R&A also assessed the various European resistance movements with varying degrees of success. See also MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London*, chapters 4 and 5; Christof Mauch, *The Shadow War against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America’s Wartime Secret Intelligence Service* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), esp. 63–106. MacPherson sees R&A trying and failing to be relevant; Mauch sees R&A making a difference in its analyses of strategic bombing. Mauch, *Shadow War*, 137 et seq., describes MO black propaganda but seems reluctant to draw conclusions about its value. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 73, is a 1944 discussion of MO. Cutler, *Counterspy*, 16 discusses how X-2 prepared for D-day, noting how the branch extracted information from detailed—and decrypted—German messages.
50. In January 1943, SOE and SO London agreed on “operational arrangements.” Wyman W. Irwin, “A Special Force: Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project in Support of Operation Overlord” (MA diss., U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS, 1991); MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London*, 70–80. SO London opted to organize along the same lines as SOE.
51. Quoted in Abrutat, *Vanguard*, 83–84. For Spartan, see Irwin, “A Special Force,” 42, 54–55.
52. In the spring of 1944, SO/London was still very much the junior partner in the SOE/SO relationship due to the fact that it had deployed a comparatively small number of agents to the continent—less than twenty at that point. The Jedburghs would change that situation. They were originally intended to supplement larger SOE/SO operational groups with an almost identical mission. See Troy J. Sacquety, “OSS, Office of Strategic Services, A Primer on the Special Operations Branches and Detachments of the Office of Strategic Services” in Sacquety, ed. *OSS, Office of Strategic Services, Primer & Manuals* (Ft. Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2013).
53. Irwin, “A Special Force,” 67–68. Bruce wrote that the choice was work with SOE on Jedburgh operations or forgo cooperation with SOE. At this stage of the war, OSS would have found it difficult to go it alone.
54. Hall, *You’re Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger*, 62. Other firsthand accounts include: Ib Melchior, *Case by Case: A U.S. Army Counterintelligence Agent in World War II* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993) and William J. Morgan, *The O.S.S. and I* (New York: Curtis Books, 1957).
55. Hall, *You’re Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger*, 32. Hall was the cousin of Virginia Hall, a well-known OSS operative.

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56. Joseph F. Haskell to Supreme Allied Commander [Eisenhower], Jan. 11, 1944, HS 6, TNA. This file contains foundational material on the OSS-SOE relationship.
57. The Overlord operations plan called first for Allied air forces to bomb bridges and rail yards, then for the Resistance to sabotage the railroads, phone lines, and power grid before ambushing German troops moving toward the coast. Thereafter, the Resistance would shift to “a more general campaign of guerrilla warfare.” Will Irwin, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 68.
58. Max Hastings, *Das Reich: The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division through France, June 1944* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2013), 131–2.
59. MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London*, 59–60.
60. See for examples OSS, “European Theater Report Digest, October 1943” and “European Report Digest, December 1943” in OSS Monthly Activity Reports, European Theater, 1943, ERR, accessed Jan. 19, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140002-7.pdf>. The agreement was reached on October 30 at a meeting attended by Bruce and a number of senior officers.
61. Quoted in OSS, “European Theater of Operations Report January 1944,” OSS Monthly Activity Reports—January 1944, ERR, accessed Jan. 19, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140005-4.pdf>.
62. Frances P. Miller, *Man from the Valley, Memoirs of a 20th Century Virginian* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 112–3. David Abrutat, *Vanguard*, 82–83, is an up-to-date overview of Sussex.
63. OSS, “Report on OSS Activities for the Month of May 1944,” OSS Monthly Activity Reports—May 1944, ERR, accessed Jan. 19, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140008-1.pdf>.
64. OSS, “Report on OSS Activities for the Month of June 1944” in OSS Monthly Activity Reports May [sic], 1944, ERR, accessed Jan. 19, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140008-1.pdf>; Jeffery, *MI6*, 538. In the words of one SHAEF officer, spotting Panzer Lehr was enough to justify the effort that had gone into the program. Miller, *Man from the Valley*, 113.
65. Abrutat, *Vanguard*, is an overview of all intelligence and reconnaissance before D-day. See also F. H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, abridged ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 436–7. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 72, cites Bruce on information from the French Resistance. See also Douglas J. Porch, *The French Secret Services, From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1995), 245–9.
66. American and British codebreakers both contributed to identifying most of the German formations in France. See David Kenyon, *Bletchley Park and*

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- D-Day* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), esp. 148. “History of the Special Branch,” SRH 035, 59, proudly reported “the publication, about ten days before . . . D-Day of the complete German order of battle” in Normandy.
67. Quoted in Boyd, *Hitler’s Japanese Confidant*, 105–6.
 68. Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 259–60. See also Holt, *Deceivers*, 565–7.
 69. Eisenhower made a special point of extending his personal thanks to the army codebreakers who, in Rowlett’s words, “had produced information on . . . German fortifications . . . vital to the success of the invasion. . . .” Boyd, *Hitler’s Japanese Confidant*, 179.
 70. Miller, *Man from the Valley*, 112. Miller was writing from memory: “Though I took no notes, I will never forget his words.” His memory tracks with another meeting that Donovan called after D-day, as well as Bruce’s diary.
 71. Miller, *Man from the Valley*, 115; Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 106.
 72. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 239. This was consistent with the elaborate precautions taken to protect Overlord, including travel and communications bans. Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, 442.
 73. This was the apparent result of an appeal by Donovan to Forrestal: WJD to Forrestal, May 9, 1944, requesting him to write to the navy commander in chief in Europe and “ask if he could take care of David Bruce and myself.” Box 2, Cave Brown Papers. Forrestal’s cable is quoted in Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 239. Donovan’s friend and protector Secretary Knox had died in April 1944 of a heart attack; Undersecretary Forrestal replaced him.
 74. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 47. This is Bruce’s contemporary diary, an excellent primary source for this period.
 75. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 63.
 76. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 56.
 77. The deception was known by the overall codename Bodyguard, and had two main parts, Fortitude North, the notion that the British and Americans planned to invade Norway, and Fortitude South, aimed at convincing the Germans that Normandy was a feint. To support Bodyguard, military intelligence officers created the fictitious First US Army Group, supposedly under the command of then lieutenant general George S. Patton, and MI5 double agents fed misleading reports to the Abwehr. The deception was bolstered by years of intricate work, mostly by British officers who invented and sustained mythical units that made the Anglo-American forces seem about a third stronger than they actually were. Bodyguard has been hailed as “the most successful strategic deception of all time.” Holt, *Deceivers*, 590. Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 258, 261, generally concurs, noting the close cooperation between the deceivers and Bletchley Park. Other works qualify those judgments somewhat. Mary Kathryn Barbier, *D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007) analyzes the questions of success and effect. (Were the Germans deceived? If so, did it make a difference?) Peter Caddick-Adams, *Sand and Steel: The D-Day Invasion and the Liberation of France*

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- (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), shows how difficult it is to isolate the effect of intelligence on this battle. See also Kenyon, *Bletchley Park and D-Day*, esp. 157–179 and Nigel West, *Codeword Overlord: Axis Espionage and the D-Day Landings* (Stroud, UK: History Press, 2019). By inflating the strength of the Anglo-American armies, the least the Allied deceivers did was to enable the German belief that Eisenhower had enough forces for a second landing.
78. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 65.
 79. This oft-told story of Donovan's D+1 adventure appears in a letter that Bruce wrote in 1958 and in an after-dinner speech by Bruce in 1971. Though it may have been embellished, it is not inconsistent with his diary. The letter is described in Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 220; the speech is quoted at length in Smith, *OSS*, 184–5.
 80. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 65–66.
 81. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 220. Recent works have suggested that Bradley was not the good-natured soldier's general portrayed in early histories. See for example Murray and Millett, *War to be Won*, 418.
 82. According to their monthly situation report, "the Allied forces on the beachhead were supported by [OSS] agents . . . who provided intelligence on [the] enemy order of battle and contributed to the great eruption of sabotage and open fighting which impeded the German . . . counter blow." OSS, "Report on OSS Activities for the Month of June 1944."
 83. See Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 70–71, for Bruce's detailed diary entry.
 84. Quoted in Lankford, *Last American Aristocrat*, 159. That officer was Col. Benjamin A. Dickson, the First Army G-2 officer.
 85. Stimson Diary, entry for June 15, 1944; WJD to FDR, June 14, 1944, describes his D-day adventure, Box 2, Cave Brown Papers. See also Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 248.
 86. US War Department, Strategic Services Unit, *War Report of the OSS* (New York: Walker, 1976), vol. 2, ix. Bruce was aware of what he called "the strict orders against D[onovan] being anywhere near Normandy." Quoted in Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 220. Donovan's attitude was "Do as I say, not as I do"; in September 1944, he was outraged by the conduct of OSS officers who were captured by the Germans while on a joyride near the German-Luxembourg border, and later moved to discipline one of the survivors, claiming that he was "absent without leave and had no orders whatever permitting him to make [that] trip." Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 293–5; Peter Finn, *A Guest of the Reich: The Story of American Heiress Gertrude Legendre's Dramatic Captivity and Escape from Nazi Germany* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2019), esp. 182. One of the OSS officers was an X-2 officer, indoctrinated into the Ultra secret. An example of Churchill's attitude comes from the case of Air Cdre. Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman, RAF, who flew a mission over France in May 1944 even though he was

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fully briefed on the plans for D-day. When he was shot down, Churchill immediately ordered that no effort be spared to rescue him, and that if he could not be rescued, he must be killed. David Stafford, *Churchill and Secret Service* (New York: Overlook Press, 1997), 290; M. R. D. Foot and J. M. Langley, *MI9: Escape and Evasion. 1939–1945* (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown, 1980), 211.

18: A Dream Come True

1. William J. Casey, *The Secret War against Hitler* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1988), 186, differentiates between “tactical” intelligence, what an army unit obtained locally from short-range patrols, prisoners of war, or aerial reconnaissance, and “strategic” intelligence from deep penetrations and agent operations.
2. Distinguished historian Max Hastings, in *Secret War*, 488–90, concludes that “the most ruthless and cynical operations run by all intelligence services [in World War II] were those involving short-range spies—locally recruited civilians dispatched to report what they could see behind the enemy’s front line.” His evidence is largely anecdotal and focuses on German and Soviet practices. His American examples are unproductive operations in Belgium in the desperate days after the Battle of the Bulge and in Germany in the spring of 1945. As Bruce was about to learn, the army had a more positive view of OSS operations in France in 1944.
3. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 89.
4. OSS London, “ETO Theater Report,” Jul. 1, 1944, quoted in MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London*, 85–86. The report concluded that “OSS is therefore in a position where it must give full support to its field units, even though they may have been considered as subsidiary and incidental to the long-range activities of the organization.” The OSS teams at the division level were a mix of SO and SI officers.
5. Reports of the numbers of such leads vary. A conservative estimate is that X-2 started with one hundred names. MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London*, 195. X-2 was also beginning to double some of these agents back against the Germans, a mission which it learned to perform well. Reynolds, “The ‘Scholastic’ Marine Who Won a Secret War.”
6. OSS, “Summary of OSS Activities during August 1944,” OSS Activities Aug. 1944, ERR, accessed Feb. 3, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp13x00001r000100140010-8>.
7. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 89, 97.
8. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 122–3.
9. Smith, *OSS*, 177–8; Brown, *Last Hero*, 324–6. The agents in Penny Farthing were not unlike line-crossers and were for the most part volunteers. For a remarkable inside look, see Hélène Deschamps with Karyn Monget, *Spyglass: An Autobiography* (New York: Henry Holt, 1995), 238–81.

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10. OSS, "Summary of OSS Activities during August 1944"; Brown, *Last Hero*, 586–7. According to Brown, the other services that contributed intelligence were the French and British—presumably resistance sources reporting to military intelligence.
11. Quoted in Porch, *French Secret Services*, 558. As noted above, the US military relied mostly on OSS to handle spies who did not speak English.
12. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 256–8, 264–7; Smith, *OSS*, 103. Donovan claimed to be personally fond of the Pope, who is generally not regarded as a hail-fellow-well-met. On May 10, the Pope granted an audience to the senior SS man in Italy, Karl Wolff, who claimed that he was committed to ending the war. Not unlike the Pope, Weizsäcker turned out to be another fence-sitter; he did not live up to his OSS codename.
13. Quoted in Lankford, *Last American Aristocrat*, 155. Much the same story is told from Hemingway's point of view in Reynolds, *Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy*, 165–71.
14. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 166. Settling scores would be a continuing part of France's liberation from the Nazis.
15. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 163–4. Initially inclined to cut off and surround the French capital, Eisenhower hesitated to attack the city itself.
16. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 164–5. There is no record of more conventional clandestine reporting from within Paris, like a Sussex team or a resistance cell with a transmitter.
17. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 170.
18. Reynolds, "The 'Scholastic' Marine Who Won a Secret War," 26, quoting Frank Holcomb.
19. Ronald C. Rosbottom, *When Paris Went Dark: The City of Light under German Occupation, 1940–1944* (New York: Back Bay Books, 2014), 310–47, describes the liberation and the controversies surrounding it, including whether Choltitz deserves credit for saving the city from destruction.
20. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 181.
21. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 185, 189. Casey in *Secret War*, 174, had much the same impression.
22. OSS, "Summary of OSS Activities during August 1944."
23. T. J. Betts to J. Haskell, Jul. 27, 1944, in OSS-European Theater of War/Operation Overlord, ERR, accessed Feb. 10, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100220002-8.pdf>.
24. See G. L. King to 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Jun. 2, 1945 in OSS-European Theater of War/Operation Overlord.
25. Eisenhower to Gubbins and Bruce, May 31, 1945, reproduced in Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 461–2.
26. Hastings, *Das Reich*, 220. Hastings's book is a case study of the extent to which the Resistance, supported by the SOE and the OSS, impeded German movement. He concludes that other factors held equal or greater sway.
27. Casey, *Secret War*, 172.

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28. OSS, "Summary of OSS Activities during September 1944," OSS Activities Sept. 1944, ERR, accessed Feb. 18, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp13x00001r000100140011-7>. This report cites the address as 79 Champs-Élysées.
29. Quoted in Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, *OSS Exhibition Catalogue* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2015), 15.
30. Robert H. Alcorn, *No Bugles for Spies* (New York: Popular Library, 1964), 95.
31. While she was working for the Department of State before the war, Hall's supervisor noted approvingly that she had little interest in fashion or cosmetics, but disapprovingly that she did not care much for office work or typing either. Cara Moore Lebonick, "The Secrets of the Office of Strategic Services Personnel Records: Spotlight on Virginia Hall," Apr. 16, 2020, accessed Feb. 17, 2021, *The Text Message* (blog), National Archives, <https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2020/04/16/the-secrets-of-the-office-of-strategic-services-personnel-records/>. According to Donovan, "Only a small percentage of the [OSS] women ever went overseas, and a still smaller percentage was assigned to actual operations behind enemy lines." Quoted in Elizabeth McIntosh, *Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 11. McIntosh herself was on active duty in China in morale operations. Ann Todd, *Operation Black Mail: One Woman's Covert War Against the Imperial Japanese Army* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017). A number of women were hired as clerks and then distinguished themselves in the foreign field, such as the X-2 operative Betty Lussier. Betty Lussier, *Intrepid Woman: Betty Lussier's Secret War, 1942-1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010).
32. Virginia Hall, "Activity Report," Sept. 30, 1944, accessed Feb. 17, 2021, National Archives Catalog, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/595661>. Hall notes that she personally did not take part in any of the teams' many sabotage operations.
33. OSS, "Summary of OSS Activities during August 1944."
34. Casey, *Secret War*, 170.
35. OSS, "Summary of OSS Activities during September 1944."
36. See for example: Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 190. On October 29, Bruce was working on a list of possible replacements for ETO staff, starting with himself.
37. Casey, *Secret War*, 177.
38. Quoted in Joseph E. Persico, *Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey: From the OSS to the CIA* (New York: Penguin, 1991), 41.
39. MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London*, is a detailed analysis of how OSS London functioned.
40. Persico, *Casey*, 58. Casey, *Secret War*, 22-23, is more upbeat about his first day at work in London, and places his arrival in late October 1943, as does

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- his OSS personnel file. "William J. Casey," OSS Personnel Files, RG 226, NARA II, College Park, MD.
41. Quoted in Persico, *Casey*, 58.
 42. Quoted in Persico, *Casey*, 57, 61.
 43. Donovan, "Future OSS Operations in Central Europe," Sept. 2, 1944, quoted in MacPherson, *American Intelligence*, 161, and Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 269.
 44. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 268–9. The future Supreme Court justice's job was to develop ways to use the European labor movement against Germany. An early indication of the shift in priorities appeared in Bruce's diary on August 30: "We are now to make the penetration of Germany our prime objective." Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 182. MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London*, 166, has Casey drafting a memo on the subject on September 11.
 45. Casey to Donovan, Oct. 12, 1944, attaching "OSS Program against Germany," reproduced in Casey, *Secret War*, 251–9.
 46. Chief, SI, ETO [Casey] to CO, OSS, ETO [Forgan], "Final Report on SI Operations into Germany," Jul. 24, 1945, reproduced in Casey, *Secret War*, 279–96.
 47. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 515–6, reviews the situation and notes that the brunt of the German offensive hit the First Army, whose G-2, Colonel Dickson, had angrily refused to allow an OSS Detachment on his turf. A careful discussion of the information and analysis at First Army in December 1944 is in David W. Hogan Jr., *A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943–1945* (Washington, DC: US Army, Center of Military History, 2000), 205–11.
 48. See for example Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, 563–6. Hinsley discusses the evidence and judges that "the Sigint [signals intelligence] was not conclusive." For a different point of view, see Murray and Millett, *War to Be Won*, 464, citing the indicators that should have put SHAEF on alert.
 49. Casey, *Secret War*, 184.
 50. Persico, *Casey*, 69. See also Casey, *Secret War*, 184–5. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 271, is an overview from Donovan's perspective. According to Bruce's diary, he was in France during the Battle of the Bulge. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 201.
 51. Quoted in Persico, *Casey*, 66. Lord would go on to obtain a law degree from Yale but would spend most of his life writing bestselling history books, including *A Night to Remember* (1955), about the *Titanic*.
 52. Casey, *Secret War*, 185.
 53. Persico, *Casey*, 70; Casey, *Secret War*, 185. See also Foot, *SOE*, 206–7. The Soviets had run a productive network known as the Red Orchestra inside Germany earlier in the war. By 1944, they apparently had few, if any, well-placed spies inside the Reich. See for example Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 276–7.

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54. Casey, *Secret War*, 188, 194–5.
55. Casey, *Secret War*, 186–93; Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 541–5.
56. Persico, *Casey*, 75. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 544–5, describes the luxurious accommodations.
57. In charge of SI for ETO, Casey oversaw detachments that were now in France but had originated in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MEDTO), like Henry Hyde's. Casey gave Hyde a good deal of latitude in running his own operations. From its base in Bari, Italy, OSS MEDTO ran operations from Italy into Austria. See Tofte to Casey, "S.I. Operations against Germany & Austria," Dec. 26, 1944, reproduced in Casey, *Secret War*, 259–62.
58. Casey, *Secret War*, 198. The final total for all OSS penetrations into Germany in 1945 was on the order of one hundred missions. [Casey], "Final Report."
59. [Casey], "Final Report."
60. "Remarks of William J. Casey . . . before the OSS/Donovan Symposium," Sept. 19, 1986, ERR, accessed Feb. 15, 2021, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88G01116R000500550009-8.pdf>.
61. [Casey], "Final Report."
62. Douglas Waller, *Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors Who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015), 379, is an account based on Casey's reports and letters home in 1945. Casey, *Secret War*, 211–3 is the same story, written years later.
63. [Casey], "Final Report."
64. Persico, *Casey*, 68, 86.

19: Allen Dulles's Nearly Private War

1. Lankford, ed., *OSS against the Reich*, 195.
2. On Dulles's background see James Srodes, *Allen Dulles: Master of Spies* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999) and Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994). See also Waller, *Disciples* and Stephen Kinzer, "When a C.I.A. Director Had Scores of Affairs," *New York Times*, Nov. 10, 2012. Allen's sister Eleanor famously commented that he had had at least one hundred extramarital affairs in his lifetime.
3. Srodes, *Dulles*, 230.
4. Allen W. Dulles, *The Secret Surrender* (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2006), 14–15.
5. Mayer had been a COI officer before the public information function had been hived off.
6. Bancroft, *Autobiography*, 129. Chapter 17 of Bancroft's memoir is the source of the information in this paragraph. While she writing many years after the fact, she was able to obtain access to some of her reports as well as letters and journals. She includes the text of at least one letter from Dulles in the book. Bancroft's extensive 1979 and 1980 oral history is generally

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- consistent with her autobiography. [Mary Bancroft], “The Reminiscences of Mary Bancroft,” Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 2001.
7. Srodes, *Dulles*, 229, quoting another tenant.
 8. Dulles appears to have had an inkling that his relationship with Bancroft was inappropriate, even by the standards of the day. He commented that he planned to keep her salary low for the sake of appearances in case of an investigation after the war. Bancroft, *Autobiography*, 137.
 9. Bancroft, *Autobiography*, 148.
 10. Prussia had its own police forces, including both regular and political police, which were absorbed into the Third Reich’s security apparatus.
 11. Bancroft, *Autobiography*, 164; Allen W. Dulles, *Germany’s Underground: The Anti-Nazi Resistance* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2000), 129. A carefully sourced biographical sketch is in Prof. Peter Hoffmann’s introduction to the 1998 edition of Hans B. Gisevius, *To the Bitter End: An Insider’s Account of the Plot to Kill Hitler, 1933–1944* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), vii–xi.
 12. Jeffery, *MI6*, 380–2. The agent was Halina Szymańska, who cultivated Gisevius as an asset, obtaining information that was “very sound.” The excerpts Jeffery quotes seem too general to have been particularly useful, especially when compared to Ultra or Magic. For a different but unsourced view, see Nigel West, *MI6*, 116–7, which has Admiral Canaris sending Gisevius to Bern to transmit “top-grade political intelligence” to London through Szymańska. Canaris was director of the Abwehr.
 13. Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, 481, meaning a source to exploit.
 14. Dulles stated that Gisevius neither requested nor received any payment or preferential treatment from the US; he was not an OSS agent. Dulles, *Germany’s Underground*, 128.
 15. There was a loose gentleman’s agreement between OSS and MI6 not to poach each other’s agents but to share information of mutual interest.
 16. Dulles’s tradecraft was at best adequate. He liked to make fun of Donovan for not keeping track of secret documents, but Dulles’s own habit of holding secret meetings at home with multiple sources was an invitation to disaster, one that, thankfully, was apparently never accepted. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 118–9. Dulles used a variety of means to communicate with Washington that, by his own admission, included less than secure telephone links. The Swiss provided a scrambler, which meant that they, and probably the Germans, could intercept his calls. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 16–17, is his general description of communications challenges. Dulles, *Germany’s Underground*, 130–1, elaborates on the compromise reported by Gisevius, and notes that no one was betrayed by a message originating in Bern.
 17. Bancroft, *Autobiography*, 164. The manuscript would eventually be published as Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, in German and English as well as other European languages.
 18. Bern to Washington (2–133), Jan. 27, 1944, in Neal H. Petersen, ed., *From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles*,

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- 1942–1945 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 205–6.
19. See for example Nicholas Stargardt, *The German War: A Nation under Arms, 1939–1945* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), a compelling exploration of German behavior during the war. Peter Hoffmann, *German Resistance to Hitler* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), is a classic overview of the Resistance.
 20. Bern to Washington (2–134), Jan. 27, 1944, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 206–7.
 21. See for example Mauch, *Shadow War*, 50, citing messages from Washington to Bern.
 22. The policy was first announced in early 1943. Originally published in 1974, Anne Armstrong, *Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of Casablanca Policy on World War II* (Chicago: Barakaldo eBooks, 2020), is a thorough if somewhat dated discussion. Chapter 1 discusses Roosevelt's views.
 23. Bern to Washington, Apr. 7, 1944, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 264–5. A summary of Dulles's early reporting is Magruder to Berle, May 17, 1944, in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers*, 1944, General, vol. 1, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1966), doc. 280 (hereinafter cited as *FRUS: Diplomatic Papers*).
 24. Bern to Washington (4–16), Jul. 13, 1945, and Bern to Washington, Jul. 15, 1944, both in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 331–5. The policy of unconditional surrender arguably worked to Hitler's advantage, motivating some Germans to fight on. But it was only one factor among many. Hitler's hold on Germany would remain strong until the day of his death. See Stargardt, *German War*, 482–544.
 25. Dulles, *Germany's Underground*, 131–2; Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, 483.
 26. Leahy, *I Was There*, 249.
 27. “The Breakers connection was established in order to secure intelligence[,] and for more than a year this contact has proven itself to be a real value to us.” Bern to London, Jul. 26, 1944, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 349–50.
 28. See for example Magruder to Berle, May 17, 1944, and Donovan to SecState, Jul. 18, 1944, in *FRUS: Diplomatic Papers*, 1944, General, vol. 1, docs. 280 and 301.
 29. See for example Bern to Washington, Jul. 22, 1944, and Jul. 24, 1944, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 341–2, 346–8.
 30. See for example Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 17.
 31. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 317. OSS reports became dead letters, especially when the president was traveling and only a limited number of messages could be sent forward. Boyd, *Hitler's Japanese Confidant*, 103.
 32. Shepardson to Bern, Apr. 28, 1943 quoted in Srodes, *Dulles*, 268–9. Many in G-2 would have scoffed at anything that came from OSS; Shepardson added that OSS still had complete confidence in Dulles.

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33. Shepardson to Dulles, Jan. 25, 1944, quoted in Grose, *Gentleman Spy*, 189.
34. See for example West, *MI6*, 224–5. In the Venlo incident the Germans dangled supposed anti-Nazi conspirators.
35. The best account of this case is one of the earliest: Anthony Quibble, “Alias George Wood,” *Studies in Intelligence* 10, no. 1 (Winter 1966). See also Lucas Delattre, *Betraying Hitler: The Story of Fritz Kolbe, the Most Important Spy of the Second World War* (London: Atlantic Books, 2005) and Greg Bradsher, “A Time to Act: The Beginning of the Fritz Kolbe Story, 1900–1943,” *Prologue* 34, no. 1 (Spring 2002).
36. Quibble, “Alias George Wood,” 70.
37. Bern to London, Aug. 21, 1943, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler’s Doorstep*, 106–7.
38. Dansey is described in Lawrence D. Stokes, “Secret Intelligence and Anti-Nazi Resistance: The Mysterious Exile of Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus,” *International History Review* 28, no. 1 (2006): 59–61. See also Jeffery, *MI6*, 58.
39. This allegation originated with Gisevius before he started working closely with Dulles. Jeffery, *MI6*, 511.
40. Philby, *My Silent War*, 92–96.
41. This was both a means for checking earlier work—the original text confirmed that the Ultra methods were working—and for breaking into messages that had not been decrypted.
42. Quibble, “Alias George Wood,” 75.
43. Norman Pearson to David Bruce, Nov. 23, 1943, quoted in Delattre, *Betraying Hitler*, 128–30.
44. Quibble, “Alias George Wood,” 76.
45. McCormack’s attitude toward other American agencies could be blistering. After listing OSS among them, he criticized “the penchant of certain agencies to bring forth a stream of classified reports . . . that are not much more than irresponsible guesswork.” Alfred McCormack, “Origins, Functions, and Problems of the Special Branch, MIS,” Apr. 15, 1943, 25, SRH 116, NCML.
46. The British would eventually unmask the ambassador’s butler, who was stealing documents from his safe at home and selling them to the Germans. Jeffery, *MI6*, 503–4. The Germans did not entirely trust the source, whom they codenamed “Cicero.” They paid him well, giving him the enormous sum of 200,000 pounds sterling—but in counterfeit notes. He was arrested when he tried to use them after the war.
47. Bern to Washington, Dec. 29, 1943, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler’s Doorstep*, 185–6.
48. Delattre, *Betraying Hitler*, 166–7. OSS chose to highlight the atmospheric on life in Germany for Roosevelt—Kolbe’s impressions—rather than conclusions based on the documents he passed.
49. It is unclear whether this was a formal review or a cable-by-cable exercise, or both. Brown, *Last Hero*, 280, reports that McCormack worked as part of

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- a panel that included General Strong of G-2 and James Murphy, the head of OSS/X-2.
50. Quoted in Delattre, *Betraying Hitler*, 170.
 51. Quibble, "Alias George Wood," 82, 86. McCormack successfully took control of the dissemination of Wood's material with exceptions for dissemination to the White House and the Secretary of State.
 52. Bern to Washington, Feb. 16, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 449.
 53. Bancroft, *Autobiography*, 134. Dulles would remain in touch with both Gisevius and Kolbe after the war, helping them to the extent possible.
 54. Donovan to Roosevelt, Dec. 1, 1944, quoted in Delattre, *Betraying Hitler*, 195–6.
 55. Roosevelt to Donovan, n.d., quoted in Delattre, *Betraying Hitler*, 196.
 56. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 58.
 57. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 62.
 58. This was the Vessel case, supposedly vetted by the OSS Reporting Board before Donovan's office forwarded reports to Roosevelt in January and February 1945. Brown, *Last Hero*, 683–703; Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 298–302.
 59. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 64.
 60. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 73.
 61. Bern to Washington, Mar. 5, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 462–4.
 62. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 79.
 63. Quoted in Allen W. Dulles and Gero von Gaevernitz, "The First German Surrender, The End of the Italian Campaign," May 22, 1945, 8 in Operation Sunrise, Box 8, Entry A 1190, RG 226, NARA II. See also Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, esp. 56, essentially a later, longer version of the 1945 report.
 64. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 76.
 65. Bern to Washington, London, Paris, and Caserta, Mar. 9, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 467–9. Dulles wrote later that Wolff's morals mattered less than his ability to bring about a surrender. Dulles and Gaevernitz, "The First German Surrender," 8.
 66. Bern to Washington, et al., Mar. 9, 1945.
 67. Some of the evidence is circumstantial, from the way in which the incoming messages were edited and forwarded, over Donovan's signature, to the White House. See for example the OSS file "Germany Sunrise 16,107," esp. 24–37, accessed Mar. 18, 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100460004-0.pdf>. See also Casey, *Secret War*, 200–1.
 68. Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 442.
 69. Leahy, *I Was There*, 334.
 70. Bern to London, Apr. 3, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 488–9.
 71. The radio operator was Vaclav Hradecky, a Czech in his midtwenties who spoke perfect German. He had been a prisoner of the SS at Dachau, where

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- he was starved and beaten. He carried an OSS radio, transmission schedule, and one-time pad with him to Italy. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 120–1; Bern to Caserta, Apr. 13, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 499.
72. Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, 439–40.
73. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 265. See also Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 318–9.
74. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 122–3.
75. Casey, *Secret War*, 200–1.
76. Srodes, *Dulles*, 187, describes them as friendly acquaintances but not friends, and concludes that Dulles irritated Donovan.
77. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 123.
78. Bern to Caserta, Apr. 18, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 501–2.
79. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 129.
80. Putzell [OSS executive officer] to Conway [Truman's secretary], Apr. 19, 1945, in “Germany Sunrise 16,107.”
81. JCS to OSS, Apr. 20, 1945 in “Germany Sunrise 16,107”; Bern to Washington, Apr. 21, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 508–9.
82. Bern to Washington, Apr. 21, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 508–9.
83. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 139–40.
84. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 142.
85. Bern to Caserta and Washington, Apr. 24, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 511–2.
86. Smith and Agarossi, *Operation Sunrise*, 144. See also Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 163.
87. Bern to Washington, Apr. 27, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 515–6.
88. Paris to Washington, May 6, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 520–1.
89. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 209, 217–8.
90. Lemnitzer to Donovan, May 15, 1945, in “Germany Sunrise, 16,107.”
91. Paris to Washington, May 6, 1945, in Petersen, ed., *Hitler's Doorstep*, 520–1.
92. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 218. The OSS War Report elaborated on this argument. Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, 255.
93. See for examples: Murray and Millett, *A War to Be Won*, and Smith and Agarossi, *Operation Sunrise*, esp. 3–7.
94. Though Dulles made no commitments to Wolff, the SS general did benefit from Sunrise. He was not one of the accused but a witness at Nuremberg. In 1949 he was given a light sentence after denazification hearings in the British zone of occupation. In those proceedings, he benefited from affidavits by Dulles and others who described his role in Sunrise. In 1964, he was tried by a West German court for his complicity in the Holocaust and sent to prison. Smith and Agarossi, *Secret Surrender*, 188–91. A more recent article makes the dubious case that Dulles was part of a conspiracy to shield Wolff. Kerstin von Lingen, “Conspiracy of Silence: How the ‘Old Boys’ of American Intelligence Shielded SS General Karl Wolff from Prosecution,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 22, no. 1 (Spring 2008).
95. Dulles, *Secret Surrender*, 218–9.

20: When Doing “Swell Work” Wasn’t Enough

1. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 90–91. See also Burns, *Quest for Cryptologic Centralization*, esp. 14–28.
2. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 134.
3. Strong would die on January 11, 1946, after an operation. “Maj. Gen. Strong, G-2 Ex-Head, Dies,” *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1946.
4. “Gen. Bissell Heads Army Intelligence,” *New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1944.
5. McCormack, “War Experience,” SRH 185, 33–36. Much the same description of the Bissell briefings would surface in a newspaper column, perhaps stemming from an intentional leak. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, “An American Secret Service,” *Washington Post*, Jan. 13, 1946. Stewart Alsop served in OSS during the war.
6. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 143–8. The relationship between the codebreaking and intelligence staffs remained a contentious issue throughout the war. On July 1, 1943, after a number of name changes, what had been Friedman’s SIS became known as the Signal Security Agency (SSA) but remained under the Signal Corps. In late 1944, the SSA came under the operational control of the G-2 but remained under the administrative control of the Corps. On September 15, 1945, this cumbersome arrangement ended as the director of Military Intelligence assumed full control of the SSA, which was renamed the Army Security Agency (ASA). This meant that that codebreakers and intelligence officers were finally in the same chain of command. G-2, “The Achievements of the Signal Security Agency in World War II,” Feb. 20, 1946, 7–9, SRH 349, NCML.
7. McCormack, “War Experience,” SRH 185, 47–53. As director of intelligence, McCormack continued to produce his Magic Summaries, but his influence was waning. By June 1945, Bissell had had enough of outsiders like McCormack and his lawyers; he decreed that henceforth he would only take in regular officers. Bissell, “Officer Replacement Policy,” Jun. 13, 1945 in SRH 141, NCML.
8. Quoted in Benson, *History of U.S. Communication Intelligence*, 146.
9. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, 604, 607. Dewey claimed that at least twelve senators knew the whole story about the codes and Pearl Harbor. Carter Clarke, “Statement for Record of Participation of Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke, GSC, in the Transmittal of Letters from Gen. George C. Marshall to Gov. Thomas E. Dewey,” [1944?], SRH 043, NCML. See also William S. White, “Marshall Says Dewey Kept Code Secret out of Politics,” *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1945. Marshall mentioned additional concerns about “Washington ‘whispering’” after the Yamamoto shootdown.
10. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, 604.
11. The main source for this story is Clarke’s “Statement for Record.” It is buttressed by David Kahn, “Carter W. Clarke Interview,” Dec. 6, 1963, David Kahn Archive, NCML. Clarke did not hesitate to faithfully execute his

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- orders even though he would almost certainly have chosen Dewey over the president he called “the old con man.” Clarke to Kahn, Feb. 3, 1987, David Kahn Archive.
12. Carter, “Statement for Record.”
 13. Marshall to Dewey, Sept. 27, 1944, reprinted in Kahn, *Codebreakers*, 605–7.
 14. See Kahn, *Reader of Gentlemen’s Mail*, 161–2. Yardley’s first book, *The American Black Chamber*, revealed the secrets of his work against Japanese codes in the 1920s and sold so well that he wanted to write a sequel.
 15. Quoted in Kahn, *Codebreakers*, 608.
 16. This complicated story is told clearly in Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 157–9.
 17. See for example: Stimson Diary, entry for Nov. 10, 1943. In April 1945, Stimson would side with army leadership against Donovan’s plans. David F. Rudgers, *Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943–1947* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 194.
 18. Quoted in Rudgers, *Secret State*, 19–20; Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 218–9. Apparently requested by Walter Bedell Smith, then chief of staff to Eisenhower, Donovan’s paper was a think piece intended to help Smith envision the postwar military.
 19. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 220.
 20. Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 222.
 21. Carter to Roosevelt, Oct. 26, 1944, Donovan Folder, Box 153, PSF, FDRL.
 22. Roosevelt to Donovan, Oct. 31, 1944, Donovan Folder, Box 153, PSF, FDRL. See also Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 226.
 23. Donovan to Roosevelt, Nov. 18 1944, Donovan Folder, Box 153, PSF, FDRL.
 24. Phillips Payson O’Brien, *The Second Most Powerful Man in the World: The Life of Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff* (New York: Dutton, 2019).
 25. Roosevelt made this clear in more than one way. In December 1944, when he created the five-star rank for America’s leading admirals and generals, Leahy was first on the list, followed by Marshall, King, MacArthur, and Nimitz.
 26. Leahy, *I Was There*, 189.
 27. O’Brien, *Second Most Powerful Man*, 378–9, overstates the case, but only slightly.
 28. O’Brien, *Second Most Powerful Man*, 377; see also chapters 12 and 14 prior.
 29. FDR to WDL, Nov. 22, 1944, Donovan Folder, Box 153, PSF, FDRL.
 30. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 225, 253.
 31. Quoted in Burns, *Quest for Cryptologic Centralization*, 18–19.
 32. Benson, *History of U.S. Communications Intelligence*, 136–8. The ANCIB was empowered to coordinate navy and army plans and operations, formulate joint agreements, and negotiate with other intelligence organizations.
 33. Walter Trohan, “New Deal Plans Super Spy System, Sleuths Would Snoop on U.S. and the World,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Feb. 9, 1945. The second half of this article reprinted Donovan’s Nov. 18, 1944, memorandum. The story

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- also appeared in the affiliated *Washington Times-Herald*, whose version Donovan read at home that morning. Rudgers, *Secret State*, 25–27; Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 304–5.
34. Walter Trohan, “Super-Spy Ideas Denounced as New Deal OGPU,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Feb. 10, 1945; Walter Trohan, “Army Submits Own Plans for Super-Spy Unit, Opposes Control by Donovan Agency,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Feb. 11, 1945. The affiliated *Washington Times-Herald* played the story down somewhat, but kept it above the fold on the front page. Walter Trohan, “Army, Navy Want Control of ‘Spy’ Setup; Generals, Admirals Declare War on OSS,” *Washington Times-Herald*, Feb. 11, 1945.
 35. Walter Trohan, *Political Animals: Thirty-Eight Years of Washington-Watching by the Chicago Tribune’s Veteran Observer* (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 3–5, describes McCormick. This was not the *Tribune*’s first story to expose sensitive information. In the mistaken belief that censors had cleared it, the *Tribune* had run stories after Midway touting US foreknowledge of Japanese plans—and then blindly defended its action as an assertion of First Amendment rights. See Elliott Carlson, *Stanley Johnston’s Blunder: The Reporter Who Spilled the Secret behind the U.S. Navy’s Victory at Midway* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017).
 36. Donovan to JCS, Feb. 15, 1945, quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 258–9.
 37. Rudgers, *Secret State*, 29. Trohan’s claim is reported in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, vi. Troy met and corresponded with Trohan about the leak. Trohan and Early had known each other for years—at least since 1934—and were on reasonably good terms. Trohan, *Political Animals*, 201. When Early died at an early age, Trohan literally wrote his obituary. Walter Trohan, “A Great American Passes,” *Carbuilder*, October 1951. In the February 9 story (“New Deal Plans Super Spy System, Sleuths Would Snoop on U.S. and the World”), Trohan claimed to have obtained Donovan’s memorandum on February 8. This was when Early was at Yalta. If he leaked the documents to Trohan, he would have done so (or arranged to do so) before he left. See also Linda Lotridge Levin, *The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen T. Early, America’s First Modern Press Secretary* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), chapter 23.
 38. “Franklin D. Roosevelt: Day by Day,” entry for Mar. 15, 1945, accessed Apr. 22, 2021, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/daylog/march-15th-1945/>. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 312–3. Roosevelt commented to the press that they had not discussed Donovan’s plans. Press Summary, Page 74, Part 3, Donovan File, accessed Apr. 30, 2021, <https://vault.fbi.gov/William%20J%20Donovan%20/William%20J%20Donovan%20Part%203%20of%207/view>.
 39. Lubin to Roosevelt, Apr. 4, 1945, and Roosevelt to Donovan, Apr. 5, 1945, Donovan Folder, Box 153, PSF, FDRL; Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 313–4. Waller notes that this was a bold bureaucratic move, another end run by Donovan.

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40. The results of the poll emerged from a meeting of cabinet officers on April 12 and constituted a lukewarm endorsement for a postwar intelligence agency, a topic they wanted to defer until after the war. Rudgers, *Secret State*, 31. A survey by the House Appropriations Committee in late spring, apparently a reaction to the Trohan articles, brought confirmation from MacArthur and Nimitz that OSS was not active in their theaters, a mixed endorsement from the Joint Chiefs, and positive reviews from CBI, ETO, and MEDTO, the commands where OSS had been most active. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 283.
41. Richard E. Schroeder, *The Foundation of the CIA: Harry Truman, the Missouri Gang, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2017), 84.
42. Rudgers, *Secret State*, 35. On April 30, Donovan forwarded another copy of his November 18 memorandum to the White House.
43. “World Bank,” *Washington Post*, Jun. 20, 1946, records the tale that, when Smith offered to resign, Roosevelt told him he was so indispensable that he would assign a marine guard to make sure that he did not leave government service.
44. Harry S. Truman, *1945: Year of Decisions* (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1955), 98–99.
45. Truman Memorandum, May 12, 1945, quoted in Schroeder, *Foundation of the CIA*, 80. This was a refrain during the Truman presidency; no part of American intelligence should function like the Gestapo, especially not the FBI. See for example Weiner, *Enemies*, 134.
46. Truman wanted contact with Hoover to come through the attorney general or Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan, a longtime associate who served as military aide to the president. This was a demotion for Hoover. Though not a Roosevelt intimate, he had had direct access to FDR.
47. [FBI], “Bureau Memo,” May 2, 1945, 80, part 3, Donovan File, accessed Apr. 30, 2021, <https://vault.fbi.gov/William%20J%20Donovan%20/William%20J%20Donovan%20Part%203%20of%207/view>. Biddle briefed Hoover’s deputy, Edward Tamm, who apparently created the memo.
48. Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 270. Donovan’s authorized biographer, Richard Dunlop, records a version of this meeting that is flattering to Donovan but not to Truman, who reportedly thanked Donovan for his wartime service before lecturing him. Dunlop, *Donovan*, 468. Dunlop quotes a full paragraph of the lecture without sourcing.
49. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 270.
50. See for example: Donovan to Truman, Aug. 25, 1945, in C. T. Thorne Jr. and D. S. Patterson, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington, DC: Department of State / US Government Printing Office, 1996), doc. 3.
51. A copy of the report and related documents is in OSS/Donovan Folder, Rose A. Conway Files, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), available at:

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- <https://www.scribd.com/doc/284321062/Park-Report-Memorandum-for-the-Record-Colonel-Park-s-Comments-on-OSS-Declassified-Top-Secret-Report-12-March-1945> (accessed Apr. 26, 2021). Clayton Bissell, “Memorandum for the Record,” Mar. 12, 1945, records that Park presented the report to him and that Bissell thought it inappropriate to comment. Park signed an undated memorandum claiming that Roosevelt had commissioned the report. Handwritten dates on the report itself are 12/44 and 3/30/45, suggesting that it might have been compiled in December 1944 and delivered to the White House on or about March 30, 1945. FBI files reference a version dated Apr. 13, 1945. File Summary, 77, Part 3, Donovan File, accessed Apr. 30, 2021, <https://vault.fbi.gov/William%20J%20Donovan%20/William%20J%20Donovan%20Part%203%20of%207/view>. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 335–6, concludes that Donovan rival John Grombach played a major role in compiling the report.
52. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 282, points out the overlap between Trohan’s stories and the Park Report. Trohan overstated the case somewhat. MacArthur resisted intelligence operations of any kind that were not under his control. Nimitz generally cooperated with national assets, and was willing to consider the use of OSS. The only part of Asia where OSS was actively committed remained CBI.
 53. “Army Used ‘Reds,’ House Group Told,” *New York Times*, Jul. 19, 1945.
 54. It was not for lack of trying. With Donovan’s approval, Colonel Eifler had a far-fetched plan to run operations against Japan with Korean commandos. *NAPKO Project of OSS*; Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 216–32. OSS Bern was also monitoring possible Japanese peace feelers in Europe from May to August 1946. Petersen, ed., *Hitler’s Doorstep*, 523–4.
 55. Richard B. Frank, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2001), esp. 104–7, 211–3, 238. Frank devotes much of the book to the role of diplomatic—Magic—and military—Ultra—traffic. Originally used by the British for German decrypts, the US adopted the Ultra designation and used it in the Pacific, especially late in the war.
 56. See Frank, *Downfall*, esp. 257, 343, 348; Max Hastings, *Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944–45* (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 444–81. The Japanese government could have prevented the bombing of Nagasaki by promptly surrendering after the bombing of Hiroshima. But it was not yet prepared to do so. See also Truman, *1945*, 420–1.
 57. Op-20–3-G50, “Japan’s Surrender Maneuvers,” Aug. 29, 1945, SRH 090, NCML.
 58. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 332.
 59. Truman, *1945*, 437.
 60. Truman, *1945*, 484, 486–7, enumerating some of the agencies affected.
 61. Rudgers, *Secret State*, 35, 41–2.
 62. Bess Furman and Tillman Durdin, “U.S. Cloak and Dagger Exploits and Secret Blows in China Bared,” *New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1945.

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63. Meyer Berger, "Wainwright Tells of Long Captivity," *New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1945; "OSS 'Underground Railway' Plan Saved U.S. Fliers in Axis Areas," *New York Times*, Sept. 16, 1945. At great risk to themselves, small OSS detachments entered prisoner-of-war camps after V-E and V-J Days and began the process of liberating Allied prisoners of war. See example Hilsman, *American Guerrilla*, 229–36.
64. Forrest Davis, "The Secret History of a Surrender," *Saturday Evening Post*, September 22, 1945.
65. Donovan to Truman, Sept. 13, 1945, reprinted in Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA under Harry Truman* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 3. Donovan's memo of Sept. 4, 1945, to senior White House advisor Judge Samuel Rosenman denounced Budget Director Smith's plans as "absurd" and lectured Rosenman: "it's time for us to grow up . . . and realize that the new responsibilities we have . . . require an adequate intelligence system." Donovan to Rosenman, Sept. 4, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, ed., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 6.
66. Smith Diary, entry for Sept. 13, 1945, quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 296.
67. Other agencies were liquidated in September as well, including the War Refugee Board and the Office of War Information, many of whose employees had started in OSS. The Joint Chiefs wanted more time to study the order—as well as demanding prompt action! Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 300–1.
68. Leahy to Stimson and Forrestal, Sept. 19, 1945, in Warner, ed., *CIA under Harry Truman*, 5–9. The document was to be routed through the Navy and War secretaries to the president.
69. Leahy to Stimson and Forrestal, Sept. 19, 1945, in Warner, ed., *CIA under Harry Truman*, 5–9.
70. A copy of the executive order is in Warner, ed., *CIA under Harry Truman*, 11–13.
71. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 302, quoting from Smith's diary.
72. Truman to Byrnes, Sept. 20, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 20.
73. Stone to Smith, Sept. 20, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 16. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 338, has Donovan leaving town so that he would not be at his desk when the memo arrived. Dunlop, *Donovan*, 473, has an alternate version, reporting that Stone delivered the message to Donovan, who accepted it with "stoic grace."

21: An End and a Beginning

1. Ramsey to Martin, Sept. 24, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, ed., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 18. According to Ramsey, it was an

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- oversight that the executive order allowed only ten days to liquidate OSS, rather than the three or four weeks recommended earlier. OSS was not the only agency liquidated in September 1945.
2. Like McCormack, McCarthy was a wartime phenomenon. He joined the army when France collapsed in 1940 and had a brilliant five-year career in Washington, rising to the rank of colonel. Like Marshall, he was a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute. He was at State from August to October 1945. After leaving Washington, he went on to an equally brilliant career as a filmmaker, eventually producing the film *Patton*.
 3. Washington to London, Sept. 12, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 73.
 4. MacPherson, *American Intelligence in War-Time London*, 134–5, even disputes the value of its study of strategic bombing, which is often cited as one of R&A's strengths. Warner, *America's First Intelligence Agency*, 12.
 5. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence*, 29. Most former members of R&A would not stay at State but soon returned to academic pursuits, where they helped stimulate the growth of interdisciplinary research, area studies, and Sovietology, as well as the sense that academics should engage outside the classroom. Katz, "The OSS and the Development of the Research and Analysis Branch" in Chalou, ed., *Secrets War*, 46–47.
 6. See chapter 13 prior. Magruder was on record as favoring an OSS that focused more on intelligence and less on paramilitary operations.
 7. McCloy to Magruder, Sept. 26, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 95.
 8. Rudgers, *Secret State*, 45–46. Some 1,362 former members of the Research and Analysis Branch would shift to State, while 9,028 other members of OSS shifted to War. It appears that many employees did not physically move.
 9. "General William J. Donovan Selected OSS Documents, 1941–1945," n.d., Microfilm Roll List and Index, RG 226, NARA II; Patricia Eames, ed., "OSS Project: General Donovan's Files," Volunteer Ventures, *Record*, May 1998, National Archives, accessed Jun. 5, 2021, <https://www.archives.gov/publications/record/1998/05/oss-project.html>. Eames notes that Donovan's and Putzell's hands and fingerprints literally appear in the frames. In 1945 the line between government and personal papers was not always clear. That Donovan did not delegate the work, and worked at night, suggests that he was aware that this initiative was irregular.
 10. "Donovan Gives Farewell Talk to OSS Crew," *Washington Post*, Sept. 30, 1945.
 11. Dunlop, *Donovan*, 473–4; Waller, *Disciples*, 394–5. On the same day, Donovan sent a letter to the OSS distribution list, enclosing a copy of his farewell address and Truman's letter. He also offered "former members of OSS" a chance to purchase a commemorative lapel pin. Les Hughes, "OSS Veteran's Certificate and Lapel Pin," *Insigne*, 2003, accessed May 7, 2021, <http://www.insigne.org/OSS-pin.htm>.

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12. As the Joint Staff's Ludwell L. Montague stated plainly, "Without William Donovan's initiative, in 1941 and again in 1944, there would have been no Central Intelligence Agency." Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 251.
13. Hoover to Clark, Sept. 6, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 8.
14. Hoover to Clark, Sept. 21, 1945, cover letter of Clark to Truman, draft memorandum, n.d., in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 17.
15. Hoover to Clark, Sept. 27, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 19.
16. Miles to Stone, Sept. 19, 1945, and Appleby to Clark, Oct. 31, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, docs. 11 and 37.
17. Chiles to Hoover, Oct. 2, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 22.
18. See for example Ladd to Hoover, Nov. 5, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 43.
19. Hoover to Vaughan, Nov. 8, 1945, HSTL, National Archives, accessed Apr. 30, 2021, <https://trumanlibrary.gov/node/317534>. Lee's treachery emerged first from the testimony of a 1945 defector. The FBI subsequently worked with the codebreaking establishment to exploit Soviet messages that Arlington Hall systematically collected during World War II and started to analyze in 1943. Robert L. Benson and Michael Warner, eds., *Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939–1957*, (Washington, DC: NSA and CIA, 1996), esp. xiii–xvii.
20. Truman to Byrnes, Sept. 20, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 15. The commonsense reading of Truman's letter is that he simply wanted State to take the lead in developing a plan.
21. The clearest expression of McCormack's ideas is in Rudgers, *Secret State*, esp. 83–87. See also the summary in Souers to Clifford, Dec. 27, 1945, in Warner, ed., *CIA under Harry Truman*, 17–19.
22. Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 335.
23. Rudgers, *Secret State*, 86; T. B. Inglis, "Memorandum for Information," Nov. 2, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 41. Admiral Inglis sat next to McCormack at a lunch.
24. H. Thebaud, "Memorandum for General Marshall and Admiral Leahy," Aug. 22, 1945, National Security Agency, accessed May 10, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/14/2002762212/-1/-1/0/marshall_king_memo.pdf. They included an exception for the FBI, but only for "criminal activities in the U.S." This prohibition was intended to apply to cryptanalytic work and was not apparently a bar to receiving Magic-Ultra reports. In December, State would join the ANCIB and be represented by McCormack.
25. Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 212–3. Smith offers a detailed and readable discussion of these developments.

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26. Claims that Magic and Ultra shortened the war by any given period of months or years are problematic. For discussions of this topic, see Budiansky, *Battle of Wits*, 332–3; Hinsley, “The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War,” in Hinsley and Stripp, eds., *Codebreakers*, 11–13. Hastings, *Secret War*, esp. 544–9, is a useful summing-up of the value of various kinds of intelligence during the war.
27. “Joint Meeting of ANCIB and ANCICC,” Oct. 15, 1945, accessed May 10, 2021, National Security Agency, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/14/2002762210/-1/-1/0/ARMY_NAVY_19451015_MTG.PDF.
28. “Joint Meeting of ANCIB and ANCICC,” Nov. 1, 1945, National Security Agency, accessed May 10, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/14/2002762203/-1/-1/0/ARMY_NAVY_19451101_MTG.pdf. This agreement would be ratified in 1946 and is usually known as “UKUSA.”
29. See for example Smith, *Ultra-Magic Deals*, 210. The author speculates that development of this “long-term intelligence shield” might have made Truman more willing to let OSS go. There is no evidence that this thought did or did not occur to Truman. Unquestionably, King and Marshall placed a much higher premium on Magic and Ultra than on anything OSS ever produced, and registered no objection to the wartime agency’s demise.
30. O’Brien, *Second Most Powerful Man*, 357–8. Specific threats, like the Soviet Union, were apparently not discussed at this time.
31. The Committee would eventually produce 39 volumes of proceedings containing hundreds of exhibits and testimony from 151 witnesses. See Nelson, *Pearl Harbor*, 437–54, and Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, esp. 582–738.
32. Quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 316.
33. Quoted in Rudgers, *Secret State*, 63–64.
34. The process is described in detail in Rudgers, *Secret State*, 47–92, and in even more detail in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 305–49.
35. See for example Ladd to Hoover, Nov. 5, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 43.
36. “Minutes of Meeting,” Nov. 14, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 45.
37. Srodes, *Dulles*, 370. In 1944 Donovan had denied Dulles’s request to coordinate operations in the European theater for much the same reason: he believed that Dulles had been unable to keep a firm grip on OSS Bern as it grew in 1944 and 1945. Srodes, *Dulles*, 316. Lovell, *Of Spies and Stratagems*, 209, is a loosely sourced reference to a postwar meeting between Donovan and Dulles, at which Donovan reportedly told Dulles that he was good at collecting intelligence but should not run an intelligence agency.
38. Magruder to Lovett, n.d., in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 34. Concerns about possible communist infiltration at State appear to have influenced Admiral Leahy’s thinking against that department. O’Brien, *Second Most Powerful Man*, 381. The timing, late November 1945, coincided with the FBI’s continuing

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investigation into Soviet espionage, targeting at least one very prominent officer at State, Alger Hiss.

39. Magruder to Irwin, Jan. 15, 1946, in Warner, ed., *CIA under Harry Truman*, 21–23.
40. Smith to Truman, Nov. 28, 1945, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 58.
41. Miles to Hoelscher, Jan. 3, 1946, Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 65.
42. This process is perfectly described in Schroeder, *Foundation of the CIA*, esp. 85–91.
43. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 344–6, 464–5, describes the process and includes a copy of Truman’s directive.
44. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 346.
45. Smith to Rosenman, Jan. 10, 1946, in Thorne and Patterson, eds., *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, doc. 70.

Epilogue

1. See for example Troy Sacquety, “History in the ‘Raw,’” *Veritas* 5, no. 3 (2009), and Troy Sacquety, “The OSS Influence on Special Forces,” *Veritas* 14, no. 2 (2018). Sacquety does not dispute the tie between OSS and SF, but questions its extent. He also points out that OSS was not the only precursor to SF.
2. See Moon and Eifler, *Deadliest Colonel*, 238–44, 247–68, for Eifler’s own testimony about his postwar years.
3. Persico, *Casey*, 202.
4. “Resignation of Col. McCormack Laid to Reorganization Feud,” *Washington Post*, Apr. 25, 1946. This was a continuation of the feud that started in the fall of 1945 and was not unlike his clashes with army regulars during the war. “Newly Named Intelligence Chief Gets DSM,” *Washington Post*, Nov. 24, 1945, describes his award. In 1947, then secretary of state Marshall would create a standalone Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and place OSS veteran William A. Eddy at its helm.
5. [McCormack], “Biographical Sketch,” 1954, in SRH 185.
6. “Newly Named Intelligence Chief Gets DSM,” *Washington Post*, Nov. 24, 1945.
7. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 345, has the last in a series of three photos of the occasion.
8. Bancroft, *Autobiography of a Spy*, 141, 242–3.
9. Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 349–50, offers a good overview of the transition.
10. SSU would complete a narrative about OSS, which was eventually published as US Office of Strategic Services, *War Report of the OSS* (New York: Walker, 1976). Published the same year, Brown, ed., *Secret War Report*, is a shorter version of the same document with commentary by Brown.

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11. Srodes, *Dulles*, 371–2.
12. Persico, *Casey*, 576.
13. Hoover to Ruth Donovan, Feb. 9, 1959, in Part 7, Donovan File.
14. “J. Edgar Hoover,” accessed Mar. 27, 2022, <https://www.legion.org/distinguishedservicemedal/1946/j-edgar-hoover>. The Legion noted the contrast with World War I, when German agents committed dramatic acts of sabotage like that at Black Tom, New Jersey, in 1916. Hoover would no doubt have welcomed official recognition as well.
15. Quoted in Fagone, *Woman Who Smashed Codes*, 329–30, 333. MacKinnon, “William Friedman’s Bletchley Park Diary,” 4n–5n, refers to the letter from Friedman’s psychiatrist that MacKinnon found among Elizebeth Friedman’s papers citing insomnia, depression, and a struggle with alcohol as his maladies.
16. Fagone, *Woman Who Smashed Codes*, 322–3.
17. Friedman to Clarke, “Personal Correspondence with Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke,” Apr. 23, 1952, National Security Agency, accessed May 23, 2021, https://nsa.gov/Portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/friedmandocuments/correspondence/FOLDER_364/41734719077395.pdf.
18. Clarke to Friedman, Dec. 4, 1950, “Personal Correspondence.” Clarke believed that Donovan had been devious and disorganized. [Forrest Pogue, ed.], “Major General Carter W. Clarke,” Interview, Jul. 6, 1959, G. C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, VA.
19. Clarke Interview, Dec. 6, 1963, David Kahn Papers.
20. Clarke to Kahn, Feb. 3, 1987, David Kahn Papers. Clarke was referring to the state of affairs before the summaries came online.
21. Layton et al., “*And I Was There*.” In addition to describing the Battle of Midway from the Pearl Harbor perspective, Layton’s book contained an unproven allegation: that Roosevelt and Churchill had a secret agreement for America to come to Britain’s aid if Japan attacked her possessions.
22. An admirable summary of the evidence, the context, and the literature is: Tom Johnson, “What Every Cryptologist Should Know about Pearl Harbor,” *Cryptologic Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (September 1987). Safford’s contentions are examined—and discounted to zero—in Robert J. Hanyok, “The Pearl Harbor Warning That Never Was,” *Naval History* 23, no. 2 (April 2009).
23. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort’s War*, 434–7.
24. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort’s War*, 432.
25. See for example Edwin McDowell, “Officer Who Broke Japanese War Codes Gets Belated Honor,” *New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1985.
26. Elizabeth Kastor, “Medal Ends 44-Year Campaign,” *Washington Post*, May 31, 1986.
27. Carlson, *Joe Rochefort’s War*, 455–6.
28. “Alfred McCormack,” editorial, *Washington Post*, July 13, 1956.

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